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Abstract 
 
 
“Of Order and Liberty: Catholic Intellectuals in Argentina and Brazil, 
1930-1980” 
By: 
Travis K. Knoll, M.A 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2015 
SUPERVISOR: Virginia Garrard Burnett 
 
 
This project challenges the historical binary of a revolutionary versus a reactionary 
Church through a comparative case study of right-wing Christian Democrats in Brazil 
and Integralist/Nationalist intellectuals in Argentina. Intellectually, the project centers on 
Jacques Maritain and notable Latin American figures. Such figures include Brazilians 
Alceu Amoroso Lima and Dom Hélder Câmara, and Argentine leaders Julio Meinvielle 
and Leonardo Castellani. The study will argue that these figures’ intellectual stands 
represented diverging paths for each country’s conservative majority, but also shaped 
their respective hierarchies’ reactions to key events in the Catholic  and secular world: the 
Spanish Civil War, World War II, the Second Vatican Council. While anti-Modernists, 
Brazilian intellectuals came to favor pluralist and democratic solutions of Social 
Democracy over and above the organic (and encompassing) visions espoused by Franco’s 
Spain, and subsequently, the Argentine hierarchy. 
This study will analyze major Catholic newspapers and journals, including Criterio, 
Jauja , A Ordem, and O Diario de Belo Horioznte. These sources will give the reader a 
glimpse into the intellectual societies and forums in which these thinkers moved, and will 
more clearly display the distinction mentioned above.  Surprisingly, conservative 
Brazilian papers maintained a vigorous anti-Communist stance, but came to see the 
government as an oppressing force prohibiting the legitimate social actions of the 
Catholic faithful.  
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Argentine intellectuals took a much more ambivalent attitude toward democracy at best, 
and a more hostile one at worst. Julio Meinvielle and Leonardo Castellani from their 
journal Jauja directly challenged the Second Vatican Council, the liberal state, and the 
rights of left-wing dissidents. More generally, Argentine ties to Franco’s Spain through 
the 1970s, as well as to conservative varieties of Peronism, as well as the loss of the 
unifying Gustavo Franceschi (editor of Criterio) in 1957, put the sizable democratic and 
reformist minority firmly outside the good graces of the hierarchy, paving the way for the 
Catholic purges in Argentina of the 1970s.  
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Introduction: A Tale of Two Right Wings 
In October 2013, Catholic and Jewish worshipers in the Cathedral of Buenos Aires 
holding a service remembering the Holocaust suddenly heard shouts accusing them of 
desecrating the space of worship.1 The source of the disturbances was a group of right-
wing Catholics disturbed that rabbis would be allowed in what they considered the most 
sacred space of worship in the sprawling metropolis. Groups of similar ideologies had 
also opposed former-archbishop Jorge Mario Bergoglio (now Pope Francis) for his 
openness to other religious communities, and especially, his stance toward the Jewish 
community in particular. This contrasted with the images of adoring throngs of Catholics, 
both traditionalists and progressives, on the beaches of Rio de Janeiro during Pope 
Francis’ June 2013 trip.  Furthermore, enthusiastic Brazilian bishops praised Pope 
Francis’ new Latin American style through his focus on poverty (clear in his March 2015 
authorization for the cause of Brazil’s Dom Hélder Câmara ) and everyday metaphors to 
explain complex Catholic doctrine. In contrast, the Archbishop closest to his former 
diocese, Hector Aguer of La Plata, kept a guarded silence, perhaps necessary because of 
rumors that Aguer’s sympathizers had always sent concerned letters to Rome about then 
Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio. What factors contributed to this difference in reaction? 
What unifying spiritual and philosophical factors identified the Pope with the faithful of a 
country with a long suspicion of his native land?  
                                                 
1 “Anti-Semitic Group Interrupts Event” Buenos Aires Herald November 13, 2013. 
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These modern-day divergences merely highlight the different developments, but also 
striking similarities, of the Brazilian and Argentine churches over the course of the mid to 
late Twentieth Century. Catholic militants in Argentina and Brazil during the 1930s 
shared a similar philosophical underpinning but diverged in their political responses to 
their respective authoritarian regimes. Brazilian and Argentine intellectuals demonstrated 
philosophical continuity in their rejection of Modernist social constructs and liberal 
conceptions of the “Social Contract.” That said, this work will attempt to show that a 
combination of opposing personalities, hierarchies, and macro-political trajectories 
brought these two similar groups to diametrically opposed views on authoritarianism, 
democracy, and the State’s responsibility to implement Catholic values.  The Brazilian 
Catholic Right (with notable exceptions) embraced Christian Democracy as the best foil 
to Communism. This tolerance-centered vision of a Christian society pushed Catholic 
militants to use the language of development to give cover from dictatorial charges of 
subversion to even their more wayward leftist-brethren within the Catholic fold. This 
position came in spite of their original support for the authoritarian coup of 1964.  
Argentine Catholic militants polarized in the 1930s and 1940s, ideologically defeated the 
“Conciliar” reformist wing of lay intellectuals in the 1950s, and convinced the hierarchy 
in the 1970s and 1980s of the necessity of a hardline against non-Catholics or Catholic 
dissidents, especially in the nationalist coups of 1966 and 1976. Argentine Catholics’ 
support for Nationalist authoritarianism was not unique, but its general silence was 
exceptional in its extremity in South America, especially given the Church’s claim to 
superiority in spiritual affairs. The Brazilian Right’s final political position however, 
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seems ironic given the authoritarian tendencies of Imperial Brazil and the relatively weak 
status that non-state actors held in Brazilian political culture up through the First 
Republic and the early 1920s.  A Brazilian Church with a history of submission and right-
wing militancy ended up championing democracy. An Argentine Church that held such a 
high view of the Church’s spiritual mission and the State’s subservience condoned the 
actions of its priests and devoutly Catholic generals in running torture chambers. But 
why?  
In any comparative history, a careful approach must be employed that compares countries 
in similar stages of development, geographic and cultural proximity (preferred but not 
required), and takes into account the long arch of each entities’ historical trajectory.2 
Macro-historical factors can help partially explain the difference in early Church 
formation and highlight important ironies. Argentina and Brazil, countries so close 
geographically, nevertheless historically diverged with regards to the formation of their 
national identities, their elites, and their colonial relationships. Argentina took the path of 
other vice-royalties of Spain, electing  national independence from Spain after the 
Napoleonic invasions. Brazil on the other hand remained part of Portugal up through 
1822, even receiving the Portuguese court, which fled the Napoleonic invasions in 1808. 
The Church-State relationship in each country also diverged. Jose Murilo de Carvalho 
                                                 
2 Citing March Bloch“Pour une histoire compare des sociétés européennes. In: Mélange Historiques, t. I, 
Paris S.E.V.P.E.N. (1963),17- 19. , Gabriella Pellegrino Soares, "A semear horizontes: leituras literárias na 
formação da infância, Argentina e Brasil (1915-1954)." PhD diss., (São Paulo: Universidade de São Paulo, 
2002), 19-20. Pellegrino Soares’ comparative study analyzed children’s tales in Argentina and Brazil. She 
notes (footnote 12 pg. 19) that archival documentation on editorial policy in Argentina did not equal the 
amount of documentary evidence on the Brazilian side. No such problems exist in this study, as multiple 
major journals and weekly newspapers exist for both countries. 
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points out notable differences based on a colonial heritage of more religious universities. 
The Argentine state took a fairly detached, yet supportive, view of the Church throughout 
the mid-Nineteenth Century period. Even in the case of traditional Church opponents, 
Church-State relationships were complex. I would argue that the Argentine liberals did 
ascribe to a regalism that restricted the official rights of the Church, but in a more 
nuanced fashion than other Latin American counterparts. Liberals in Argentina did not 
draw exclusively on the Bourbons, but rather, on traditional notions of a “popular” 
Patronato. In this turn on agreements between Rome and local governments, the Pope 
merely recognized the principle of, not granted the right to, local and popular 
appointments of bishops. 3 In Brazil the Church was constantly subjected to vigorous 
state control, which followed from its elites’ legally focused training.4 Other scholars 
such as Anthony Gill employ a cost-benefit analysis in analyzing the Church’s support 
for authoritarian regimes but are in many ways anachronistic and ignore long-standing 
intellectual debates in Catholic circles around the issue of political systems.5 
                                                 
3 See: Roberto Di Stefano, El púlpito y la plaza: Clero, sociedad y política, de la monarquía católica a la 
república rosista (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI Editores Argentina S.A, 2004), 233. 
4 José Murilo de Carvalho, A construção da ordem: A elite política imperial 6º edição (Rio de Janeiro: 
Civilização Brasileira,2011),39-40. Carvalho argues that the Brazilian elite, because of their homogeneity 
of education in Coimbra, were able to escape much of the radicalization and differing opinions of their 
Spanish counterparts. In this sense then, the Brazilian state was “more organized, more cohesive, and 
perhaps more powerful.” (40). The centralization of the Catholic elite in Brazil during the 1930s would 
reflect this general national tendency. 
 
5 See: Anthony Gill, Rendering unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and the State in Latin America 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 96-97. Anthony Gill posits that competition from Protestants 
among the working class prompted episcopates like Brazil to embrace a preferential option for the poor to 
retain parishioners. This thesis is problematic, as most scholars agree that the serious growth of 
Protestantism began around the 1970s, meaning that the beginnings of serious opposition to the coup 
(beginning in the 1965-1967 period) preceded the serious decline in Catholic followers that Gill guesses 
caused said resistance. While Gill points to debates occurring in the 1950s around the rise of Protestant 
communities, and while newspapers did indeed condemn Protestant evangelism, religious tolerance had 
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Both societies however had striking similarities that draw attention to their divergences. 
Both countries passed through the 18th Century diffusion of Enlightenment principles, 
albeit in a more socially conservative form than their French counterparts. Both suffered 
monarchical crises due to the Napoleonic conquests as well as Iberian moves to 
consolidate the empire and throw off some of the more traditional protections of empire. 
The Brazilian society of the 18th and 19th Century relied on classic notions of social order 
(that often precluded modern industrialization like that of the Prussians and English) to 
maintain a tight-knit group of bureaucratic elites in power, even as they embraced a 
modernist paradigm in their pursuits of European science and philosophy.6 Similarly, 
Argentine independence leaders held a conservative vision of the 1810 May Revolution 
as, among other economic factors, a chance to protect traditional colonial values from the 
encroachment of increasing Enlightenment Bourbon Spanish governance and against a 
potential French conquest.7  
These respective traditions informed the Catholic intelligencia during the mid-20th 
Century. On one hand, the Brazilian intellectuals found themselves influenced by their 
traditional support of “organic” societies and suspicion of “contractual” conceptions of 
                                                 
already entered into Brazilian Catholic circles by the mid-1950s, before John XXIIIs endorsement. 
Historians cannot rule out that Catholic militants to boost their own following, overstated Protestant gains 
pre-1970. Gill’s thesis also ignores the fact that many of the key figures to the military regime in 1964 had 
been integralists caught up in the social question as far back as 1930. 
6 José Murilo de Carvalho, A construção da ordem, 40,43. C 
7 This viewpoint is controversial. The traditional historiotraphy of the May Revolution has emphasized the 
conflict between the “imagined” criollo communities and the peninsular Spanish bureaucrats.  Revisionist 
historians such as Enrique Díaz Araujo however, emphasize that the context around the independence 
movement included a conservative elite that embraced an explicit (as opposed to an implicit) social based 
on the Spanish monarch as  opposed to the Enlightenment concepts that the Bourbons had been slowly 
embracing and which the Cadiz Court a year later would codify. Enrique Díaz Araujo, Mayo Revisado (La 
Plata: Editorial UCALP, 2010), 80,87,94,108. 
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citizen rights, something that had become much starker after the resurgence of the 
hierarchy post 1916. Nevertheless these intellectuals followed the lead of the US-
pressured Vargas regime redemocratizing in 1945, possibly reflecting the Brazilian 
Church’s residual tendency to seek a certain accommodation with the state.8 On the other 
hand, Argentine intellectuals, slightly more divided and  isolated from democratic 
governance, and passing through a period of military (1943-1945) and populist (1945-
1951) rule, found themselves leaning more toward the Catholic authoritarianism of the 
Iberian regimes. Such tendencies appropriated the discourse of the Counter-Reformation,. 
As far back as the 17th Century, the philosopher Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), had 
influenced the Jesuits at the University of Cordoba and held that natural law, that is, the 
order of creation ordained by God, was based on concepts such as “authority” and the 
“social body” as the foundation for society. The Jesuit father Pedro de Ribadeneyra 
argued the division between the spiritual and the political did not favor the separation of 
Church and State per se, but rather subordinated the State to the position of enforcer of 
religious doctrine, which the Church interpreted.9 The Argentine tradition of a Church-
centric Patronato, as opposed to a traditionally regalistic concept, therefore lent itself to 
the idea of a confessional Catholic state.10 According to the histories of the two countries 
                                                 
8  Ana Maria Koch, "Cruzada pela democracia: militantes católicos no Brasil republicano." Revista 
Brasileira de História 33, no. 66 (2013): 288. 
9 Silvano G.A. Benito Moya, La Universidad de Córdoba en Tiempos de Reformas (1701-1810) 1ª Ed. 
(Córdoba: Centro de Estudios Históricos Prof. Carlos S.A Segreti, 2011), 332-334. Citing: Pedro de 
Ribadeneyra, Príncipe Cristiano, lib. 1, cap. XIX In: Biblioteca de Autores Españoles, tomo 60 (1868). 
10 Roberto Di Stefano, “El laberinto religiosa de Juan Manuel de Rosas” Anuario de Estudios Americanos 
Vol. 63 Num. 1 (enero-junio 2006): 20. Di Stefano argues that Juan Manuel de Rosas did in fact try to 
implement many of the Church reforms of his liberal predecessors, but mixed these attempts with rhetoric 
favoring traditional Catholicism and a restauration of the various international religious orders that the 
Bourbons and the liberal Argentine governments of the 1820s had suppressed. Regardless, Di Stefano also 
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therefore, it is not surprising that the Argentine circle of intellectuals clearly had a deeper 
history of religious militancy than did their Brazilian counterparts, despite passing 
through a similar wave of Bourbon reform and Liberal isolation. Unlike in Brazil, 
Argentine Catholic intellectuals could count on a reservoir of regional memory and 
understanding that came from the early founding of local religious institutions.  However, 
these various institutions also led to a general lack of political consensus, whereas in 
Brazil, Catholic elites copied the State’s centralizing tendencies in mapping their own 
intellectual networks. This centralization helped the opinions a few particular leaders to 
disproportionately weigh in the public intellectual debate. 
Ultimately, structural and macro-historical narratives can only explain so much however. 
What this paper intends to do is delve into the personalities that shaped, or failed in their 
attempts to shape, the Argentine and Brazilian Catholic debates over the debates over the 
meaning of “order” and “liberty”, democracy and authoritarianism, and Communism 
versus its alternatives.  To fill in the gaps in the comparative frame and explain the 
contradictions mentioned above, this study will analyze Argentina and Brazil within a 
global context in which their various Catholic intellectual communities reacted to 
important world events, such as Mexico’s Cristero Rebellion, the Spanish Civil War, 
World War II, the Second Vatican Council and the Cold War. The study will focus on 
attempts by various intellectuals to either reinterpret, or double down, on traditional 
Catholic historical narratives. In particular, this paper will discuss the impact of one of 
                                                 
asserts that these reform efforts ought to neutralize Rosas’ legacy as a conservative Catholic, replacing that 
reading with one of a leader with a “dead-end” and “contradictory” political strategy. 
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the leading Catholic intellectuals of the 20th Century, Jacques Maritain, a philosophically 
conservative Christian humanist who reinterpreted Thomistic philosophy to allow the 
state to weigh in on issues of morality insofar as they did not violate the conscience of the 
human individual.11 The Brazilian Catholic elite, centralized in the think-tank Centro 
Dom Vital, and in the figure of Alceu Amoroso Lima from the 1930s and 1960s, came to 
embrace Maritain’s philosophy, which provided a Catholic democratic alternative to the 
liberalism that they despised. In Argentina, Catholic intellectuals represented by such 
disparate activists as Leonardo Castellani, Julio Meinvielle, Carlos Sacheri, and Antonio 
Caponnetto, equated social plurality with what they saw as liberal heresy. They rejected 
Maritain’s distinction between the person whose individual success contributed to the 
common good, and the individual, whose success suffered tension with the collective. 
Instead, a person could only thrive where virtue was fully promoted, through the 
confessional state which limited or eliminated errors that liberalism allegedly 
encouraged.12 
Ultimately, this project does not attempt to conduct merely another reinterpretation or 
chronicle of the ideas of the right-wing, but will problematize some of the historical 
                                                 
11 John Hellman, “The Opening of the Left in French Catholicism: The Role of the Personalists” Journal of 
the History of Ideas Vol. 34 Num. 3 (Jul.-Sept. 1973): 384-386. Hellman classifies Maritain as the 
foundation of leftist Catholic thought, but notes that his theological conservatism caused a break with his 
old protégés. This break have caused many scholars to equate Christian Democracy as a conservative, or at 
best, middle-class accomodationist movement. Therefore, Maritain, its intellectual father, becomes a 
reactionary vis-à-vis the socially committed. I fundamentally disagree. Maritain maintained radical 
company, including Saul Alinksy during his stay in the United States, and consistently held a view that was 
critical of the French liberal order that Charles De Gaulle attempted to establish. 
12 These distinctions are not absolute. In Brazil conservative figures such as Gustavo Corção resisted what 
they saw as Alceu Lima’s dangerous conversion to Communist sympathizer. In Argentina, Gustavo 
Franceschi, head of the leading journal Criterio tried to balance lay and hierarchical opinions, and did 
praise Christian democracy, although his version was much more ultramontane than that of Lima’s. 
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binaries underlying much academic discourse surrounding the Catholic Church in the 
twentieth Century. Since the election of the Pontiff a little over two years ago, academics 
have taken a renewed interest in the Church, but consistent biases remain in existing 
scholarship. Scholars emphasize social practice, not the doctrines that influence these 
practices. The study of religion as a spiritual social movement, as a sort of ancient NGO 
still predominates existing scholarship such as in the work of Mary Roldán.  In this 
reading, which frequently pits the popular Church against the international hierarchy, 
rational choice and dilemmas of individual conscience form the base of courage to resist 
the hierarchy and  thus form the basis of resistance. In this case, conscientious objection 
waters “the roots of social activism in rural Colombia.” 13  Another article in the same 
2014 Latin American Studies Association journal by Margarita López Maya also 
chronicles the radical democratic student movement, the Copeyana Revolutionary Youth, 
and the group’s struggles to shift the Christian Democratic party COPEI into an 
increasingly participatory direction. Like so many other studies, when discussing the 
1960s, the Lopez Maya study defines the Church only by its most “progressive” 
encyclicals, those by John XXIII and Paul VI.14 Such emphases play an invaluable role in 
                                                 
13 Mary Roldán, “Acción Cultural y Popular, Responsible Procreation, and the Roots of Social Activism in 
Rural Colombia” Latin American Research Review Vol. 49 Special Edition (2014): 32-34. She presents an 
interesting narrative of a progressive, population-control minded, Acción Cultural Popular, and their efforts 
as a religiously affiliated “responsible parenthood” organization, to establish a more gender-equal family 
culture in 1960s Colombia. However, this scholarship repeats a materialist vision of the Church faithful 
pitted against an intransigent and influential Church hierarchy while the ACPO is forced to navigate the 
“reasonable” agenda of birth control and their duty of obedience to the Church hierarchy. 
14 Margarita López Maya, “Iglesia católica y democracia participativa y protagónica en Venezuela” Latin 
American Research Review Vol. 49 Special Edition (2014): 45-49. The author does not rely exclusively on 
Vatican II, but while the author alludes to a long tradition of eminent Catholic writers (the mainstays of 
personalist and Christian Democracy), her paradigm is situated in the “theology of rupture” that sees the 
Second Vatican Council as a revolutionary turning point in Church history in terms of social teaching. 
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correcting historical elite biases. The Second Vatican Council clarified in a pastoral sense 
how the Church discussed doctrine. But this view does not sufficiently recognize that for 
the Church, many of the concepts discussed in the pastoral documents are merely 
reiterations of the large body of teaching that is Church Social Teaching. In this view, 
discourse is merely subjective and cannot be extracted from its local context. In that 
sense then, attempts to impose universal religious principals are doomed to failure and 
are not worth studying in and of themselves. 15 
A view which conceives of discourse as merely contextual and subjective instead of 
purveying a concrete philosophical argument diminishes the study of hierarchies which 
are still capable of weighing in on debates, and tends to shift focuses away from the 
orthodox theology that has shaped social justice for at least over a century, to the populist 
(sometimes fringe, sometimes mainstream) movements that make varying degrees of 
effort to claim the politically favorable title of “Catholic.” In short, such scholarship, far 
from being objective, itself takes a radically anti-theological and anti-clerical stance in 
the name of analyzing “popular religion.” 
Instead, much of my focus on the anti-Modernist reapplication of Scholastic theology 
(the Thomist Revival), the Christian Democracy of the 1950s, the Second Vatican 
Council, and their Brazilian and Argentine applications will take an explicitly theological 
approach. That is to say, I will attempt to wrestle with the theological ideas, not just the 
political structures in which they appeared. In the words of Conciliar theologians I will 
                                                 
15 Patrick H. Hutton, History as an Art of Memory (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England,1993), 
5-6. .   According to Hutton’s reading, Maurice Halbwachs foreshadowed this historical subjectivism, 
arguing that ideas themselves only survived in the collective social context. 
 11 
attempt a historical resourcement, a return to the texts and ideas of Catholicism itself, 
even as I keep in mind the sociological dimensions of these political movements (laymen 
vs. clergy, hierarchy vs. popular movements, political vs. spiritual etc.).16 Using a hybrid 
comparative and connected approach that crosses national borders, this project will first 
lay out the context of the Catholic world in which Argentine and Brazilian Catholics 
debated the major issues of liberty and order.  
The first contextual chapter will further detail the justifications for my combined 
historiographical method within the context of Latin American intellectual histories. It 
will then proceed to outline in broad terms the connections between French progressive 
(and ironically anti-modernist) Jacques Maritain and his counterparts in Latin America. 
This chapter will focus on Maritain’s theological distinctions insofar as they affected his 
political vision: First, his distinction between the autonomous individual and “integral 
humanism”, second, his division between the sacred and profane, and third, his overall 
view of freedom and critiques of authoritarianism which remained consistent despite the 
changing political climate of the Second World War. The first chapter will briefly outline 
simultaneous and interlocuting Brazilian and Argentine reactions to the 1936 Spanish 
Civil War, the rise of the Axis powers in the 1930s, the war, and to the formation of the 
international order. This chapter will attempt to focus special attention on areas of the 
debate in which Latin American intellectuals play an autonomous, not merely a 
reactionary, role in European political debates as well as regional politics. One such 
                                                 
16 Massimo Faggiolli, “Vatican II and the Church at the Margins” Theological Studies Vol. 74 (2013): 811. 
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example is Leonardo Castellani’s publication in the Spanish journal Sur praising Jacques 
Maritain’s intellectual abilities and theological orthodoxy (a position he would later 
reverse). Another such example is Dom Hélder Câmara’s leadership in the Second 
Vatican Council of using recently developed Brazilian Church bodies as a basis for 
informing the Universal Church on the issue of collegial governance.17 
The second chapter will discuss the origins of the Argentine Catholic community’s 
majority support for authoritarian governments, and military regimes in particular 
between 1930 and 1976. A  more traditionalist intellectual tradition combined with a 
decentralized lay-intellectual community eventually allowed for a radicalization of 
certain groups in the 1930s that managed, for a time, to triumph in the ideological 
struggle for predominance in the Argentine episcopate. Argentine integralist intellectuals 
did not merely serve the needs of authoritarian regimes, but surpassed these regimes in 
ideological purity, often accompanying begrudging support with visceral criticisms of 
regime failings. 
 
The third chapter will dive into more detail about two Brazilian newspapers, O Diario de 
Belo Horizonte and O Lutador as well as the monthly Catholic periodical A Ordem.18 
These newspapers approached the political tumult in Brazil from a decidedly reactionary 
                                                 
17 Martinho Condini, “Dom Helder Camara, Arcebispo de Olinda e Recife e O Concílio Vaticano (1962-
1965), Revista Último Andar (ISSN 1980-8305), n. 24, (Dez. 2014).  
18 There was quite a bit of overlap. Future editor for O Lutador Pe. Pascoal Rangel wrote in March 1966 
about the liturgy. Pe. Pascoal Rangel, “Os cristãos redescobrem a Liturgia” 19 de março de 1966. Franco 
Montoro called for a “renovation of Democracy” citing Jacques Maritain, and describing pluralism as a 
“basic demand” of a democratic regime. Franco Montoro, “Renovemos a Democracia” O Diário  3 de abril 
de 1966  
 13 
standpoint on some topics, but nevertheless adjusted their discourse to mirror that of an 
increasingly socially minded Church leadership. This led to early and surprising tensions 
and ironies in relationship to Brazil’s 1964 military regime. 
On the whole, this study, through close documentary evidence and a solid philosophical 
chronology, will argue for philosophical continuity where traditional accounts only 
account for political rupture.19 This work will emphasize the importance of ideas where 
others see those ideas of mere social markers for structural political process. Finally this 
study will illuminate a conservative alternative to both revolutionary philosophies that 
have divided the Catholic Church over the last forty years and the reactionary politics that 
has driven the Church to embrace some of the more unsavory regimes in the region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
19 Daniel H. Levine, “Democracy and the Church in Venezuela”, Journal of Interamerican Studies and 
World Affairs,Vol. 18, No. 1 (Feb., 1976): 6-8.  Not all Latin American churches experienced this 
continuity. The Church in Venezuela under the democratic regimes of the 1960s, started to expand their 
pastoral work beyond healthcare and education to other groups that tried to engage the marginalized in the 
society. Democratic governance granted the Church resources for these new actions while also 
“neutralizing” them as a potential oppositional force to the regime. Levine’s study combines analysis of 
government and Church programs with interviews from the hierarchy to produce a balance between elite 
and popular viewpoints. 
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Chapter One: The Church in the World: The return of the Catholic 
Intellectual Elite 
 
Introduction: 
This project attempts to place Brazil and Argentina in  unique positions vis-à-vis other 
Latin American Catholicism. This project considers Argentina’s episcopate a reactionary 
body captive to its own political marginalization within the state and its own idolization 
of its national past. The Brazilian episcopate, which started in the same general position 
of political impotence, spiritual zeal, and ambition, nevertheless opened itself up to 
rethinking Catholicism and later became one of the world’s leaders in progressive 
Catholic social thought. My goal in this chapter is to briefly outline the paths of other 
Latin American Churches to suggest general trends and also highlight the distinctiveness 
of the Brazilian and Argentine positions. I will consider these two countries’ position 
towards authoritarianism and democracy through a connective approach that emphasizes 
individual intellectuals, their travels and their connections, as well as a broad comparative 
approach that traces the distinctive variations in position in key Catholic hierarchies 
worldwide.  
Four major events most visibly tested the Church’s mission locally and globally from 
1930 to 1980: The Cristero Rebellion (the international controversy which notably 
highlighted  the unity of Argentine Catholic militants and exposed differences between 
two prominent Brazilian intellectuals), the Spanish Civil War, World War II, and the 
Cold War. This first chapter will not cover each of these events equally, preferring to 
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primarily introduce key actors in the worldwide Church who used their considerable 
influence and ability to comment on world events to mold circumstances at home. Such 
actors include the French philosopher Jacques Maritain, who allied with traditionalists 
before jousting with them over the “holiness” of the Spanish Civil War. Regional actors 
include Alceu Amoroso Lima, the head of the Centro Dom Vital and director of A Ordem 
(the leading Catholic lay journal) and his mentor Jackson de Figueiredo, who protested 
the worsening conditions in secular Mexico with two distinct approaches to engaging 
revolution. Argentina titled slightly more authoritarian than Brazil, featuring intransigents 
like Jesuit Julio Meinvielle who sustained a full attack on Maritain and the reformers of 
the Second Vatican Council, all the while endorsing the Spanish regime, but also the 
slightly more moderate (and conservative) Gustavo Franceschi, a priest who acted as a 
bridge between the hierarchy and the laity.  World events in turn shaped these actors, 
who acted under certain restrictions be they revolutions, or total conflict that forced some 
dissenters to flee their countries and try their fortunes elsewhere. Intellectuals formed 
surprising and seemingly contradictory relationships as they traveled. Christian 
democratic authors including Maritain got the ear of Franklin Roosevelt and befriended 
community organizer Saul Alinsky. Alceu Lima befriended the Mexican ambassador 
during the Cristero Rebellion. Authoritarian, socially-minded Catholics simultaneously 
lauded the statesman Winston Churchill, and the military dictator Francisco Franco. 
This project seeks to trace the web of the Catholic intellectual class across oceans, 
political cultures, and time periods. Considering the ambition of this project, what tools 
are at the researcher’s disposal, and what traditional pitfalls must one avoid when 
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attempting to tease out the driving factors of regional political developments? A hybrid 
historical approach will help illustrate both the forest and the trees of these Catholic 
connections, taking into account individual intellectual thought without losing sight of its 
broader implications, and allowing the fine brush strokes of intellectual history to fill in 
the broad painting of political and institutional history with liveliness and detail. 
COMPARATIVE OR CONNECTED HISTORIES? A FEW EXAMPLES AS A PROJECT GUIDE 
When choosing the lens through which to view this study, several historical currents stick 
out, each with its own strengths and drawbacks. The comparative framework obviously 
jumps out as a possibility.  
After all, as Maria Ligia Coelho Prado points out in her article on the comparative 
approach’s aptness for Latin America, the countries I am analyzing appear very similar in 
their social structures (e.g strong concentration of the state at the beginning of the  
twentieth  century), similar in their relationship to the institution analyzed (a weak 
Church marginalized by a strong liberal state), all occurring in the same general time 
period (1900-1930s). Furthermore, the objective of this work attempts to demonstrate a 
certain causal relationship between the two communities’ rejection and acceptance of 
certain thinkers and Catholic philosophies, and their embrace or repudiation of 
democracy. In summary, this work deals with the large structural issues (war, economic 
preferences, national narratives) that might account for the contrasts between initially 
similar Argentine and Brazilian Catholicisms.  
This project’s objective, to suggest explanations for historical differences, fits well with a 
comparative approach. Comparative history works well analyzing macro-political 
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structures as Barrington Moore’s attempt to show the origins of democracy and 
authoritarianism through an analysis of political and social alliances in Germany 
demonstrates. Similarly, through a rigorous comparison of both Brazil and Argentina to 
other Latin American countries, this study can more easily detect differences in local 
circumstance than if the study were to only focus on one particular case and risk falling 
into the trap of taking each country’s national narrative at face value.20 At the same time, 
this study, basing itself almost exclusively on the primary sources from the countries of 
origin, attempts to avoid the pitfall of a “globalizing” narrative in which the researcher 
merely classifies his or her object instead of creating an original body of knowledge. A 
correct comparative history instead works with a “unified problem” that illuminates 
rather than diminishes the connections of actors between the countries compared.21  
 
Excellent examples of such studies have emerged in recent years especially from 
Brazilian historiographers.  Maria Helena Capelato in one comparative study of Peronism 
and Vargas raises interesting questions about authoritarian Varguista attempts to 
appropriate Modernist language and structures in order to advance its state, all the while 
denying the mantle of a “social” revolution in the Peronist sense of the word. Such a 
study suggests an autonomous space for concurrent, but not completely uniform, political 
projects. Vargas’ Estado Novo’s emphasis on efficiency and progress as its national goal 
                                                 
20 Maria Ligia Coelho Prado, “Repensando a História Comparada da América Latina” Revista de História 
153 (2º’2005), 17-18,21. 
21 Maria Ligia Coelho Prado, “Repensando a Historia Comparada da America Latina, 23,30. 
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instead of vague notions of justice, seemed to have contributed paradoxically to its 
diminished appeal after Vargas’ suicide, at least when compared to the strong appeal in 
Argentina of its populist counterpart which still holds sway over politicians both left and 
right.22  Similarly, José Luis Bendicho Beired compares two ideological communities, the 
Argentine and Brazilian right-wing. He creates his categories with care, both speaking to 
the unique engagement of the Brazilian right to modernity and offering Vargas’ need of 
Brazilian Catholics over and against the Argentine democracy’s indifference to their 
Church militants, as a plausible factor in the rise (and moderation) of the Brazilian 
right.23 These two case studies suggest that the nation-state indeed plays an important 
(but not monopolistic) role in the development of Catholic intellectual thought from the 
First World War through the Second World War. 
Although comparative history may be an ideal lens through which to analyze the larger 
political situations of the mid to late Twentieth  century, such a structural approach might 
not be ideal for discussing specific groups and communities of people nor smaller social 
networks. As Bénédicte Zimmermann and Michael Werner point out, comparative history 
runs the risk of creating false binaries between “differences and similarities” applied to 
situations with many moving parts. Many failed comparisons also assume an “exterior 
point of view” to the compared objects, a view that would need to have the same amount 
                                                 
22 Maria Helena R. Capelato, Multidões em cena. Propaganda política no varguismo 
e no peronismo (Campinas: Papirus, 1998),19 Cited in: Maria Ligia Coelho Prado. “Repensando a Historia 
Comparada da America Latina”, 25. 
23 José Luis Bendicho Beired, Sob o signo da nova ordem:Intelectuais autoritários no Brasil e na 
Argentina, (São Paulo: Loyola, 1999),67-68. 
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of historical distance between the two historical events to detect a true symmetry between 
the objects. Instead, the authors invite the reader to consider reciprocity, exchange, and 
influence as primary factors in historical inquiries. Such a method, they think, might help 
to dissolve the notion of an objective modernity, confined by notions of national identity, 
which intellectuals distribute worldwide.24 That is, history cannot be completely objective 
in this scientific sense. The researcher’s travel to one place or another, preference for one 
place or another, geographical location, nationality, and prejudices all play a part in 
impeding an objectivity that would meet the aforementioned scientific standards. 
Therefore historians in general might wish to abandon the notion that they can somehow 
objectively tease out cause and effect by “controlling the variables” when isolation of the 
multiple cases from one another is impossible. 
Given that my project consists of both an analysis of global and national politics and the 
relationships between Brazilian, Argentine, and French Catholic writers, a lens that 
diminishes the importance of political boundaries and emphasizes mutual influence might 
be ideal. As Anthony Grafton relates in his overview of the “History of Ideas” genre, in-
depth comparison of national intellectual movements requires both a close reading of 
texts-including newspapers and pamphlets which may represent elite attempts at shaping 
public opinion- and a deep historicizing that recognizes nuanced changes in general 
political thought during the period analyzed.25 “Connected histories”, which imply the 
                                                 
24 Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, "Pensar a história cruzada: entre empiria e reflexividade." 
Textos de História. Revista do Programa de Pós-graduação em História da UnB. 11, no. 1-2 (2012): 89-
91, 97, 103,111. 
25 Anthony Grafton, “History of Ideas: Precepts and Practice”, Journal of the History of Ideas, January 
(2006) Volume 67:1: 4-5. 
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idea of mutual creation of ideas in a decentralized historical narrative, make the types of 
assumptions necessary of a rigorous intellectual history. Sanjay Subrahmanyam notes the 
dialogue between Mughal ruler Jalal al-Din Muhammad Ackbar and Portuguese Jesuit 
missionary Antônio Monserrate to demonstrate the importance of travel and fluidity in 
his work on Eurasia specifically the existence of a dialogue between Catholic Counter-
Reformation missionaries and the various religious forces (Bhuddist and Sufi) in the 
Indian empire.  The author also points to larger apocalyptic expectations that bridged 
multiple religions and shaped the dialogues between the Jesuit and the Indian King, 
expectations that extended from India to “the Most Catholic Monarch, Philip II of 
Spain.”26  
Connective approaches also allow symbolic dates to take on transcendent political 
qualities and shifting meanings. Hashim Aidi in his work on post-911 Latin-Arab 
solidarity points out the “tragic” significance of 1492 for Arabs, Native Americans, 
African-Americans and Latinos as well as a universal “backlash” on the part of these 
groups against the allegedly imperialist profiling of the United States government to raise 
the possibility that a symbol of subjugation could turn into a symbol of resistance or vice 
versa.27 A connected approach also detects other attempts to rebuild spheres of influence 
within the context of global crisis. As Martin Guillemette proposed at an international 
conference on Latin America and the First World War, vigorous debates over world 
                                                 
26Sanjay  Subrahmanyam, "Connected histories: notes towards a reconfiguration of early modern Eurasia." 
Modern Asian Studies 31, no. 03 (1997): 746-748. 
27 Hisham Aidi, “Let Us Be Moors: Islam, Race and "Connected Histories" Middle East Report, No. 229 
(Winter, 2003), pp. 42-44, 51. 
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politics reached the pages of regional Mexican newspapers in Yucután and Guadalajara 
and mixed with anti-imperialist Revolutionary discourse spurred on by the United States’ 
entrance into the war. In a broader transatlantic history on the same time period French 
professor David Marcilhacy, described attempts by Spain to use its neutrality reclaim its 
former philosophical influence over the Americas and strengthen Iberian ties.28 
Similarly, my objects of study, national Catholic newspapers and journals, lend 
themselves to a decentralized approach, as can be seen in other studies such as Lakshmi 
Subramanian’s newspaper analysis of Tamil engagements with the idea of a “Greater 
India.”29  As José Elías Palti writes, the essentialism encouraged by false comparisons 
extends to ideas, facilitating unnecessary value judgments. A connective approach 
contributes to evaluating each idea’s reception without passing immediate moral 
judgments about their “authenticity.”  
Normally we think of political concepts as flowing from their place of origin and 
influencing and “infiltrating” a host culture. The idea of infiltration, expressed often by 
right wing governments in Brazil (1964) and Argentina (1966, 1976), reinforced state 
power and national narratives. 30 The way each hierarchy conceived of “the foreign” and 
their itinerary of travel contributed in divergent ways to each country’s “culture of 
                                                 
28  Citing Guillemette Martin In: “Coloquio Internacional «América Latina y la Primera Guerra Mundial. 
Una historia conectada»México D. F., 26 y 27 de junio de 2014, 389.  Citing David Marcilhacy In: Ibid. 
390. 
 
29 Lakshmi Subramanian, “Tamils and Greater India: Some issues of Connected Histories” Cultural 
Dynamics 24(2-3), 160. 
30 Jose Elias Palti, “The Problem of ‘Misplaced Ideas’ Revisited: Beyond the ‘History of Ideas’ in Latin 
America” History of Ideas: Precepts and Practice”, Journal of the History of Ideas, January (2006) Volume 
67:1: 154-155. 
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knowledge”, their ability to acknowledge that traditions change through “creative 
reception.” Even small events such academic lecturing and teaching bridge abstract ideas 
to larger cultural and political trends in each country.31 By characterizing ideas as 
“foreign” and clinging to romantic ideas of uniqueness, nationalists in these countries, 
such as Juan Manuel de Rosas, and later, and conservative Jesuit priests such as Julio 
Meinvielle and Leonardo Castellani, created false binaries which often favored the 
imported philosophies of the ruling classes and created and impeded legitimate social 
justice efforts based on “questionable” ideas. In Argentina, nationalists remained 
successful in dominating the Catholic sphere conflating authoritarian solutions with 
argentinidad and Marxism with subversión and “criptojudaísmo.” In Brazil however, the 
once-authoritarian Brazilian hierarchy embraced US developmental philosophies and 
later, edgier reformist “foreign” ideas relating to social justice. 
I agree with Philippa Levine’s criticism of Connected Histories as a somewhat 
superfluous attempt to distance contemporary historians from the seemingly outdated 
comparative categories. Levine acknowledges that some comparative histories have 
trapped actors and societies into essentialist narratives and codified the existence of the 
nation-state, which in reality only began in earnest in the nineteenth century. However, 
she also makes a compelling case that those authors which reject “comparative” 
approaches do not reject basic regional categorizations, but merely attempt “a finer 
grained”  approach to conceiving historical space. For Levine, far from codifying the 
                                                 
31Peter Burke, "Cultural history as polyphonic history." Arbor 186, no. 743 (2010): 483-486. 
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nation-state, the comparative approach can actually challenge fixed boundaries by 
documenting similar historical cases worldwide and locally.32  
My case fits within a proper comparative framework because the story I tell occurs within 
nations but is not completely subsumed by national identities. I compare between and 
within nations simultaneously. While national politics or institutional preferences can 
influence the positions of the national Episcopate position, “Catholicism” within the 
nations observed is not homogenous and can often find support outside their own nation 
and opposition within it. However, as a transnational entity, it has official politics that 
also lend themselves to a study that deemphasizes national boundaries. That is to say, I 
can both observe an “official” national position and dig further into the divides within the 
national churches themselves on the ways to confront the challenges of an increasingly 
developed, modern, and secular world. 
A study by Katia Gerab Baggio offers an example of a de-Europeanized and relatively 
decentralized comparative history that offers a bridge between intellectual and political 
history. While Baggio discusses the formation of national identities saying, “national 
identities are affirmed in great part vis-à-vis neighbors” she nevertheless highlights Latin 
American agency, focusing on the intellectual and cultural motives for Brazilian travel 
contrasted with the European pursuits of the “exotic.” Furthermore, by focusing on 
Brazilian travels to neighboring countries, Baggio complicates the ethnic and national 
narrative of the superior European traveling to a Latin American intellectual desert.  
                                                 
32 Phillipa Levine, “Is Comparative History Possible” History and Theory 53 (October 2014), 333-337. 
Levine emphasized that comparative history need not be transnational, but often focuses on multiple 
historical trends within the same geographical region. 
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 The author differentiates between private and public writings, personal and expert 
opinions.33 Through three authors, Arthur Dias (1886-1960), Augusto Mario Caldeira 
Brant (1876-1968), and Luiz Amaral (who traveled to Argentina and published a book in 
1927), Baggio exposes a range of 19th Century essentialist narratives such as Dias’ praise 
of sarmentista progress, Brant’s comparisons of La Plata and Belo Horizonte (both 
planned cities), and Amaral’s disdain for Paraguayan backwardness, praise of Brazilian 
rural values, and condemnation of porteño cosmopolitanism and potential for social 
revolution. Baggio also considers realistic narratives such as Brant’s accounts of Spanish 
idioms and travel-guide precision of various parts of both central and periphery Buenos 
Aires. 
 Despite what some may see as generalizations, Brant’s critical look at the working 
conditions in Buenos Aires, Dias’s exaltation of Argentina as a “model”, and Amaral’s 
begrudging praise of Buenos Aires’ development, also offer the reader of these texts a 
chance to see in the authors a reflection of their own fears about Brazilian development 
and socialist revolt in the region.34 José Beired, a comparative historian, nevertheless 
shows capability in conducting serious research into the connection between the 
intellectual and political, writing about the Iber-American Union (UIA) and the journal 
La América’s importance in drawing Latin America closer to Spain under the threat of 
further US intervention and after years of painful history between the two countries. The 
                                                 
33 Kátia Gerab Baggio, “Dos trópicos ao Prata: Viajantes brasileiros pela Argentina nas primeiras décadas 
do século XX”, Goiânia, v. 13, n.2 (jul./dez. 2008): 425-427, 430-431. 
34 Ibid., 436-440, 443. 
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Spanish government, as a matter of “public interest” sponsored series of journals and 
associations to create a sense of Spanish universalism.35  In a sense, I wish to emulate this 
hybrid journalist-historian’s approach critically documenting and recording Catholic 
discourse within the framework of both the Cold War, traditional Catholic suspicions of 
modernity, and attempts by some Catholic writers to push reform. 
THE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS BEGIN: 
Social Catholicism and reform around the turn of the Twentieth Century had its roots in 
the Thomist revival of the late Nineteenth Century in response to the 1891 Encyclical 
Rerum Novarum in which Leo XIII declared Thomism to be a summary of Catholic 
doctrine. The Catholic response was not uniform, instead deciding to engage liberalism in 
a number of different was from accommodation, to outright hostility, to mid-point 
accommodation. Mexican historian Manuel Ceballos Ramírez sees four different groups 
operating internationally in the revival period between 1891 and 1930. The first group, 
“utopian” liberal Catholics, had (even before Rerum Navorum) comfortably operated 
within the confines of the states which had restricted them. This group attempted to meld 
liberal Catholic ideals with a seemingly antagonistic liberal philosophy and even with the 
new revolutionary classes emerging at the time. This group called for a “restructuring” of 
the Church to deal with changing times, and considered the revolutionary classes to be 
                                                 
35 José Luis Bendicho Beired, “O hispano-americanismo na imprensa espanhola: a trajetória de Unión 
Ibero-Americana e Revista de las Españas (1885-1936)” In: Beired, José Luis Bendicho, Maria Helena 
Capelato, Maria Ligia Coelho Prado, Intercâmbios políticos e mediações culturais nas Américas (São 
Paulo: UNESP, 2010)  13-16. 
 26 
“in the backdrop of God’s plan” to make this necessity of this change apparent to more 
entrenched sectors of the Church.  
One of the historic figureheads of this international current, French philosopher  Felicité 
de Lamenais wrote in 1834 that the “suffering classes” had now formed movements that 
are based “in the same feeling: A deep solidarity with the miseries of a people who were 
never worried about before.”  Although work remained, the philosopher called this an 
“immense progress.”  In short, Lamenais and the Liberal philosophers showed a 
willingness to reengage classes of society they had shunned or feared before. But as 
Ceballos Ramirez points out, the loss of the Church’s temporal power, most importantly 
the fall of Rome in 1870, caused this group to lose favor within the broader Church, seen 
as “enemies” of the Church for making a pact with its strongest detractors.36 As the 
Church lost power in the outside world, they attempted to reassert their moral power in 
the spiritual realm. 
The other group, defined broadly as the “intransigent” group, rejected, on philosophical 
grounds, the compromises proposed by the “conciliation” school of thought. This group 
can be divided into three sectors according to Ceballos Ramírez: The traditionalists, the 
social wing, and the democratic wing. All of these groups rejected liberalism on 
ideological grounds, but they split as to the means of responding to the secularization of 
society. The traditionalists, based on a Counter-Reformation vision of society, believed 
                                                 
36 Felicite de Lamennais a Charles de Coux, 10 de diciembre de 1834, en J.B Duroselle, 1951, p.37 Cited 
in: Manuel Ceballos Ramírez, El catolicismo social: Un tercero en discordia: Rerum Novarum, la cuestión 
social y la movilización de los católicos mexicanos (1891-1911) ( D.F: El Colegio de México, 1991), 22. 
See also: Ibid. 24-26. 
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that the Church’s old power structures should be restored, along with the hierarchies they 
had once implied. In Mexico, this position became untenable after the defeat and 
execution of Maximillian I in Mexico in 1867, as Monarchism was tied to this unpopular 
invasion. Worldwide however, Monarchism constituted a legitimate Catholic option until 
Pope Pius XI finally condemned in 1927  the inevitable mixing of political regimes and 
spirituality that such a system brought. 
The social Catholics for their part embraced Leo XIII’s view that Catholics must respond 
to the need of the hour, and decided that his encyclical provided a way to contest 
Socialism for the hearts and minds of the working class. A Social Catholic’s means to 
achieve this was not necessarily the electoral democratic process. The Social Democrats 
emphasized a pragmatic complicity in the system. They combined the call of the Pope to 
attend to the working classes with the mandate to enter the public sphere. Democratic 
Catholics did not so much believe in the tenets of a representative republic as much as 
their ability to manipulate said system to “re-Christianize” society through election 
efforts and legislative victories. These schools divided themselves according to their 
different reactions to the Thomist renovation of the late Nineteenth century. This revival 
began in earnest in 1879 with Leo XIII’s Aeterni Patris which instead of merely rejecting 
modernity, sought to reconcile faith and reason through a revival of the scholastic 
method. As the revival moved into the Twentieth Century, philosopher Jacques Maritain 
tried to revive scholastic thought and argued for its relevance to modern political debates. 
This led Maritain to the idea of a “pluralist” Christian democracy where even those 
philosophically opposed to Christianity had a role, as long as they contributed to the 
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common good. The liberals rejected Thomas Aquinas altogether in favor of conciliation 
with the existing government. On the other extreme, the traditionalists, represented by 
groups such as Action Française, relied on old monarchical concepts, not reinventions of 
medieval philosophy, to justify their claims. 37  
Such philosophical divisions played out not just in Europe, but in the southern cone as 
well. As Susana Monreal points out in an article on Rerum Novarum, Leo XIIIs 1891 
encyclical had varying impact in Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina based on the status of the 
Church in those regions. In Argentina, a more traditional Church less affected than other 
countries by its liberal reforms, officials such as the Archbishop of Buenos Aires 
protested that the encyclical gave away too much philosophical ground to modernity. In 
Chile, more socially oriented Catholics embraced the change in tone, while in Uruguay, 
the encyclical had little impact (but nevertheless a positive impact) on a severely 
weakened and socially oriented church.38 In the Chilean Church, the Conservative Party 
as early as 1913 pushed some of the first notions of “Christian Democracy” that tied 
progress to improving working conditions and not just the prerogatives of captains of 
commerce.39  In contrast to the Chilean Modus Vivendi, the Mexican  Cristero crisis 
(1926-1929), in which an extremist liberal government cracked down on religious 
                                                 
37  Ibid. 23-26, 47. See Maritain’s seminal works “The Integral Human” and “Christianity and Democracy” 
for elaborations of these concepts. 
38 Susana Monreal, “Catolicismo social en el Cono Sur: Genealogía de un ideario”. In: Berríos Fernando; 
Jorge Costadoat; Diego García, Catolicismo social chileno: Desarrollo, crisis y actualidad (Santiago de 
Chile: Centro Teológico Manuel Larraín, 2009), 29-31. 
39 Ana Maria Stuven, “Cuestión social” y Catolicismo social: De la nación oligárquica a la nación 
democrática” In: Ibid. 62-63. These critiques however paled in comparison to critiques of the socialist 
ideologies that Catholic papers such as La Revista Católica condemned for destabilizing the social order. 
Morality, not economics, played a central role in worker discontents. Spiritual examples of austerity, 
thought the social school, ought to bring workers back into the fold (Ibid.67). 
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expression, galvanized  Catholics in the southern cone region to reconsider Catholicism’s 
place in their own societies.  
As Miranda Lida argues in her essay on the Cristero rebellion in a world context, 
Argentina in particular, the popular nature of the rebellion acted as a catalyst for Catholic 
militancy in areas like Buenos Aires.  The transnational effect of the Mexican repression 
and rebellion would foreshadow European debates over the Spanish Civil War. Argentine 
Catholics used the Mexican state persecutions to rally the faithful around the Virgin of 
Guadalupe, as seen by the increase in pilgrims during the 1920s. These localized actions 
complemented the larger internationally oriented Eucharistic congresses. These catalysts 
of activism contradicted Weberian sociological hypothesis that religion suffered at the 
hands of Liberal bureaucratic thinking. Instead, modernity mixed with traditional 
Catholicism in cities like Buenos Aires to stimulate an intellectual and social hybrid that 
granted the Church a higher profile in the 1930s than it had enjoyed at the turn of the 
century.  
The Church used the Mexican case to update their methods of resistance in the largely 
hostile Argentine political environment and created media outlets and papers such as La 
América del Sud (1876-1880), La Unión (1881-1889), La voz de la Iglesia (1882-1911) 
and El Pueblo (founded in 1900) to compete with the larger liberal press. After the 
release of the Encyclical Quas Primas (1925) however, Argentine Catholics lost interest 
in engaging with the liberal tradition instead turning to more traditional forms of support 
such as masses for religious freedom. The Argentine Church also hoped that these events 
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would bestow upon them the glow of religious fervor, timing them to coincide with 
important ecclesial appointments.40  
As this paper will mention in future chapters, in Brazil the picture remained more 
complicated however. As Marcelo Timotheo da Costa points out in the same volume, 
both the leading figure of the Brazilian right, Jackson de Figueiredo and his protégé, 
modernist literary critic-turned-convert Alceu Amoroso Lima, would deplore the actions 
of Mexico’s Calles government’s repression of the Church.  But while de Figueiredo saw 
the inevitable damnation of the Mexican state, Alceu Lima saw potential in the shared 
educational background of some of its representatives. 41 This difference of opinion came 
to the fore in a private correspondence in May 1928 when Alceu Lima asked Jackson de 
Figueiredo to publish an article he had translated which apparently portrayed Russian 
Communism in a balanced, if not exactly sympathetic, light. Jackson responded by 
praising the article’s style, but seriously questioning its substance: 
I’m returning the article about Russia. I’ve read all of it and it’s very 
admirable….But A Ordem could not possibly publish it. It’s a defense of what’s 
going on there. And to the Alceu of today I ask, why publish it in O Jornal? Why 
take to our urban masses the suggestions of an apologist-or almost that- of the 
Russian Revolution?  
                                                 
40Miranda Lida, “La Cuestión mexicana en el catolicismo argentino de la década de 1920” In: Jean Meyer, 
Las Naciones Frente Al Conflicto Religioso en México (D.F: CIDE, 2010), 247-249, 250, 253-254. 
 
41 See: Marcelo Timotheo da Costa, “La espado y el arado: El conflicto religioso en México y la 
intelectualidad católica brasileña, los casos de Jackson de Figueiredo y Alceu Amoroso Lima”. Ch. 4 In: 
Jean Meyer, Las Naciones Frente Al Conflicto Religioso en México (D.F: CIDE, 2010), 88-90. 
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I’m sending you two or three more chapters of my mess, those that I found copies 
of in the bookstore. Is it worth it for you to waste time in reading that which I’m 
not even sure if I’ll publish?42 
Alceu Lima backed down saying that he would not attempt to publish it and that 
publishing for the sake of publishing was no longer a goal he held dear. However, he did 
go on to provide an elaborate defense of his motives that incorporated much of de 
Figueiredo’s language if merely to defuse it. Lima saw a basic advantage in “knowing the 
enemy [addressing in his reply letter both the Mexican and Russian Revolutions]” not as 
a straw-man, but as a philosophy with competing and legitimate claims which could steal 
away the working classes if left to fester unanswered: 
[The desire to publish] is only because it seems convenient to me for us to 
know the center from which the greatest threat to our civilization 
emanates. 
This could be a defect that I should correct myself of, but I have a passion 
to see from the inside the point of view of my adversaries. Perhaps it is a 
weakness, a habit of seeing all truths as points of view, but there it is. 
Bringing this article to the attention of a certain audience, I would hope 
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that this audience would be in the necessary state of mind to know what is 
going on there, the force of that, and the necessity of defense, not in the 
appearances of purely exterior measures that only defend the concrete, but 
in the soul, in the depths, in the very essence of our civilization…Look, 
neither Russia nor Mexico are abstract phenomena. We have to look at 
them as Joseph de Maistre looked at the French Revolution. I was just 
reading a few days ago the Considerations on France and all that it says 
about the French Revolution applies to the Russian Revolution…All of 
this led me to translate this article and to imagine that certain lines could 
fit in a journal like A Ordem, which fears no type of truth, as long as it 
defends the truth.43 
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revista como A Ordem, que não teme qualquer espécie de verdade, desde que defende a verdade.»  
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This correspondence brings forth several interesting observations: First that the two 
authors read world philosophy extensively, not confining themselves to the debates 
occurring in Western Europe or Brazil. Second, Mexico and Russia constituted sister 
revolutions for the two, with the mother of all revolutions being the French uprising of 
1792.  
Third, Alceu Lima’s dialogue philosophy constituted a minority within the Catholic 
social network. Part of the Catholic militants’ sensitivity came from the timing of the 
Cristero unrest itself. The wars started five years after the founding of the journal A 
Ordem and four years after the founding of the Centro Dom Vital. Generally, Catholic 
militants, who had just made progress through a successful détente with the liberal 
government after decades of isolation under the First Republic, were fearful of a secular 
backlash. Forcefully invoking Calles and Lenin by name, the 1930 election that 
eventually brought Getulio Vargas to power, conservative militants warned that the 
opposing party’s victory would eventually lead to totalitarian revolutions. 44  
Therefore, in an indirect way, even among the less radicalized Brazilian Catholic elite, 
the Cristero Wars put an end to the language of reconciliation and accommodation, 
instead vindicating the most radical Catholics who advocated the path of no negotiation 
with the modernist state.45  Despite these trends, a New Theology with its roots in a 
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radical Christian Humanism reminiscent of John Henry Newman, would slowly sow the 
seeds of potential reform, or at least allowable dissent, in Rome.  Abandoning the purely 
intellectual arguments of previous Thomist scholars, these “personalists” would focus on 
contextualizing theology and social activity contrasted with the earlier Royalist emphasis 
on doctrinal purity. This ideology, less developed than its counterpart, would have to toe 
a fine line to ensure that its philosophy both remained socially progressive and that it 
dodged the anti-clerical vision of the ascendant revolutionary thinkers inspired by Karl 
Marx’s materialism. These authors would place a premium on a diminished philosophical 
rigor and a heightened intuition attuned to the political feelings of the day.46 Jacques 
Maritain would soon take the mantle of its philosophical standard-bearer.  
JACQUES MARITAIN: THE CATHOLIC ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM 
Jacques Maritain was born in 1882 to Paul Maritain and Geneviéve Favre. He was an 
unlikely figure to become the Catholic standard-bearer for updated Thomistic thought. He 
was born into a Protestant household, attended the elite high school Lycée Henri-IV, 
which while having a Catholic heritage was immersed in the secular milieu of its time, 
and later the Sorbonne (to which the high school was related as a preparatory school).  As 
Bernard Doering points out, his mother was a very good friend of the liberal Catholic 
essayist Charles Péguy and his grandfather was a founder of the Third Republic, fruit of a 
revolutionary secular political system that hardly exuded Catholic values. He also 
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married Raissa, a Jew, and befriended a defender of the Jewish role in the plan of 
salvation, Léon Bloy.47  
However, Maritain cannot be classified as a progressive in the modern sense. He quickly 
fell under the influence of Father Humbert Clerrisac, a reactionary who later became his 
confessor. In the early years after his conversion in 1906, Maritain uncritically took the 
advice of these confessors, and even in later years stretched to defend their thinking. 
Doering highlights a particular letter in which Maritain wrestled with his mentor’s 
attempts to justify an authoritarian political solution that would bring even the Vatican to 
censure the French Catholic fringe: 
But what could Father Clérissac have been thinking…? Here is how I explain it to 
myself: the restoration of the monarchy seemed to Father Clérissac indispensable 
to the restoration of the Church in our society; in his eyes, the monarchy alone 
was able to reestablish the Church in the fullness of its rights. He noted with 
horror all that the Church had been forced to abandon in fact or to leave…since 
the revolution….he recognized the source of the blows struck against the notions 
of hierarchy, and order, which are essential to the life of the Church, and he 
placed the Church above all else; hence he detested Democracy as an evil...he 
knew the dangers which at that particular time “Modernism” posed to the 
dogmatic teaching of the faith.48  
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48 Doering quoting Maritain on Father Clérrisac. In: Ibid. 11. Doering also wrote in 2003 responding to an 
America article on the Catholic Church’s eventual agreement with Hitler during the war to maintain 
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However, Maritain’s orthodoxy, not his progressivism, would cause him to oppose the 
political solutions Maurras offered. For Maritain, as articles published in the 1920s for 
the La Revue Universelle would show, saw that Maurras and extreme liberalism drew 
from the same well:  Positivism.49 Politicized Catholics and anti-clerical zealots drew, in 
Maritain’s vision, from the same sort of individualistic Darwinism and positivism that 
rejected the very dignity of the human person in exchange for setting up idols to concrete 
political philosophies. In his 1938 lecture “Integral Humanism and the Crisis of Modern 
Times” Maritain separates Enlightenment reason from the sanctified reason of the gospel, 
taking  materialist philosophies head on: 
Instead of a development of man and reason in continuity with the Gospel, people 
demand such a development from pure reason apart from the Gospel. And for 
human life, for the concrete movement of history, this means real and serious 
amputations. 
Prayer, divine love, supra-rational truths, the idea of sin and of grace, the 
evangelical beatitudes, the necessity of asceticism, of contemplation, of the way 
of the Cross,-all this is either put in parenthesis or is once for all denied. In the 
concrete government of human life, reason is isolated from the supra-rational.50 
                                                 
institutional silence in exchange for limited autonomy. Doering blamed such an agreement not on racist 
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49 Ibid. 21. 
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Maritain, in a moment of Catholic triumphalism, scorned Kierkegaard and an “archaic 
and reactive” Barth. He saw the two of the leading neo-orthodox theologians of the early 
Twentieth Century as studying the themes of the “intelligence which comes from the 
serpent” as well as trying to resurrect a “primitive reformation” to achieve “purification 
by reversion to the past.” To him, these “noble” forms of thought only belied the 
emptiness of liberal promise, “of lying optimism and illusory moralities” to which the 
working class demands radical solutions to rid society of “the liberty which starves 
workmen and burns the stacks of grain.”51 Over and against this liberally-imbued 
Protestant philosophy, Maritain proposed his vision of a plural society based on anti-
liberal, but pluralistic, Christian values, that held on to universal truths while progressing 
into an uncharted future. 
In opposition to this bleak picture, Maritain presented Christian Humanism, which 
emphasized a spiritual “person” instead of a utilitarian “individual” as the proper base for 
reason, as the way to “re-make anthropology” and rediscover the “dignification” of the 
individual through its openness to the world of the divine and superrational.”52 Maritain 
seemed further down in the essay to earn his reputation as the “Red Christian”, giving 
due credit to a materialist Communism that wished to replace the Christian message with 
another universalizing message, no matter how unsustainable. Maritain saved his harshest 
criticism a generalized racist ideology “which sets itself against Christianity by rejecting 
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all universalism, and by breaking even the natural unity of the human family, so as to 
impose the hegemony of a so-called higher racial essence.”  
Maritain affirmed that while Communism triumphed through the legitimate demands of 
an ill-informed working class, that racism, which also “detested” capitalism, conquered 
through pure war helped along by the “strong privileged interests blindly anxious to 
safeguard their own position.” In contrast to both of these systems, Maritain proposed an 
“integral” system that would attend to workers’ rights and dignity as well as “substitute 
for bourgeois civilization, and for an economic system based on the fecundity of 
money….” His new temporal order entailed “not a collectivistic economy, but a 
‘personalistic’ civilization and a ‘personalistic’ economy, through which would stream a 
temporal refraction of the truths of the Gospel.”  In a more secular sense, Maritain hoped 
for a spiritual transformation, a “profound renewal of the interior energies of conscience.” 
53  In short, Maritain wanted to channel individual autonomy through a Scholastic moral 
framework. Rather than a radically autonomous moral agent, he envisioned a society 
made up of individuals that would look out not only for their material interests, but the 
collective spiritual interests of the larger body politic. 
Maritain did however maintain some vestiges of traditional thought and even anti-
Semitism. Despite marrying a Jewish convert, Maritain wrote in 1921 that a Jewish race 
that rejected Christ as their savior, necessarily played “a fatal role of subversion” because 
their spiritually just inclinations towards justice turned toward a warped “messianic” 
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political vision.54  Argentine author Julio Meinville, later one of the strongest critics of 
Jacques Maritain, would sustain and support a similar, but less charitable line of attack 
against the Jewish populations well into the 1960s. Far from attributing the “Jewish 
Problem” to misguided good intentions, in the prologue to Meinvielle’s book The Jew in 
the Mystery of History, right wing Catholic historian Antonio Capponnetto asserted that 
the Jew was a threat to civilization. He further argued that the Jewish race “with Satanic 
hate seek[s] the destruction of Christian civilization…take[s] the goods of 
Christians…how they exterminate them…when they can.”55 Meinvielle attempted to 
avoid the label of racism and anti-Semitism, the former explicitly condemned by the 
Vatican in the 1930s by changing the allegory of Isaac and Ishmael. Instead of the 
traditional interpretation of Ishmael as the father of the adversarial tribes of Canaan, he 
came instead to represent the “carnal” unconverted Jew pitted against the perfected 
“converted” Jew who represented the blessed line of Jacob. Meinvielle perpetuates a 
perverse “Jewish exceptionalism” or Jewish abnormality that leant itself to absolutist 
rhetoric. To him the Jew that converted excelled in Christian virtues above other 
Christians. Those who rejected Christ also excelled…in the arts of depravity.56  Putting 
Maritain’s 1921 essay side by side with Meinvielle’s theologically-based anti-Semitism, 
                                                 
54 Bernard Doering quoting , Jacques Maritain, “A Propos de la Question Juive,” Le Mystere d’Israel 
(1965), 305f.  In: “The Origin and Development of Maritain’s Idea of the Chosen People” In: Robert 
Royal, Jacques Maritain and the Jews (South Bend,Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1994), 27. 
 
  
55 Antonio Capponetto, El judio en el misterio de la historia 6to Edición (Buenos Aires: Theorica, 1982), 
18. 
56Julio Meinvielle, Ibid., 28-31.  
 40 
the similarity of the reasoning is surprising (given Maritain’s personal connections to 
Judaism) even if his political solutions were less draconian than Meinvielle’s. 
 Rabbi Leon Klenicki called Maritain’s condescending attitude “triumphalism at its best.” 
He drew little solace from Maritain’s categorization of Christianity as “the overflowing 
fullness and the supernatural realization of Judaism.”57 Rabbi Klenicki attributes 
Maritain’s supercessionist attitude to a conflation of the Jewish conception of growing 
holiness through daily works with salvation through works.58   Maritain’s mistake may 
have seemed benign, but the mistaken assumption that modern Judaism was obsessed 
with its own laws and society at the cost of mercy had endured centuries. The seeming 
condemnation of Jewish “works-based” attitudes by Paul of Tarsus and the writers of the 
four gospels, had created many societal tensions between the confessional states of the 
past and their Jewish minorities. Often the stereotype of works-based religious obsession 
and segregation allowed Christian rulers more concerned with their financial debts to 
justify their hatred of the Jewish populations on scriptural and common law grounds. 
Maritain’s early views toward Jewish populations was problematic, but his separation of 
the sacred and profane would allow him to avoid the political implications of such 
analysis. Ultimately, his personal relationships overrode this reading and tended to 
moderate his philosophy more generally. 
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Maritain did, however, surprise in the company he kept. From 1924 onward, Doering 
observed, Maritain often mingled with scholars focused on the East, such as Louis 
Massignon and Olivier Lacombe from China and India,  and unorthodox philosophers 
such as Russian Nicolas Berdyaev. This created suspicion, if not direct outrage, on the 
part of the defenders of the Western classical tradition. These connections must have hurt 
nationalist friends such as Bernanos Massis, who, in 1924 was on the cusp of writing A 
Defense of the West, but Maritain was no relativist.  Maritain’s pluralism dovetailed with 
his belief that the universal message of Christ leant itself to pluralism, and that a 
“political materialism” that saw the Church mainly as the guardian of the social order 
stood at odds with a Church whose mission was “to dispense to men supernatural truth 
and the means to eternal life and which confers on her the right to intervene in temporal 
affairs.”59  
By, the 1930s, Maritain would ease his position on the Jewish question as well, bucking 
his former Catholic mentors and becoming a vigorous critic of political and racial anti-
Semitism deeming such antiquated ideas incompatible with the “New Christendom” that 
he envisioned. Maintaining his distinction between Christian spirituality and Jewish 
materiality, Maritain nevertheless tweaked his previous essays in response to charges by 
other intellectuals that the Jews’ natural task was to subvert Christian civilization. 
Maritain instead put the Jewish nation squarely on the side of the divine: 
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As a foreign body, as an activating ferment introduced in the mass, it will not 
leave the world at rest; it prevents it from sleeping, it teaches the world to be 
discontented and restless as long as it does not possess God; it stimulates the 
movement of history.60 
Even if he did call Jewish populations “restless” instead of “subversive,” Maritain 
maintained problematic racial distinctions. The Jewish question would haunt Maritain not 
just for its implications on race, but also on politics. If the Jewish people became a 
symbol of worldly justice and human rights, then their (justified for some) rejection 
naturally became a symbol of an authoritarianism that fundamentally debased (or 
preserved) the human dignity and social harmony. Maritain would circumvent his 
essentialization of the Jews by saying the state should tolerate even the theoretically 
subversive (Jews, Communists etc.). But other Catholics would not make such 
concessions.  Nevertheless, Maritain’s critics, his subtle shift on the Jewish question, and 
his contrarian positions on two important “Catholic” wars would transform him into the 
symbol of a naïve compromiser, or more dangerous, a willing tool of those factions 
(Freemasonry, Judaism, and Protestantism) that wished to destroy the witness of the one 
true church, from within if possible. The first such parting of the waters for Jacques 
Maritain would start with the Spanish Civil War. 
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CATHOLICS IN THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR: A GLOBAL AND LATIN AMERICAN 
PERSPECTIVE 
The Spanish Civil War of the 1930s in which General Francisco Franco battled the 
Spanish Republic in an attempt to restore the Bourbon monarchy to the throne galvanized 
Catholics enthralled with the idea of authoritarianism and corporatism.  Economics and a 
upper-middle class fear of economic and political anarchy fueled the conflict. After their 
electoral victories, the Popular Front pushed a series of reforms which the right saw as 
anti-military. Amid general strikes on the part of various anarchist and labor groups, 
assassinations of right wing figures such as politician José Calvo Sotelo, prior plans for a 
coup against the Spanish Republic came to a head. Franco’s forces made quick work of 
Republican forces, but regions such as Catalonia and Basque, which would become 
centers of franquista repression, remained beyond the military’s reach.61  
Many Catholic writers believed that such a war needed to be won at all costs. However, a 
minority group of Catholics rejected a take-no-prisoners approach to the question of 
Communism and wondered if conservative Catholics might just have become too 
politicized for the gospel. This opinion, just like anti-Communism, also found favor at the 
Vatican with Pius XI’s 1926 condemnation of the monarchist militant French Catholic 
group Action Française for their putting utilitarian political militancy over spiritual 
necessity. The polarized politics of the 1930s however, gave the group a second wind and 
democratically minded progressives suddenly felt themselves on the defensive.  
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 In Europe, English and French Catholics watched with alarm as news of possible 
Communist infiltration of the Spanish government spread. The Church in the previous 
decades had established a policy of accommodation, causing uncertainty to activists 
concerned with stopping the “Red menace” and at the same time respecting the rights of a 
secular state to self-governance.62 In Argentina, horror stories of Church persecution and 
martyrdom under the Republican government as well as conservative anxiety over 
general social unrest, allowed Catholics to quickly draw red lines when speaking about 
the Civil War. As the narrative went, Franco and the military had come to restore order to 
a chaotic Spanish body politic. Julio  Meinvielle wrote in 1937 regarding the Spanish 
Civil War, that Franco, “a most illustrious caudillo,” had put an end to the Popular Front 
(he asserted that the conservative government won by half a million votes), led by the 
“masonic” government of Portela Valladares, and stopped the Jewish-led “third blow” 
against an already defunct Christendom, Communism, from spreading.63 Criterio in 
Argentina echoed Meinvielle’s sentiments, putting the Spanish Civil War in the context 
of a spiritual struggle against modernity itself: “Our state is no longer a skeptical state, 
nor is it a people that rests,” it asserted.  “Our state rejects Rousseauian skepticism. It 
knows that truth and justice are permanent categories of reason, and not arbitrary 
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decisions of the will. Our state knows, as does the people, the truth of God and the Truth 
of Spain.”64 
Not only did Spain possess the truth in many nationalists’ opinions, it represented an 
ideal of nationhood that had the blessing of the Holy Trinity itself, based on medieval 
corporatism, starting from the home, building up through local communities, to the 
nation-state itself. As Toledo Archbishop, Cardinal Dr. D. Isidro Gomá y Tomás wrote in 
the Argentine journal Criterio near the end of the war with the triumph of the Franco 
regime: 
And the country is Spain… [a]nd we are sons of our fathers, in our organic being 
and our education. We are sons of the Fatherland which is no more than an 
extension and amplifying of the paternal home where we receive the fullness of 
our natural life…as such, man through the demand of his very nature, is tied 
threefold: To God, to his parents, and to the Fatherland.65 
Gustavo Franceschi, edited Criterio, the leading journal at the time, building bridges 
between lay people and the hierarchy, pluralist Catholics and those with more 
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authoritarian tendencies. Born in Paris in 1881, and came to Argentina in 1886 at the age 
of five. In 1904, at the age of 23, he was ordained a priest after his studies in the 
Seminary of Buenos Aires. He participated in the early Catholic movements in Argentina 
such as Father Federico Grote’s Workers’ Circles which attempted to stave off socialism 
through an emphasis on improving workers’ conditions and educating them in the faith.66 
This emphasis on workers’ rights was in line with the traditions of Leo XIII and Pius XI, 
although supporting the workers did not necessarily preclude support for the Franco 
regime.  
Pressed between three authoritarian options, Franceschi chose what he saw as the most 
Catholic of the options. Franceschi most strongly rejected what he saw as Nazism’s 
pagan influences and German resistance to Catholic values, as demonstrated by the 
German government’s refusal to allow Catholics to attend the 1934 Eucharistic Congress 
in Budapest.67 Criterio allowed a pro-Spanish position to flourish, considering Franco as 
a viable alternative to the various authoritarian governments and infinitely preferable to 
Communism. Most Argentine Catholic scholars were either Fascist or Fascist 
sympathizers, even as they rejected some  
In Brazil meanwhile, Alceu Lima’s A Ordem took a slight more cautious, if still 
supportive, tone toward the Fascist advances. The journal pointed to the Republic’s 
importance to Russia as a justification for throwing its lot behind the Franco regime. The 
journal did show slight reserve however, presenting itself as a neutral observer that had 
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suspicions regarding both sides. Quoting El Heraldo’s comments on Russia’s “heroic” 
support of the war, without which the Republic would have fallen long before, the author 
settles accounts:  
These declarations [from El Heraldo praising Russia’s continuing backing] are of 
the utmost importance for evaluating the nature of the Spanish struggle. No one 
can ignore that there we find regular troops of the fascist armies that even the so-
called totalitarian governments have confessed as their contribution to the Spanish 
Civil War. We cannot lose sight of the fact however, that the intervention of 
Russia into the internal affairs of the Spanish people could not be easily tolerated 
by countries that had everything to lose with the expansion, in their backyards, of 
the revolutionary Kremlin at the service of Moscow’s ambitions. 68 
The author continued, adding that between the two powers, Communism and Fascism, 
the latter offered some positive qualities: 
The so called authoritarian states offer an attractive perspective in their renewing 
politics: The actual desire to organize the nation on the foundations of 
Corporatism. In this particular aspect, one of these countries that deserves a closer 
look is Portugal, because more than the others, it reserves for individual liberty 
and initiative a sliver of autonomy in the constructing of its economy. Already a 
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project about a work contract between factory workers and industry leaders has 
begun in the Portuguese press.69 
In short, even Lima, who seemed more open to dialogue Russian leftists almost ten years 
before, showed a predilection for Fascist governments, especially the Iberian variety. 
Citing a free-ranging debate over whether wages should be universal by profession, or 
remain based on individual merit, perhaps Lima believed that the Catholic and organic 
principles underlying these societies would check their more destructive impulses. 
Support for Franco against the “international Communist conspiracy” then, seemed to be 
the uniform Catholic position. 
However, several issues arose that complicated the salvific language of Falangist saviors 
and Republican villains. The Basque region was heavily Catholic, yet also on the side of 
the Republicans.70 Progressive intellectuals such as Jacques Maritain, and even more 
conservative writers like Bernanos Massis, began to wonder whether this anomaly might 
not prove an important point about mainstream Catholics’ distance from on-the-ground 
realities of the peasants and workers. From their point of view, Pius XI had warned about 
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the dangers of a working class.71 If progressive Catholic intellectuals could find 
justification in the words of tradition for their more nuanced take on the topic du jour, 
then perhaps they could avoid Vatican censure. 
Indeed, Pius XI had written at the beginning of the decade, in his encyclical on working 
conditions Quadragesimo Anno (1931) that those who called themselves the most loyal 
Catholics impeded implementation of Catholic social reforms called on by his 
predecessor Leo XIII, instead taking an allegorical approach to the commands of Rome to 
improve the lot of the workers. The Pope divided the world into two classes, those with 
abundant wealth, and the workers crushed under “new industrial developments” and the 
richer classes who   “thought it in their abundant riches the result of inevitable economic 
laws” and thus that any other form of wealth redistribution other than “supporting the 
poor through charity alone” to be a violation of the natural order of things. In the Pope’s 
vision, reforming priests, despite broad social consensus and Vatican support, and 
wedged between the social extremes of revolution and indifference, found resistance 
from the upper echelons of society, and even Catholics themselves: 
However, in spite of such great agreement, there were some who were not a little 
disturbed; and so it happened that the teaching of Leo XIII, so noble and lofty and 
so utterly new to worldly ears, was held suspect by some, even among Catholics, 
and to certain ones it even gave offense. For it boldly attacked and overturned the 
idols of Liberalism, ignored long-standing prejudices, and was in advance of its 
                                                 
71 Bernard Doering, “Jacques Maritain and the Spanish Civil War” The Review of Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 
(Oct., 1982): 490. 
 50 
time beyond all expectation, so that the slow of heart disdained to study this new 
social philosophy and the timid feared to scale so lofty a height. There were some 
also who stood, indeed, in awe at its splendor, but regarded it as a kind of 
imaginary ideal of perfection more desirable then attainable [Italics mine].72 
These papal words, only a few years before the heated debates of the mid-1930s, seemed 
to give progressives the leverage they needed to argue for nuance. Jacques Maritain, the 
leader of the French dissent to the franquistas, wrote a series of essays in which he put 
economic justice first and foremost among Catholic priorities. He argued that if the 
Church did not deal with the full range of human problems and remained distant, that 
workers would quickly confuse Catholicism automatically with a reactionary philosophy. 
The French review Sept echoed these sentiments whenwriting in response to a lack of 
social reforms on the part of the right in 1934. The French journal asked skeptically, 
“Will such misunderstandings [mistaking Catholicism for reactionary politics] appear 
again and will religion once more fall victim to political and social deviations? Our 
Spanish friends have the duty to do everything possible to avoid such a situation.” 73 
Another editorial from the same magazine also sought comfort in the arguments of Pius 
XI, arguing that Catholic workers who voted for the socialist party did not entirely lack 
basis, but rather they were “so miserable, so drenched with humiliation and social 
suffering that they are ready for anything . . . to escape their fate.” The author urged the 
                                                 
72 Pope Pius XI, “Quadragesimo Anno” Vatican City, May 15, 1931, Section 14. 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/pius-xi/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-xi_enc_19310515_quadragesimo-
anno.html. Link accessed January 10, 2014. 
73 Doering, “Jacques Maritain and the Spanish Civil War”: 493. Also: J. Lassaigne, "L 'Espagne sera-t-elle 
fasciste!" Sept, 21 April 1934,  In: Ibid. 493-494 
 51 
Catholic intelligencia to not only fight a war but to win the hearts and minds of 
“Catholics without hope” denying those who would destroy the Church the opportunity to 
exploit “a pretext for believing that the Church shares that [society’s] indifference.”74  
The progressive position grew even more defensible as it moved from the level of 
abstract warning to that of practical, and cruel, reality. The bombing of the city of 
Guernica, made famous by Pablo Picasso’s painting, not only incited the rage of Spanish 
Republicans and U.S. backers, but drew a strong rebuke from the progressive Catholic 
community, which saw in the bombings a disproportionate and unnecessary  use of force 
against a civilian population, and a Catholic one to boot. In a joint statement “For the 
Basque People”, intellectuals like Maritain, François Mauriac, and Emmanuel Mounier, 
compared the indifferent or self-righteous Catholics who supported the bombing as 
retribution “Pharisees” who would have passed by the injured man on the road in Jesus’ 
parable. Instead, the Church was supposed to “bend over their wounds” without “should 
haves.” Sounding a final alarm, the writers invoked Jesus’ farewell speech in John: “One 
of the branches is threatened with destruction and the whole vine is suffering.”75 The call 
for Christian unity and charity in the midst of political divisions seemed simple enough, 
and indeed this argument staved off conservative attempts to achieve a Vatican 
condemnation similar to that of Charles Maurras a decade before. However, the Catholic 
world did not find itself in a position to embrace pluralist democracy just yet. 
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Maritain went on the offensive as the primary intellectual combatant for the progressive 
Catholic cause.  In a March 1937 article in the French journal Espirit, which he helped 
found, but would later part ways with, Maritain directed the blame for the rise of 
Socialism at those who had abandoned the working class, calling on Catholics to “live 
with the people” in order to emulate what had made socialism so effective while 
correcting its errors.76  In an April 1937 article in the Spanish journal Sur he highlighted 
working class problems in Spain as some of the most severe of Europe.77 In  June 1937, 
Maritain wrote one of his only reflections on the Spanish Civil War, taking on the notion 
of a Holy War, conceding that war was sometimes necessary, but that to kill in the name 
of Christ (instead of, for example, under one’s obligation to the state) was a sacrilege. 
Maritain condemned the burning of churches and execution of priests, but also the use of 
Muslim mercenaries to put down the revolt. Alluding to another principle of Just War 
arguing that stopping one evil should not bring about another evil, Maritain exclaimed, 
“A man who does not believe in God might think: after all this is the price of a return to 
order and one crime deserves another. A man who believes in God knows that there is no 
worse disorder. It is as if the bones of Christ, which the executioners could not touch, 
were broken on the Cross by Christian.”  
Following his overall trend of distancing current political solutions from a strict 
Scholasticism of the 12th and 13th Century, Maritain even questioned the “impurity” of 
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the Crusades. Although Church history had generally regarded them as a true holy war, 
Maritain asked whether God had truly willed such atrocities in the name of regaining the 
Holy Land. Maritain rather argued that religious disputes had become by the 1930s 
accidental, not intrinsic to the nature of war.78  For Maritain then, because war consisted 
of a conglomerate of interests, economic, territorial, and political, and often crossed 
within and outside of religious groups, the notion of a “sanctified” conflict was 
necessarily a contradiction in terms.  The continuing European crisis of which the 
Spanish Civil War was a symptom, which would deepen during World War II, forced 
Jacques Maritain into self-imposed exile in 1940 in North America, where he already had 
experience lecturing in Toronto’s Medieval Institute and Princeton University. The 
problems of the war would unfortunately follow him and other prominent Catholic 
intellectuals across the Atlantic Ocean. 
Jacques Maritain in the U.S and Catholic Reactions to the Spanish Civil War and 
World War II: 
The US environment in which Maritain arrived for his lectureship at Princeton University 
(1941-1942) portended a long struggle to convince his religious compatriots to embrace 
the vision he had fought so hard for in Europe. As J. David Valaik chronicles, prior to 
Maritain’s arrival, Catholic magazines had taken firm stances for the Spanish 
revolutionaries. The Jesuit magazine America accused the Spanish republicans of being 
Communists in disguise and preferred the risks of an excessive fascist regime to the 
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known horrors of the Communist regime. Their editor Francis X. Talbot, under the 
influence of the Pro-Franco intellectuals of the day, felt so strongly about this stance that 
he rescinded a verbal agreement with the editor of Commonweal to remain neutral on the 
war itself even as both sides condemned the Republicans’ ruthless treatment of religious 
communities.  
The Commonweal and its editor George N. Shuster, followed Maritain and Pius XI’s lead 
however, prioritizing outreach to the working class as a legitimate concern that should 
temper any Catholic consideration of the potential right-wing government that could 
replace the Republic.79 While Shuster viewed Franco’s movement as an “anti-worker” 
invasion, the majority of the Catholic laity, the hierarchy, and Catholic publications sided 
with the Jesuits in considering the civil war “a life or death struggle” for the soul of 
Catholicism in Spain. Commonweal, under pressure from its readership, briefly joined 
other newspapers such as the Holy Cross’ Ave Maria which identified Franco with the 
great liberators of the Eighteenth Century (among them, ironically Touissant L’Overture, 
an Enlightenment leader of the Haitian slave revolts). Ave Maria even went as far as to 
draw parallels between Christ and Franco, a common tactic of Fascists, asking “Was not 
Christ a divine rebel?” This question, an almost taunting rebuke of Maritain’s distinction 
between the sacred and secular described in his treatise on holy war, also stood in 
opposition to the pacifism which undergirded the Catholic Worker’s critique of Franco’s 
advances.  
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Franco’s support for Nazism and anti-Semitism also raised serious concerns among 
Catholics who had taken Pius XI’s condemnation of racism to heart.80 In 1938, two years 
before his arrival, three major newspapers, Denver’s The Register, Boston’s Pilot, and the 
Catholic’s Digest attacked Maritain as both deliberately uninformed of Republican 
atrocities, and condescending in an alleged preference to maintain French security against 
a German threat over the preservation of his fellow churchmen. Intellectuals such as 
Henry Palmer, however, sympathized with Maritain’s pacifist approach. Palmer’s 
condemnation of a sword-cross alliance in Spain along with a change of editorial staff at 
Commonweal that reflected a more neutral stance, made the terrain more hospitable to 
Maritain in 1940.81 The conflict in the United States showed just how contentious the 
debate over Communism and Fascism had become in the world’s largest democracy. 
Ironically, bitter pushback to Maritain’s ideas would have their roots in the country that 
would soon become fascism’s primary opponent, showing just how fluid boundaries 
really were regarding the flow of ideas, and just how malleable national identities were at 
this point in time. 
Maritain and other progressive Catholics vigorously supported the resistance to Adolf 
Hitler and the French collaborationists from their exile. But significant differences 
between Maritain and the Free French movement would demonstrate that Maritain leaned 
more toward the role of a philosopher than a pragmatic politician.  Although he would 
later develop a substantiated view of governance that melded liberal pluralistic values 
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with Natural Law theory, during WWII, Maritain’s philosophy led him to react more than 
to construct his own vision.  
 
As John Hellman writes in an important article on Maritain’s time in exile in the United 
States, Maritain differed with allies such as Yvonne Simon and their unequivocal support 
of general Charles De Gaulle’s Free French Movement, which had set up an exile 
government in London after the fall of France to the Nazis, and the French government’s 
decision to collaborate with the invaders. While Simon saw romantic figures of resistance 
against tyranny, Maritain maintained a more accusative, skeptical, approach.  Far from 
distancing him from tough political choices, Maritain’s conception of the common good 
often led him to take politically inconvenient positions. Maritain put the burden of 
governance squarely on the shoulders of the French (he said the French middle class had 
“gotten the government they deserved” in the collaborationists), and thus, prioritized an 
organic democratic growth that would strengthen the entire French body politic. Maritain 
did not eschew politics in favor of a purely abstract theology, even in exile. He appealed, 
leveraging his friendship, to US President Franklin Roosevelt, asking the president to 
declare the rather isolationist nation in favor of the French cause. However, showing his 
philosophical conviction in correspondences with Simon, he rejected De Gaulle’s 
authoritarian nationalist sentiments as well as his anti-British, anti-US xenophobia, which 
in Maritain’s view only hurt France’s resistance efforts.82  
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Yves Simon denounced the “de-Christinazation” of the West accomplished not by the 
Communist powers as his opponents had feared, but rather by the “soft” authoritarian 
governments in France and Italy that gave sanction to the resentful political philosophy of 
the Nazi regime.  He wrote to Maritain in 1944 that the Catholic bore responsibilities 
“immediately behind that of the Nazis” by encouraging anti-Communist propaganda that 
only reinforced class-resentments and a sense of entitlement on the part of those that had 
composed the old governments of the occupied countries.  Maritain shared these 
sentiments, but unlike Simon, let them separate him from the Free French movement 
itself. Maritain wrote DeGaulle in 1942 slightly before his falling out with the French 
general that France’s working class could not work independently, but rather needed 
brave leaders that would foster a system “more profoundly and more truly democratic, 
more fervent for liberty, for justice and fraternity, more truly republican than 
that of the old liberalism.”83  Maritain then, did not want a Thomism of the past, but a 
radical transformation of political and spiritual society itself. 
Maritain considered radical solutions to the world problems of racism and working class 
alienation, aligning himself morally behind the rough American community organizer 
Saul Alinsky, who made himself famous and feared through the disruption of the social 
order and direct public challenges to those in power. Maritain also identified Eduardo 
Frei, a Chilean politician that would receive US support in later presidential runs, as 
another figure capable of bringing about his ambiguous state based on Natural Law and 
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secular pluralism.84 Maritain did not include his friend Roosevelt in that list of leaders of 
a defunct system. His time in the U.S., as well as influencing the U.S. Catholic debate 
had influenced his Thomism. Writing in 1942 in the midst of World War II, Maritain 
took a restrictive view of the state in spiritual matters, but an expansive view of the 
state’s prerogative in practical affairs. Following traditional Catholic doctrine, for him 
law did not follow from a merely positive consensus of the majority, but rather from 
immutable principles: 
 
The State, may, under defined circumstances, require a mathematician to teach 
mathematics, and a philosopher to teach philosophy: these are functions of the 
social body. But the State may not oblige a philosopher or a mathematician to 
adopt a philosophical or mathematical doctrine, because these depend solely and 
exclusively on truth...the secrets of the heart and the free act as such, the universe 
of moral truths, the right of conscience to listen to God and to make its way to 
him-none of these things, in either the natural or the supernatural order, may be 
touched by the State of fall into its clutches. It is true that law binds in conscience, 
but this is because it is law only if it is just and if promulgated by legitimate 
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authority, and not because the State of the majority would be the rule of 
conscience.[citation?] 
Maritain argued that while the state reserved the rights to impose punishments it could 
not “reform the judgment of [one’s] conscience” and impose “its own judgments of good 
and evil…or impose any religious faith whatsoever” without resorting to “means of 
psychological poisoning, organized by lies and terror.”85 On Thomist grounds, Maritain 
justified the separation of Church and State and laid the groundwork for a radical 
renovation in Catholic thinking on religious freedom. Maritain also maintained a central 
tenet of Christian Democracy, that man’s spiritual development lay at the heart of social 
reform, but that mere spirituality led to a dead faith. This view of Christian Democracy 
can be found in the philosophy of San Alberto Hurtado, a Chilean Jesuit, and a 
contemporary of Maritain’s in the 1930s and 1940s. He gave a talk in Rancagua 
Cathedral in October of 1943 pondering: “All of this is necessary [wealth redistribution, 
union organization, an education plan], but [reform] presupposes the reform of spirits. 
Reform society or man? Begin with man to transform society.” 86 
In short, authoritarianism, Communist or Fascist, denied truth by denying the dignity and 
autonomy of the individual. Communism of the Stalinist variety wished to homogenize 
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all classes and indoctrinate workers to engender loyalty to the state. Fascism wished, in a 
parallel way, to hoist the idol of traditional national values, religious and cultural, upon 
the conscience of unwilling dissenters. For this reason, both systems were doomed to 
failure. History ended up proving Maritain’s assumptions of totalitarian failures and the 
societal strife the transitions would cause correct. With the end of the War, the world, and 
the Catholic Church in general was left struggling to pick up the pieces of a broken old 
order and bracing for a new one highlighted by the Cold War. 
THE COLD WAR BEGINS: DIVISION, REFORM, AND CONFLICT 
“All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin. And therefore, as a free man, I take pride in 
the words "Ich bin ein Berliner!"- John F. Kennedy, June 26, 1963 
 
The words above highlighted exactly the reversed role Russia now played in the postwar  
U.S. imagination. While the United States had always regarded the Soviet Union with 
suspicion, the war had allowed a brief interlude in which democracy considered 
Communism a necessarily evil-and therefore ally-against the Fascist forces that 
threatened U.S. interests around the globe. However, Russian-US animosity soon showed 
through. The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the quick Japanese surrender 
ensured that Russia would advance no further than Manchuria. Furthermore, the 1950 
Korean War pitted the Soviet’s northern proxy against the US backed UN proxies and 
Southern government. The Brazilian journal A Ordem took note of the conflict, using 
much of the apocalyptic language that had surrounded the Spanish Civil War: Tales of 
burning churches, loss of property, and the destruction of crucifixes and other sacred 
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objects in a “satanic rage.”87 The Korean conflict also served as a juxtaposition to an 
absolutist pacifist mindset, and served to reveal the discrepancies in liberal philosophies. 
In a criticism of Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, and long a 
compatriot of Mohandas Gandhi, A Ordem points out numerous differences between the 
two: Belief in material progress vs. the anti-materialism of Gandhi, a liberal sexual ethic 
compared to  Gandhi’s call for abstinence, the prime minister’s admiration for socialism 
contrasted with Gandhi’s spiritualized ethic. The journal, which favored the Western 
Europeans over the Soviet Union, criticized Nehru’s partial application of non-violence at 
home even while he demanded a halt to the UN-backed conflict in Korea.88 As these 
articles show, Catholics in Latin America showed a keen interest in other regions of the 
world and the Cold War’s effect on the world’s balance of power. The Brazilian 
intellectuals showed a general affinity for the actions of Western European democracies, 
while Argentine intellectuals seemed to show a more non-aligned approach toward US 
presence in the region. The US was not an omnipotent actor, but was a significant one. 
Generally, Christian Democracy89, and democracy in general, received a boost in the 
1940s and 1950s as the Fascist option declined and the United States saw it as a sort of 
hedge against Communism.90 In general, the United States did fear both right wing and 
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left wing popular reform. In Argentina, the 1943 that had brought the GOU junta to 
power and general Juan Domingo Peron into the position of the Secretary of Labor, had 
eventually evolved into a populist democratic movement that unnerved the United States 
enough for their own ambassador in the region to issue a “blue book” alleging direct 
connections between Peron and the defunct Nazi regime. From the left, the United States 
feared military leaders who instituted sweeping reforms threatening US interests. 
Catholic allies that had shown affinity toward the United States in the past continued that 
support.  
 
Jacques Maritain, the French  ambassador to the Vatican and a founding influence on the 
United Nations in the years immediately following the war (1945-1948) melded Thomist 
conceptions of a harmonious state based on Natural Law with U.S democratic principles. 
He pushed for reforms at the Vatican and even influenced the UN’s Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights. His influence on world affairs should not have been a 
surprise. In his The Rights of Man and the Natural Law (Les droits de l’homme et la loi 
naturelle), Maritain tied the Natural Law directly to Roosevelt’s Four Freedoms (of 
speech, worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear) saying they “correspond to 
yearnings of the Law of Nations which demand to be fulfilled by positive law and by an 
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economic and political organization of the civilized world.”91  Given the glowing 
language linking Roosevelt to one of Maritain’s own guiding principles, his participation 
in the organization which Roosevelt built, and in which his widow Eleanor Roosevelt 
now participated, should not have come as a surprise. 
 
In contrast to Maritain’s idealism about democracy’s inherent ability to restrain the 
selfish tendencies of the middle class, the United States showed a certain ambivalence to 
these ideals. Fearing the spread of Communism in Latin America, the United States 
opposed populist governments, often giving nods to local dictators in order to protect 
corporate economic interests.92  As the Cold War heated up after the Cuban Revolution, 
democratic allies that had been ignored in preceding decades suddenly seemed more 
appealing to the U.S.  Realpolitick drove even the United States’ support for one of 
Maritain’s closest Christian Democratic allies. Fearing populist leader Salvador Allende’s 
rise in Chile, the United States supported the Christian Democratic candidate Eduardo 
Frei in the 1964 Chilean elections, an election he eventually won. Frei, proved to be a far 
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from being a radical right-wing leader, instead Frei lead a series of literacy campaigns 
with radical education theorist Paulo Frieire which mixed Christian Democratic politics 
with Freire’s ideas about cultural liberation through a community’s design of their own  
education.93The United States supported center-left democracy based on stimulating 
economic development not to swat Communist mosquitos, but to drain the swamp of 
inequalities that made Communist growth.   
 
Unlike Maritain, some Catholic hierarchies gladly reaped the benefits (for the elites) of 
US economic ties without ascribing to its political philosophy. Ideologically, 
conservative Catholic writers shared liberal writers’ disdain for what they saw as soulless 
US imperialism.94 Catholic writers would also express severe doubts about the United 
States’ conception of democracy, holding to traditional Catholic teachings that came into 
direct conflict with the individualist and liberal ideas of their northern neighbor.  Debates 
over land reform in late 1940s Guatemala provides an early, and surprisingly developed, 
example of this skepticism. Only two to three years after the war, when the United States’ 
power seemed immeasurable, the conservative Guatemalan Church held to their “third-
way” philosophical position despite their reliance upon US economic ties.  
                                                 
93 For details on specific CIA operations see: 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20040925/docs.htm#245. Link accessed January 13, 2015. Better: 
Richard Immerman’s, The CIA in Guatemala. 
 For elaboration on these literacy campaign efforts, see: Andrew J. Kirkendall, "Paulo Freire, Eduardo Frei, 
Literacy Training and the Politics of Consciousness Raising in Chile, 1964 to 1970," Journal of Latin 
American Studies 36, no. 04 (2004): 687-717. 
94 The vitriol with which Catholic writers talk about the U.S’  intervention in Vietnam echoes liberal 
nationalists’ Jose Marti’s critiques of the U.S in Nuestra America and Rodo’s depiction of the U.S as 
Caliban in Ariel). 
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In a text on land reform and its relationship to Communism at the end of May 1947, 
Accion Social Cristiana’s (the most prominent Catholic magazine in the country) 
editorial board recognized the connection between poverty and the Communist appeal, 
calling poverty the “gangrene that rots and corrupts countries.” The author warns readers 
of other techniques such as unnecessary wars that eat up a country’s treasury, as well as 
inflation, high taxes that stifle business and “imped[e] the formation of the reserves 
which assure progressive development” leading to the “rupture of the relations between 
the patron class and the workers.” The author warns against “heavy bureaucracies” that 
stifle entrepreneurial growth. Apparently this disruptive process of “socialization” is best 
brought about by land reform. The editorial does not blame unequal land distribution, but 
a bad distribution of workers “lack of attendance at work…vices…and the destruction of 
the principles of moral responsibility in the patron class…the breakdown of respectful 
discipline and respect in the workers because of the effect of propaganda in the 
countryside.” The author warns that adding a redistribution (presumably of a socialist 
nature) would cause the “chaos” that the communists need to “impose their detestable 
way of life. God help us!”95  
 
This view reflected the dilemma that Church leaders, in Guatemala and across Latin 
America, faced in their relationship to the United States. Generally, the liberalism that the 
                                                 
95 Editorial, “El comunismo y la Reforma Agraria” Acción Social Cristiana, 29 de Mayo de 1947. 
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US promoted (and Maritain found so useful) was anathema to the very notion of the 
common good and the Catholic dominance sought by social Catholics. The United States 
after all was a product of the Enlightenment experiment in popular (albeit representative 
and restricted) sovereignty, fused with French deist ideas and materialist economic 
theories. Catholics tended to hold a healthy suspicion of the free markets as a breeding 
ground for the inequalities that gave rise to Communism. Therefore, the Church generally 
emphasized moral tenets, not material solutions. The article repudiates the worker’s 
slothfulness, but also the owner’s loss of noblesse oblige. This feudal concept, combined 
with a priority on the human person as the center instead of economic structures and 
analysis, stood at the heart of the Catholic critique, even as the Cold War made clerics 
choose between the “two sides of the coin” that Leo XIII had condemned.  
 
Guatemala represented a Christian Democratic paradox. While Maritain’s stay in the 
United States strengthened his pluralistic vision, in this land so close to the United States, 
Franco’s Spain still offered the brightest beacon of hope for a Christian society. Some 
authors, such as José Calderón Salazar, claimed that a libertarian right was as dangerous 
as a communist left, that capitalism only existed in an uneasy alliance, the lesser of two 
evils. Salazar exempted Franco from the category of the “right” because of his alleged 
pursuit of the common good. The right, defined as the capitalist extremists that were 
protesting against Franco at the time constitute a “tyranny” that “dictates” the terms of 
the common good. Some authors went as far as to claim that the authoritarian ruler 
represented an “authentic” democracy that brought order and stability to the population 
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and expressed the deepest wishes of the Catholic majority, even if the Spanish Basque 
population didn’t quite see it that way. One writer, Alfonso Junco, gave Franco a 
particularly glowing review, distinguishing between formal and authentic democracy 
decades before the US’s own ambassador would make his famous distinction between 
“authoritarian” and “totalitarian.” Franco eschewed an “opportunistic attitude” instead 
opting for “democracy insofar as it is authentic and deep [as opposed to “formal or 
sophistic” democracy].” The author argued that Franco emphasized “spontaneity” over 
the coopting for the masses, and echoing Alceu Lima’s view on Portugal in the 1930s, 
Junco praised the Spain of the 1940s for supporting “productive capacity…particularly 
with its emphasis on individual initiative.”96 The conservatively minded Guatemalan 
Catholic Church of the 1950s embraced the language of democracy as it applied to 
economic principles, but in the social sphere, embraced the reactionary Democratic 
Social Catholicism of the 1930s.  
 
Broadly speaking, the Catholic Church, a multi-state actor in world affairs, seemed free 
to take a none-of-the-above approach to the United States’ foreign policy in the region, 
supporting the U.S. only when larger geopolitical forces pushed it to.  All told, the 
positions of the early Cold War Catholic Churches  reveal a complex relationship to the 
events unfolding, and the government actors, of the region. On one hand, the Catholic 
Church during the 1950s drew clear lines separating Catholicism and Communism. On 
                                                 
 96Alfonso Junco , “Franco y la Democracia” Acción Social Cristiana 28 de marzo de 1946. See also: José 
Calderón Salazar, “La derecha:Otro Peligro”, Acción Social Cristiana 8 de mayo 1947. 
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the other hand, the economic development and social justice that served as hallmarks of 
modernity threatened to blur these lines altogether. The Church’s charge seemed 
therefore, to wrestle with the possibility of yet again engaging a world that presumed a 
Church without answers. The Catholic Church responded to this challenge by calling for 
the second Ecumenical Council in less than one hundred years in Rome, setting the stage 
for either reform or retrenchment. 
 
THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL: RECEPTIONS AND REACTIONS 
In 1960, Pope John XXIII announced the preparations for a new council. Though 
surprising, the Council presented an opportunity for both reformist and traditionalist 
wings of the Catholic Church. For progressives, the Council opened the door for 
reengaging Modernity, the rationalist philosophies that the Church had originally 
condemned as materialistic and devoid of God. For traditionalists, the Council offered an 
opportunity to resolve the unfinished business of the First Vatican Council which had 
been cut short by invasion. Specifically, the Second Vatican Council, in light of two 
world wars, allowed traditionalists to point to the failures of fictitious modern models 
such as the modern nation state and condemn with more moral backing the racial scientist 
ideas that had provided the base for Nazi ideology.   
 
Modernity’s failings were not all that traditionalists could count on however. In the lead 
up to the Council, the Roman Curia, and specifically the Holy Office (now the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith) guided both the preparatory documents and 
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the discussion committees. The bishops expected a speedy ratification of the preparatory 
documents, and a final condemnation of what they saw as festering heresies. However, 
the traditionalists did not anticipate John XXIII’s desire to “open” the doors of the 
Church to “let in the air.” Nor did they anticipate one of his harsher descriptions of old 
Scholastic philosophers as “these prophets of doom.” As if echoing Maritain’s 1940s 
criticisms of DeGaulle’s Free French Movement, the Pope insisted on “a new order of 
relations” that had been lacking in previous generations due to an overly narrow view of 
theology that did not take into account early (and lively) Patristic debates. Through “a 
return to the sources”, the Pope encouraged theologians to recognize new possibilities in 
theological development and its place in the longer tradition of back-and-forth debates 
between the Church fathers.97  
 
Gaudium et Spes (The Church in the Modern World), an apostolic constitution, and 
therefore the highest category of decree in the Church, developed a “new humanism” 
which, through powers of observation (much like Leo XIII’s careful response to the rise 
of Socialism), allowed the Church to condemn religious fundamentalists who had pitted 
science against reason, while offering a standard theological narrative of “sin and grace” 
that affirmed God as the center, as opposed to the adversary, of individual human 
achievement. Another document, Dignitatis Humanae stirred even more controversy, as 
it expanded Maritain’s warning that the state could not dictate religious doctrines into a 
                                                 
97 Joseph A. Komonchak, “The encounter between Catholicism and liberalism, 78-79.  
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general call for religious freedom. Besides resetting the relationship between the 
monotheistic religions, the document also quoted the parable of the wheat and the chafe, 
implying, against previous pastoral interpretations, that error, or “competing truth claims” 
could exist simultaneously while preserving the common good.  
This assumption caused consternation among anti-Modernist bishops, especially France’s 
Lefébvre. Lefébvre’s Society of St. Pius X, would later quarrel with Pope John Paul II 
leading to “schismatic actions.” Divisions, regional and theological, further fueled 
tensions. From a Continental philosophical perspective, liberalism meant the exclusion 
and suppression of religion, something Catholics feared. From a US-English standpoint, 
formal separation of Church and State existed to allow room for religious debate to 
flourish.  
Two main lines of theology, Thomism and “patristic” theologians with their ground in St. 
Augustine, generally dominated the debate. Thomist scholars at the council focused less 
on a repudiation of the world than an understanding of it on its own terms. This attitude 
reflected Aquinas’ desire to meld Thirteenth Century secular philosophy with his 
understanding of the gospel. Aristotelian influences perhaps allowed Thomists to 
attribute failures in the modern world to ignorance rather than base malevolence, whereas 
Augustinians, while right in their return to complex patristic debates, tended towards 
more dualistic visions of man’s relationship with the world. 98 A closer look at these 
divisions allow the reader to quickly see Maritain’s influence on the Council. A Thomist 
                                                 
98 Ibid. 80-81, 84-87. The Society of St. Pius X has not been officially declared “schismatic” since 
Lefebvre and his four followers were legitimately ordained. However, they committed “schismatic actions” 
in the subsequent ordaining of priests not approved by the Pope himself. 
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scholar versed in the Anglo-Saxon tradition from his time in exile, and  positioned at the 
highest levels of the Vatican bureaucracy for a time, Maritain with his “New 
Christendom’s” simultaneous embrace of pluralism and rejection of an atomized 
modernity, had served as the blueprint for a Council that would have worldwide 
repercussion. A return to patristic sources allowed Church leaders new methods of 
historicizing theological concepts, and expanded debates beyond time-tested Scholastic 
syllogisms. 
 
Latin America, as much as any other region, would struggle with these concepts in a local 
way.  On one hand (surprisingly), Argentine Jesuit Julio Meinvielle argued for a theology 
of continuity with regards to the Declaration on Religious Freedom, arguing that such a 
document represented a reaffirmation of the right to conscience in the traditional sense, 
but that modernity, with its “intellectual anarchy” necessitated a different type of 
language, affirming man’s inherent self-worth in a mechanistic age.  Meinvielle argued 
that the Council merely attempted to clarify “secondary rights” such as freedom of 
religion and liberty generally speaking, so that humans would more easily claim their 
“primary” right”: To serve God in truth. 99 On the other end of the divide, as Phillip 
Berryman explains in his 1980s work on Central American Liberation Theology, the 
region’s clergy started to move beyond even the popularly based grace of the Council, a 
grace based in the hope for progress to that of “a world of poverty, end even misery, 
                                                 
99  Julio Meinvielle, La declaración conciliar sobre la libertad religiosa y la doctrina tradicional (Buenos 
Aires: Ediciones Theoría, 1966),6-7. This position is surprising because Meinvielle so often positioned 
himself against Conciliar reformers especially on the issue of religious tolerance. 
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which the efforts at ‘development’ were proving unable to change.” Those countries like 
Brazil and Colombia in his vision, failed to recognize this trend, and therefore liberation 
theology failed in those areas even while it succeeded during revolutionary governments 
like that of the 1979 Sandanistas.100 In the late 1940s, a prelate from Rio de Janeiro, Dom 
Hélder Câmara, and then head of Brazilian Catholic Action (ACB), was already pushing 
for the strengthening of the Church’s relationship to the poor. He also lobbied the Vatican 
for a more collegial spirit that led to the founding of the first national conference, the 
National Conference of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) in 1952. Like Maritain, Câmara saw a 
disordered list of priorities on the part of the traditional clergy. For Câmara, this position 
constituted a political transformation that had begun to read Integral Humanism (1936) 
per the recommendation of Alceu Lima. Echoing Maritain’s skepticism of the middle 
class, he questioned “the Pharisaic [attitude] of determining that we the bourgeosis  
represent social order and virtue and that Communists embody disorder, disequilibrium 
and disenchantment, and the forces of evil…we have our own faults and sins […] 
because we cover up social injustices with generous and spectacular offerings.”101 
Câmara  believed that combatting poverty would root out the atheist Communism that 
conservative colleagues so feared, pushing, instead for an all-out assault on atheism, 
                                                 
100 Phillip Berryman, The Religious Roots of Rebellion: Christians in Central American Revolutions 
(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books,1984),25-27. 
101 Quoting Helder Câmara In: Nelson Piletti; Walter Praxedes, Dom Hélder Câmara: Entre o Poder e a 
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social programs that would bring the freshness of the gospel to the downtrodden that 
viewed the Church with indifference, if not outright skepticism.102  
His colleagues resisted his vision as well as close ties to the questionable governments of 
Jânio Quadros and João Goulart. Câmara’s participation in many of the government’s 
social action programs moved his fellow clerics to label him a Communist, and the 
Vatican was forced, in the middle of the Second Vatican Council, to reassign him to the 
Northeast. In the halls of Rome though, Hélder Câmara remained extremely effective, 
helping author “the Pact of the Catacombs” which admonished the “deficiencies in the 
life of the poor” and encouraged priests to abandon the regal, almost pharisaical lifestyle, 
and live in the “ordinary way of our parishioners”, increasing vocations by “sharing the 
worker life and the work [itself].”103  
 
Dom Hélder Câmara reflected the Council’s acknowledgement of other philosophies and 
its willingness to at least engage with all parts of the modern world stating that he had 
“special love” for “atheists in name [that are nevertheless] Christian in practice.” 
Câmara’s “work of evangelization” had a specific name: Developmentalism. For Câmara, 
seeing the “disfigured face” of Christ was not sufficient if Christian followers found 
themselves unable to see the potential glorified Christ in the worker “pulled out of 
underdevelopment.”104 Dom Hélder Câmara did not represent the break from the 
                                                 
102  Martinho Condini, “Dom Hélder Câmara, Arceobispo de Olanda e Recife, e o Segundo Concílio 
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103 Ibid. 72 citing Kloppenburg, 1966, p. 526-528, 73-74. 
104 Ibid., 76 citing Oliveira, 2000, 91,95. 
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hierarchy of the Church that his radical supporters or reactionary critics hold up as their 
banner of support or opposition to the Brazilian Church’s resistance of the 1964 military 
regime. Rather, he remained consistent with a Christian Democratic idea of engagement 
with the common man, and working class in particular. Such an engagement came from 
Maritain’s philosophy with which he was familiar, and was in step with Eduardo Frei in 
Chile, whose government in 1963 would condemn the 1966 Oganía coup  in Argentina. 
As O Diário’s foreign correspondent Newton Carlos would report, beyond condemning 
authoritarian coups, Frei’s government would also be open to “dialogue” with political 
opponents, “even the Communists with whom he competed for the Chilean masses.”105  
This line of thought had represented an influential, but minority, view in previous eras 
(the Spanish Civil War and World War II as we have seen), but saw itself codified in the 
documents of the Second Vatican Council. 
 
Divisions over the means to development (social or economic) extended to reproductive 
rights. Even after the Council’s definitive end, the Argentine and Brazilian Church’s’ 
divisions showed regarding Pope Paul V’s 1968 pastoral letter on birth control, Humana 
Vitae. In Argentina, a social consensus between an anti-imperialist left, a traditionalist 
hierarchy, in the midst of a population decrease paved the way for a swift acceptance by 
large sectors of Argentine society of the pastoral letter.106  In Brazil, the hierarchy 
                                                 
105 Newton Carlos, “Denúncia de Golpe no Chile”  Diário 31 de julho de 1966. 
106  Karina A Felitti. "La Iglesia Católica y el control de la natalidad en tiempos del Concilio: la recepción 
de la encíclica" Humanae vitae (1968) en Argentina."Anuario IEHS: Instituto de Estudios histórico 
sociales 22 (2007): 349-372. To see a constructive critiques of the Episcopate’s reception of Humanae 
Vitae and its relationship to Paul VI’s letter on social justice Populorum Progresso See: Radrizzani, Juan 
 75 
attempted to impose, with only moderate success, a unified Catholic face upon receiving 
the news of the letter’s publication. However, Brazilian Catholics’ openness to world 
influence allowed for a vigorous debate surrounding the pastoral letter itself, and echoed 
the dilemma for Catholics across the globe.  
The Brazilian daily O Lutador ran an article covering a petition by seventeen couples of 
the Paulist associates who considered that the encyclical would only add to the economic 
and social pressures facing working families, and indirectly, encroach upon the privacy of 
the individual. All the while, the couples claimed faithfulness to the Catholic Church and 
condemned governments that attempted to impose birth control upon its citizens.107 So 
controversial was that letter that the paper ran an editorial on the same page stating that 
covering news did not mean an endorsement of the views expressed in the story, but 
rather, that the story merely showed an informative purpose. However, the Brazilian 
paper questioned whether the Brazilian hierarchy, which was concerned with social 
issues, fully backed the Pope despite their supportive statements, signaling one area of 
agreement with the Costa military regime.108 
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 In both countries, the question of birth control became a matter of national pride and 
development. On one hand, Argentine intellectuals and church officials saw in the Pope’s 
restriction of birth control, a viable incentive for national growth in a time of stagnation, 
whereas their Brazilian counterparts saw birth control as a way of attaining greater 
economic equality for the poor and reaching stages of development similar to those of the 
“central” countries. In each case, theology mixed heavily with the economy and often the 
theological  converged with  the practical. The Brazilians for their part, continued the 
social tradition begun in the 1940s, only to turn the “correct belief-correct action” 
sequence on its head. Praxis, the foundation of the nascent Liberation Theology, would 
come to dominate the Brazilian seen as a more direct form of developmentalism. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
A proper analysis of intellectual flows in the Catholic world shows that the elites of each 
country did not merely impart or receive knowledge from Europe, but rather, were forced 
through their travels, correspondences, and even periods of exile, to deal with complex 
local realities and relationships that challenged easy theories that demonized one faction 
and lauded the other. Catholic intellectuals from all over the world observed hotbeds of 
Catholic resistance to secular regimes attempting to squash religious freedom. A look at 
the Nineteenth  Century shows a stark divide between those who wished to adapt to an 
increasingly militant liberalism and those that wished to construct a “Catholic option” in 
the public sphere. But even this latter “intransigent” group suffered divisions in its 
reaction to secularization. Christian Democrats, based in the personalist Catholic 
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tradition, showed a certain amount of flexibility in their definitions of political truths and 
on notions of tolerance. Social Catholics, while sharing many of these critiques, 
nevertheless held to a firm “third-way” option that excluded both revolutionary and 
liberal philosophies from their governing models.  
Three periods, the Cristero Rebellion, the Spanish Civil War, and World War II, provided 
early tests for Christian Democracy and Social Catholicism, with the latter, in the absence 
of a truly Royalist option, finding favor among the majority of authoritarian writers and 
the Church hierarchy. Figures such as Jacques Maritain turned theological certainties on 
their head. Maritain’s friendship with radicals who expressed indifference or outright 
distaste for religious doctrine in part suggests a certain hesitance surrounding political 
dogmas even as the French philosopher repeatedly side-stepped traditionalist charges of 
heresy. 
 In the Post-war period, US interests would complement and collide with Catholic social 
ideologies. The Guatemalan Church would embrace the United States’ economic aid and 
anti-Communism, while rejecting the superpower’s emphasis on the liberal free market, 
instead doubling down on Spanish corporativism. The Chilean Church, which had always 
placed a premium on social action tied to political parties. These prelates would 
eventually find its lay solution in the form of Eduardo Frei, who had Maritain’s 
philosophical backing, and the United States’ tacit endorsement as a champion of 
economic development and a bulwark against revolutionary alternatives embodied in 
Popular Front candidate Salvador Allende.  
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The Brazilian Church, commonly associated with the Cuban Revolution and its brand of 
revolutionary Christianity by its more conservative critics, opted for robust social action 
that stayed at least an arm’s length away from the castrista personalism that so infuriated 
Social Catholic bishops on the Island. Furthermore, independent intellectuals separated 
over approach as much as substance.  Jackson de Figueiredo and Alceu Lima developed 
subtle, but key difference in their approach to liberalism (polemic vs. dialogue) that 
would eventually dispose Lima towards a conciliatory tone in the Post-World War II 
decades.  On the other hand, the continuing influence of figures like Castellani and 
Meinvielle in Argentina, and the failure of the democratic intellectuals such as Criterio 
editor Jorge Maria Mejia, to bring their international reputation to bear in order to win 
local disputes, would lead to an enduring conservative intransigence that allowed military 
governments to flourish unchallenged by the Church.109 
The following chapters of this thesis will outline in greater detail the trajectories of 
Church/State relations in Argentina and Brazil to more fully account for the difference in 
each Episcopate’s engagement with their respective authoritarian governments. These 
chapters will focus on specific journals, newspapers, and thinkers, and their responses to 
international events of Catholic significance.  They will also wrestle with larger questions 
around each country’s integration of its Catholic wing, and how such integration or 
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marginalization affected each respective community’s internal conflicts and their ability 
to respond to world events. 
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Chapter Two: “A Country of Jauja”: Authoritarian Catholics in 
Argentina 1930-1980 
INTRODUCTION: 
On March 13, 2013, Cardinal Jorge Mario Bergoglio became the first Latin American 
pope. Questions immediately surfaced regarding his role during the dictatorship, 
accusations of complicity, and rebuttals claiming that he had assisted in guiding an 
underground railroad of sorts of political refugees to Europe. His apparent conflicts with 
two disappeared priests under his charge, Francisco Jalics and Father Orlando Yorio, 
highlighted the divisions that ravaged the Church during that time period, and with the 
complicity of many in the hierarchy, decimated its social wing. The horrors of the Dirty 
War have polarized society’s reading of the Church. Activists such as Emilio Mignone 
accused the Church of being at best silent, and at worst complicit. Sociological historian 
María Soledad Catoggio takes a different tact, emphasizing the internal conflicts and 
contradictions within a Church split by the various social upheavals of the day.  Catoggio 
notes that the Montoneros, one of the main guerrilla groups, started a correspondence 
with John Paul II while nationalist priest Leonardo Castellani uses his connections with 
Argentine dictator Jorge Rafael Videla to free Argentine writer Haroldo Conti. Shifting 
political circumstances pitted reformers against revolutionaries and authoritarians against 
the reformers. To challenge a simplistic narrative of collaboration, Catoggio points to the 
successes of personal interventions on behalf of disappeared priests and on notable 
failures of direct denouncements. Denouncements did not strengthen the Church’s hand, 
all the while endangering and killing several key leaders in the Church such as La Rioja’s 
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Enrique Angelelli, and Neuquen’s Jaime de Nevares.110 However, both of these views fail 
to present a complete theological and political view from within the Church itself, instead 
tracing its reforms in relationship to secular political politics. This political debate centers 
upon Church complicity or resistance to this authoritarian regime as a primarily political 
maneuver, for example: the Montoneros as resisters, and the privileged hierarchy as the 
dictatorship’s loyal stooges). 
 In short, these political historians discard Catholic ideas as an independent epistemology, 
instead trying to see the bishops mainly as power brokers whose theology takes a second 
place to worldly survival. Catholic intellectuals, especially from the nationalist wing, 
present a challenge this narrative. In the first place, intellectuals maintain a certain 
amount of autonomy, bringing discomfort to ecclesial and secular authorities alike. 
Argentine Church historian José Zanca identifies three unique levels of Catholic 
intellectuals: Religious, disciplinary, and political. Zanca also divides the Church during 
the early and mid-twentieth century between the hierarchy, the clergy, and the laity, in a 
descending orjder of power and influence.111  In this chapter, I will outline the various 
currents of Argentine Catholicism centered around its reaction to the Spanish Civil War, 
and the Second Vatican Council. Catholic activists such as Emilio Mignone (one of the 
main proponents of the “complicit vs. persecuted” Church dichotomy, was a Catholic 
who pushed a renovating vision of the Catholic Church, one that at the same time 
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proposed a break in the traditional relationship between the Church and the state. On the 
other side of the Catholic divide stood the old guard that, with the backing of the 
hierarchy, rejected the conclusions of the Second Vatican Council and mocked the 
Council’s main contributors. Bridging the divide for a time before the council was 
Gustavo Franceschi, editor of Argentina’s main Catholic journal Critério. Franceschi’s 
view wavered between the traditional corporatist viewpoint he had inherited from the 
1930s with the Christian Democratic position he was forced to accept after the war.   
This divide showed that Catholic Nationalists and their opponents, far from retreating 
from a corrupt world, and leaving it to the military, threw themselves heavily into 
politics. But while Catholics of all stripes sought a way out of the liberal wilderness, they 
valued the exaltation of Catholic values as their first priority.  Catholic Nationalists often 
navigated their own issues with the military dictatorships that checkered Argentina’s 
twentieth Century, considering the regimes too close to traditional liberal structures (too 
sensitive to foreign investment and international opinion) to deserve Catholics’ full 
support, but better than the “Marxist conspiracy” and incompetent democratic structures 
that constantly threatened “the Fatherland.”112 This chapter will first trace Argentine 
liberal and conservative relationships to the Church from the interwar period (1918-
1930), through the buildup to the Spanish Civil War and World War II and the (1930-
1945). During this latter time period, Catholic intellectuals broached a particular system, 
fascism, as a vehicle for applying religious ideas to politics, but even this philosophy 
                                                 
112 See: Jorge Saborido, “El nacionalismo argentino en los años de plomo: la revista Cabildo y el proceso 
de reorganización nacional (1976-1983)”, Anuario de Estudios Americanos, 62, 1, enero-junio, 235-270, 
Sevilla (España), 2005. 
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presented challenges to a Catholicism concerned with reducing the state’s role in 
religious affairs even as Catholics attempted to influence the state. 
Second, the argument will also deal with the fragmentation of the Argentine Catholic 
intellectual establishment during the Peronist era (1946-1955) and simultaneously, the 
democratic transition and Conciliar period (1945-1966). Lastly, and third, the paper will 
attempt to explain the ideological triumphs of more radical elements of the Church during 
Argentina’s series of coups and near-civil wars (1969-1983) despite a brief Catholic-
Liberal détente immediately following the 1955 coup against General Juan Domingo 
Perón. For closer analysis I will focus on the work of Leonardo Castellani, a Jesuit priest 
that simultaneously invited scorn from his immediate colleagues and the international 
Catholic community, and praise and protection from the Argentine bishops and 
intellectuals such as the fascist and anti-Semitic priest Julio Meinville. Following his 
trajectory as editor of his own journal, Jauja, this paper can offer concrete details that can 
paint a more exact picture of Argentine reactionaries than those offered through 
macrohistory or sociological analytical binaries.   
As a necessary contextual preamble, this paper will outline both unitario (with regalistic 
tendencies toward the Church) and federalist historical (more traditionalist Catholic, but 
also paternalistic toward the Argentine state) narratives comparing with them with the 
social and subaltern histories currently gaining prominence among Argentine scholars.113 
                                                 
113 For a summary of liberal historian and President Bartolomé Mitre’s historiography see: Reviewed 
Work: Bartolome Mitre, Historian of the Americas by John L. Robinson Review by: John Lynch Journal of 
Latin American Studies Vol. 17, No. 1 (May, 1985): 263. See: Bartolomé Mitre, Historia de Belgrano 
(Buenos Aires: [La Librería de la Victoria] Imprensa de Mayo, 1859). See also: Domingo Faustino 
Sarmiento, Conflictos y armonías de las razas en América (Buenos Aires: S. Ostwald, 1883). For an 
 84 
Comparing a nuanced reality to the narratives constructed by liberals and their revisionist 
counterparts regarding international affairs and domestic heroes, this paper will be able to 
critically highlight the Church’s specific historical discourse, and stake out the 
uniqueness of the Argentine Church’s position. Such an approach ultimately highlights 
the theological, rather than merely political, questions that drove these intellectuals. 
 CONSERVATIVES AND LIBERALS: DECONSTRUCTING THE MYTHS 
“Varón que quedaste en la historia entrando a la gloria tu vida patriota, ejemplo fue tu vida recta sembrando 
respecto a tu alrededor. Los hombres con sus conveniencias trataron una con seña tu imagen borrar, más 
sólo así consiguieron que el pueblo conozca la justa verdad.”- Rimoldo Fraga, “El Restaurador yo te 
canto”114 
 
The polarization that the introduction indicates took place within the context of a 
historiographical battle to determine the heart of the nation: Classical liberals who exalted 
elite democracy as the ultimate vehicle, and those that revived Spanish monarchism and 
Argentina’s revived conservative hero, Nineteenth Century governor of Buenos Aires 
Juan Manuel de Rosas (1835-1952). This particular historiography, Argentina’s neutrality 
during the war, the hierarchy’s rejection of the Vatican II reforms, and the chaos 
surrounding the growing violence at the end of the Isabel Peron government, all opened 
                                                 
example of Federalist revisionist historiography see: José María Rosas, La caída de Rosas (Buenos Aires: 
2. ed., Colección Política e historia, 1968).   For subaltern historiography see: Windus, Astrid. "El 
afroporteño en la historiografía argentina: algunas consideraciones críticas," Trabajos y 
comunicaciones No. 28-29(2003): 9-41. See also: Ricardo D. Salvatore, Wandering Payasanos: State 
Order and Subaltern Experience in Buenos Aires During the Rosas Era (Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 2003) 
 
114 “Man who made his place in history, your patriotic life entering into glory, your straight life was an 
example, sowing seeds of respect all around you. Men with their own agendas desired to blot out your 
name, but trying that they only made the country know the righteous truth]. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1WP4tzMv46E.  
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the way for a traditional sounding, but innovative and radical way for reconceiving 
Catholicism.  
Nineteenth-Century liberals in Argentina prided themselves on developing, among other 
things, the Sarmientine idea of civilization and barbarism, barbarism being associated 
with the traditional Catholic Church. However, they generally took a moderate position 
regarding the Church. Anti-clerical measures such as those developed in 19th Century 
Guatemala and Colombia did not come to fruition in Argentina. Instead, a modest modus 
vivendi between liberals and the Church forestalled conflict. This relative stability is 
shown in the 1853 Constitution which states “El Gobierno federal sostiene el culto 
católico apostólico romano,”[The Federal Government sustains the Roman Catholic 
religion]. This   relationship has continued to survive, even through the 1994 reform, 
which went as far as to abolish the Catholic religion as a test for public office.115 This 
being said, the state was not passive regarding the church.116 Not all liberal advances 
projected benign intent. The Argentine Church was unable to halt liberal reformist 
agitation that began when the first constitutional president Bernardino Rivadavia pushed 
for state control of the church, its personnel, and its property.117 However, these reforms, 
                                                 
115Artículo II de la Constitución argentina, (1994). 
116  For more information on the Bourbon reforms and their effects on colonial Argentina, see: Roberto Di 
Stefano, "Entre Dios y el César: el clero secular rioplatense de las reformas borbónicas a la Revolución de 
Independencia." Latin American research review (2000): 130-159. To see the gradual development of 
secularization based in the reforms and the late development of the Argentine Church, see: Roberto Di 
Stefano, "Lay Patronage and the Development of Ecclesiastical Property in Spanish America: The Case of 
Buenos Aires, 1700–1900." Hispanic American Historical Review 93, no. 1 (2013): 67-98. 
117John J. Kennedy, Catholicism, Nationalism, and Democracy in Argentina, (South Bend: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1958), p.19. 
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unlike ones in Twentieth Century Mexico, did not punish the Church; they merely 
deepened the church’s dependence on the state without addressing the Church as a moral 
institution.  
Historically, the Church had remained divided since the revolution in its response to 
liberalism and the Church’s role in society.  Father Isidoro Guerra of Buenos Aires, a 
traditionalist Dominican scholastic supported the liberal-backed independence 
movement. Father Mariano Medrano, a liberal who lauded the Enlightenment’s 
unorthodox scientific advances, criticized Rivadavia’s attacks on Church property, 
warning they could hurt non-state institutions that relied on the Church for assistance.118 
The adaptability and ambiguity of the church’s status might explain some of its ability to 
avoid a complete break from the state.    
 
But Medrano had real basis for concern in protesting against the vacuum the state would 
leave through the expropriation of Church property. Since the colonial era, the Church 
had been influential in education and politics, but by the time the Constitution was 
ratified the national attitude had shifted toward partly sidelining the church’s influence, 
fearing that its power base might impede the formation of a national identity. 
Government officials did not exclude it per se, but reinforced the idea of the Church as a 
social, not overtly political, institution. In short, the church has an uncertain, but not 
uncomfortable status within the Argentine polity. This ambiguous tension continued into 
                                                 
118 Karl Schmitt, “The Clergy and the Enlightenment in Latin America”, The Americas Vol.15 No.4 (Apr. 
1959): p.388. 
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the mid-twentieth century. US historian John J. Kennedy wrote about the Church’s 
ambiguous social limbo in 1958: 
“The major question that may be asked here is: ‘Does Argentina have an official 
religion?’ Most Argentines would immediately reply in the negative. They would 
maintain that Article 2 of the Constitution provides ‘support’ for the Catholic religion 
without making it the official religion of the state. The decision of the 1853 convention 
was definitely to ‘support’ and not to ‘profess’ Catholicism on the part of the State. In 
this respect the 1853 decision was a deliberate departure from earlier constitutional 
essays, notably those of 1819 and 1826, which had expressly recognized Catholicism as 
the state religion.”119  
Domingo Faustino Sarmiento (1868-1874), a prominent leader of the Argentine liberal 
tradition critiqued by the Rosista populists and Catholic traditionalists, was not anti-
clerical as much as he was personally dismissive of any religion that tried to usurp the 
power of the state. Sarmiento personally showed suspicion towards what he saw as 
religious superstition. Influenced by his uncle Fray José de Oro, a doctor and priest, he 
contrasted religious dogma with the technical scientific advances of modern medicine. He 
was, however, willing to accept a moral role for the church so long as it did not interfere 
politically with the liberal agenda. His insistence that priests only enter politics under the 
conditions that they endorse liberal civic morality gave Sarmiento a mixed view of priest 
                                                 
119 Ibid.,12.  
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Pedro Ignacio de Castro Barros, whose mix of politics and his religious duties to be an 
unacceptable distortion of true Catholic teaching.120   
On the other side of the ideological divide stood Buenos Aires governor Juan Manuel de 
Rosas (1835-1852), who styled himself a popular leader of the masses (with especially 
strong support among Afro-Argentines) and also a defender of the traditional perks of the 
Church. Many of his actions during the Restoration earned him the praise of the Church 
hierarchy.  He banned books that contradicted the moral doctrines of the church, did 
away with the religious tolerance laws, and returning much of the church property to the 
orders that had lost them during the Liberal regimes (dating back to the 1820’s). Such 
actions for a time pleased a church reeling from previous reforms. The porteño bishops’ 
classification of Rosas as “the definitive protector” of the church therefore should not 
puzzle scholars. However, not all that Rosas did reflected the best interests of the Church. 
Rosas still saw the church as the “bureaucratic arm of the state”, and thus intervened its 
everyday functioning.121   
                                                 
120 Roberto Di Stefano and Loris Zanatta, Historia de la iglesia argentina:Desde la conquista hasta fines 
del siglo XX, (Buenos Aires: Grijalbo S.A 2000), 247-248. After pushing for independence in the Tucuman 
Congress in 1816, Castro Barros  went into exile declaring himself nor Federalist nor  Unitarian (the 
conservatives and liberals of Argentina). He finally moved to Uruguay, and then Chile, to dedicate himself 
exclusively to his priestly duties. To see a summary of his political life, see: “Castro Barros un riojano que 
dejó su alma por la Patria y murió en el exilio” El Independiente (Archivo). 
http://www.elindependiente.com.ar/papel/hoy/archivo/noticias_v.asp?204151. Accessed October 18, 2014. 
 
121Roberto Di Stefano and Loris Zanatta,Historia de la iglesia argentina (Buenos Aires: Grijalbo 
Mondadori,2000)  235-237 quoting monseñor Madrano writing to Rio de Janeiro. 
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Rosas even challenged the supreme head of the universal church, annulling papal letters 
in Buenos Aires that were not properly approved by the Ministry of Foreign Relations.122 
Traditional types of patronato relationship, in which the state purportedly serves the 
interests of the Catholic Church in “restoring” them to prominence, came, in the eyes of 
some historians, at a cost of the church’s loss of legitimacy. The review of papal 
statements constitutes only one example of a patronato that in reality leans regalistic.  
Rosas often contested Rome in its appointments of bishops in Buenos Aires, and unlike 
Sarmiento, prioritized politicizing the church itself. Priests would preach sermons 
denouncing his opposition. More amiable however to traditional patronato arrangements, 
he used his armed forces to suppress clergy suspected of resistance to traditional church 
doctrine. This type of close church-state collaboration should raise concerns among 
Church historians today about Rosas’ legacy. A question remains about the wisdom of 
painting Rosas’ legacy as a Catholic one, if he once more subjugated the Church to the 
prerogatives of the state, merely tacking on a few additional benefits.123  
 Argentine historian Ricardo Salvatore paints a mixed picture of rosista repression, 
working class popularity, and Catholic traditionalism. Liberals characterized Rosas’ 
government as an all-encompassing “tyranny” that imposed “chromatic uniformity” on its 
subjects by mandating the use of Federalist clothing, by relying on corporal punishment 
                                                 
122José Maria-Ghio, La iglesia en la política argentina, (Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2007), 23. 
http://books.google.com/books?id=JtWyjwGGu8oC&printsec=frontcover&dq=José+MariaGhio,+La+iglesi
a+en+la+pol%C3%ADtica+argentina&source=bl&ots=S3fCVZHLYv&sig=urftPhoV8FEZQPVRhfujUcQ
QBQs&hl=en&ei=JNy9TZfAFo6FtgfLia3fBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CB0
Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q&f=false  
123John J. Kennedy, Catholicism, Nationalism, and Democracy in Argentina, 60-61 
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for crimes such as desertion, and its encouragement of religious festivals. Its use of 
violent spectacle also garnered it the caricature of Spanish “barbarism” by unitario 
critics. Federalist derision of cosmopolitan sophistication as “effeminate and pretentious” 
only reinforced unitario prejudice.124  Regarding his politics of religion, Rosas solidified 
liberal charges of tyranny by the ritual “Judas” burnings. In these appropriations of 
Catholic anti-Semitic religious narratives, the crowd burned images dressed in French 
style and unitario colors after the unitarios’ “journalistic propaganda” has been exposed 
by the actor. The actor associates the mercantile class with the ultimate betrayal of the 
system of Christ.125 As late as the eve before unitario caudillo Justo José de Urquiza was 
to defeat him at the battle of Caseros, Rosas premiered a play of Pedro Lacasa, El 
entierro del loco traidor, salvaje unitario Urquiza in which the violent plebes participate 
in the beheading of an Urquiza effigy which is later dragged out into the street, 
combining the private and the public in an attempt to dissuade possible deserters.126 Such 
artistic spectacles only strengthened the Liberals’ animosity toward an authoritarian 
church and reinforced their disdain for religious politics. 
However, attempts to clean up Rosas’ image dominated the 1960-1980s. Manuel Galvéz 
and Antonio Caponetto led the way in portraying Rosas neither as a dictator nor a usurper 
of Church power, but an obedient, ultramontane ruler. As historian Tulio Halperin 
Donghi summarized in Criterio during the 1970s, Rosas’ conservative ideology conflated 
                                                 
124 Ricardo D. Salvatore, Wandering Payasanos: State Order and Subaltern Experience in Buenos Aires 
During the Rosas Era (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2003),  132, 150, 234 
125 Ibid., 364-365 
126 Brenda G. Werth Theatre, Performance, and Memory Politics in Argentina (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 109-110 
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foreign inventions, philosophies, and economic intervention with liberalism, with him as 
its detractor.127    One article by revisionist historian Antonio Caponnetto drove home 
more firmly the effort to distinguish between liberal regalism and the regulation that 
Rosas imposed upon the Argentine Church: 
The logical solution, we insist, would have been to elaborate on the nature of 
regalism, to distinguish its various meanings and historical expressions,  and to 
understand that rosista Regalism in particular had certain characteristics that set it 
apart … from that which today we could consider and condemn as a persecution 
of the Church…it was a Catholic state, confessional and militant…it pushed 
policies inspired by respect for the Natural Order….one thing is the state of the 
Austrians and Hapsburgs, and Rosas here, and another the Bourbon state, that of 
Carlos III, of Rivadavia project…the Reform…[that] was brought about in the 
spirit of the “Anti-Church”.128 
 More neutral authors in recent years balanced the historiography penned by Rosas’ 
liberal rivals.129 Many of the Liberals’ charges turned out to be either exaggerated or 
                                                 
127Tulio Halperín Donghi,”Estudios creicentes sobre el pensameiento politico de Rosas”, Criterio, 25 de 
marzo 1976, Año XLIX Nº 1736 
128 Antonio Caponnetto, “Recensión bibliográfica a Samarina de Berra, Silvia. Un Pueblo se 
debate:proyecto eclesial o poder temporal. La Iglesia durante los gobiernos de Rosas. Buenos Aires, 
Guadalupe, 1988”. En Historiografía Rioplatense, n. 4, Buenos Aires, Instituto Bibliográfico Antonio 
Zinny, 207-208. Lo lógico, insistimos, hubiera sido ahondar en la naturaleza del regalismo, distinguir sus 
distintas acepciones y expresiones históricas, y entender que el particular regalismo rosista tuvo 
características propias que lo alejan…de lo que hoy podríamos considerar y condenar como una 
persecución de la Iglesia…era un Estado Católico, Confesional y de Fe Militante…llevó adelante en la 
Argentina una política inspirada en el respeto al Orden Natural…una cosa es el Estado de los Austrias y 
Augsburgos, y aquí el de Rosas, y otra el de los Borbones, el de Carlos III o el ensayo de Rivadavia…la 
Reforma… [que] se llevó a cabo con el espíritu de la Anti-Iglesia.” 
129 Historians, filmmakers, and authors such as Sarmiento have characterized Rosas as an iron-fisted 
dictator. Twentieth Century author Jonathan Brown claims that Rosas was responsible for the development 
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disingenuous. Analyzing the working class, one is able to see the fissures in the Rosista 
system.130 What’s more, Rosas’ “tyranny” and strict laws were in large part a 
continuation and enforcement of previous laws from former governments, including 
those of political adversary and predecessor Rivadavia. To enforce these laws, Rosas 
increased the size of local judicial systems to keep up with the growing populations.131 
Ironically then, this subaltern look at the federalist regime also detracts from Revisionist 
narratives of Rosas as the “Restorer” of the laws, since he was, in reality, implementing 
the statutes of the government which Rosas’ defenders abhorred. Furthermore, a 
subaltern perspective might lead historians to rate the idea of a rosista Catholic society, 
organic and harmonious, as dubious at best. Families, normally the foundational unit of 
the organic state hailed by traditionalists, became a bulwark against the worst abuses, and 
a negotiating tool for peons to address grievances against their commanders.132 This 
society then, hardly shown as an example of Catholic benevolence. 
Despite their historical limitations, the idyllic and dystopian visions of Rosas point to a 
strange dialogue between Catholic militancy and the Liberals. To the casual observer, the 
                                                 
of state terrorism in Argentina , Jonathan C. Brown, A Brief History of Argentina 2nd Ed. (Facts on File, 
2010),  126. The claim that Rosas was primarily responsible for developing the mechanisms for state terror, 
even in Buenos Aires Spanish repression of the Afro-Argentines in response to the Haitian rebellion. For 
elaboration on one particularly harsh incident, the 1795 French Conspiracy, See: Lyman Johnson, 
Workshop of Revolution: Plebeian Buenos Aires and the Atlantic World, 1776–1810 (Durham and London: 
Duke University Press, 2011), xi,149 
130Ricardo D. Salvatore, Wandering Payasanos, 133, 151. Salvatore complicates the liberal image of an 
omnipotent dictator drowning society in a sea of red also did not hold up upon further scrutiny. Officers 
noted only 52% of arrested suspects wearing some kind of federalist symbol. Many plebes would even 
change clothes while crossing the border, demonstrating to some extent the casualness with which the 
population regarded Rosas’ ideology. 
131 Ibid., 165 
132 Ibid. 300-303 
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dichotomy between unitarios and federalists may seem stark, but on closer examination, 
they actually held many similar basic principles of moral decency in common. They 
would carry an idealized vision of Argentina (which boasted of an uneasy ideological 
unity) from the Enlightenment into the liberal scientific age. 
LIBERAL AND NATIONALIST ARGENTINA: CONVERGENCES AND CONTRASTS 
Rosas may have defended the gauchos and the popular Afro-Argentine classes, but 
neither conservatives nor liberals had tolerance for the indigenous populations. Liberals 
and nationalists agreed at the beginning of the State formation process that racial mixing 
represented an impediment to national development. As historian Federico Finchelstein 
points out in his work detailing the roots of Argentine fascism, liberals like Sarmiento in 
1844 and Julio Argentino Roca, Argentina’s first modern president in 1879, eagerly 
encouraged the “cleansing” of the “repugna[nt]” native populations. Even the Liberals’ 
adversaries, the conservative nationalists saw Roca’s campaign in the desert as a 
“republican triumph” of Western Christian civilization over a barbaric frontier. While 
conservatives distrusted foreign influence, liberals saw the nation as underdeveloped, and 
immigration presented a cure and path for development. Indian extermination also 
represented a step forward in its European Positivist “laboratory of progress” that seemed 
to fly in the face of the Universalist metaphysical trends of the Argentine constitution.133  
                                                 
133 Federico Finchelstein, The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War: Fascism, Populism, and Dictatorship 
in Twentieth Century Argentina, (Oxford University Press, 2014), 15-16. The transition from classical 
liberal ideologies to “scientific” liberalism marks an attempt by Argentine liberals to further adopt the ideas 
of French philosopher Augusto Comte, who claimed that for a nation to reach its full potential, it must be 
capable of breaking out of the absolute restrictions of Natural Law and universal principles to deal with the 
“technical” issues faced by each country on its path to development, the end goal of all moral codes in the 
Positivst (third) stage of development.  
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Neither accidental nor intentional ideological convergences between liberals and fascists 
should not surprise modern historians. Many of the intellectuals that formed the first 
right-wing, but secular, Nationalist circles came from socialist and anarchist circles as 
well as a “multi-class” cross-section of religious and military figures. Finchelstein points 
to one author during the 20th Century, Leopoldo Lugones, as the best example of this 
contradictory relationship. Lugones, a famed literary critic, rejected Social Democracy in 
favor of revolutionary solutions characterized by “liberal nationalism,” an authoritarian 
form of government espoused by his close friend, General Roca. Lugones remained 
suspicious of an invasion from “foreign leftists” and internal democratic enemies, and 
proposed “the sword” that divided freedom from hierarchy as the most plausible solution 
to this threat.  
However, many Nationalists diverged from this hybrid scientific-nationalist view, 
drawing on Spanish ideas of an avowedly Catholic republic to maintain order. Federico 
Ibarguren advocated an anti-liberal approach that attempted to undermine liberal 
democracy. But nationalists also recognized that the roots of governance lay in the 
joining of Church and State. As Denoso Cortes pointed out, “The Sovereign is like God: 
either it is one, or does not exist…It is indivisible and incommunicable.”  Wishing for a 
return to the Spanish colonial era, Nationalists nevertheless rejected the idea of a 
nationalism of return, claiming to preserve Spanish traditions in a more complete way 
than the liberalized Spain of the 1812 Constitution.134 
                                                 
134 Ibid. 19-21, 24. Also: Ibid., 22 quoting Donoso Cortes In: Juan Donoso Cortes, Ensayo sobre el 
Catolicismo, el Liberalismo, y el socialism (Madrid: Imprenta de La Publicidad, 1851) ,202. 
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  Nationalism in Argentina was a revolt against what it saw as the “international monetary 
order” and did not support business conservatism. This “international order,” in the minds 
of the Nationalists, is based in the Jewish religion, and is not only economically, but also 
religiously contrasted with the ideal Catholic State. Catholic Nationalist authors such as 
David Nuñez classified this type of “correct” anti-Semitism.135 Nationalism’s populists 
strand, which developed alongside its Fascist school of thought also has its roots in the 
1930s and is summarized by this quote in Combate, a Nationalist journal of the same time 
period as Castellani, Meinville, and Franceschi were writing: 
“Most of the political adversaries of nationalism consider it a conservative 
movement…whose aspiration is to ensure the establishment of a social class while 
abandoning the people that produce.” Nevertheless the nationalist movement did favor 
social improvement since “the capitalist system operating in this country and in most of 
the world’s nations is…unjust and inhuman.”136   
Journals like Nueva República and Combate bridged the gap between the secular and the 
religious right wing in a way that helped pave the way for the development of Catholic 
forms of exclusion and versions of national identity.  Often, these papers, unlike Catholic 
Nationalists, embraced the populism of the Yrigoyen administration considering the 
Radical leader “the true expression of the Argentine caudillo.” Despite this difference, 
                                                 
135 “Hay varias clases de antisemitismo: Económico, sociológico, político, religoso y moral. Es lícito aun 
obligatorio el antisemitismo económico, contra la dura y intolerable dictadura del dinero ejercida  por la 
Banca internacional judia.”  Pro. Dr. David Nuñez, ¿En qué quedamos? ¿Son o no son deicidas los judios?, 
(Buenos Aires: Editorial Presencia en el mundo 1967),15. 
136Alberto Spektorowski, The Orgins of Argentina’s Revolution of the Right, (Notre Dame: Notre Dame 
Press,2003), 138 quoting  “El nacionalismo aspira  a una mayor justicia social”, Combate, May 15, 1935. 
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these secular nationalists shared with Catholics a general disdain for Anglo-Saxon, and 
particularly Great Britain’s, materialism, accusing the seafaring nation, along with local 
elites, of an international monetary conspiracy against the Argentine nation.137 Because 
of their emphasis on hispanidad and exclusive national identity, as opposed to the liberal 
project of immigration or the international pre-Soviet Marxist perspective, these 
intellectuals were primed to make the transition to accept state formation as a sacred 
project. 
CATHOLIC NATIONALISM: BEGINNINGS 
Argentine Catholic Nationalism, started by lay intellectuals in the inter-war period (1914-
1939), developed in response to the crisis of modernity caused by the First World War. 
The movement centered initially on university issues such as tuition and exam regulations 
and later moved to the wider issue of how to create a “Catholic Renaissance” focused on   
“high” culture and the formation of elites. It also rejected the economic populism of 
Radical president Hipólito Yrigoyen (1916-1922, 1928-1930).138 These intellectuals had 
middle class backgrounds and waged their battle for national renewal through private 
education.  No one Catholic group or center represented the movement, due to the 
marginalization of Catholics in the early 20th Century and the variety of competing 
political ideologies at the time.  The first Catholic University founded by Luis Duprat 
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was opened in 1910, but later closed because of its inability to receive national 
accreditation. It was later replaced by the Catholic Cultural Centers of the 1920s and 
1930s.139  These intellectuals had escaped from the working class action arena into which 
Catholics had been pigeon-holed at the beginning of the 20th Century to move into the 
influential educational circles long dominated by liberal elites.  Precisely because of the 
affinity between nationalist “hispanidad”, anti-Liberal authors such as Leopoldo Lugones  
and Catholic writers, society began to associate most types of nationalism with 
Catholicism, even if nationalism also encompassed secular, non-theological visions of 
nativist fervor. 
 Catholic thinkers did, however, stand out from the rest. Julio Meinvielle based his idea 
of governance on an anti-materialist embrace of Natural Law. For him, the state could not 
interfere in the spiritual salvation of individual humans, but bore the responsibility for 
establishing the necessary order to allow citizens to see the everyday functioning of 
society through a “supernatural” framework. Meinvielle harshly criticized democracy 
because of its tendency to divide the sovereign, throw governance into the hands of the 
popular classes, and lead to moral relativism. He did however, consider the possibility of 
a democracy in which all worked toward the common good as an acceptable form of 
government. Adherence to Natural Law, not popular support or bureaucratic solutions, 
determined the legitimacy of the government. In this context that meant tying ideas of 
divine sanction to the authoritarian solutions developing during the late 1920s and 1930s. 
                                                 
139 José Zanca, Los intelectuales católicos y el fin de la cristiandad, 88. 
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Popular sovereignty came into play only if rulers respected the customs and traditions of 
the people. A true sovereign would draw back from the temptation to create an 
illegitimate government based on abstract, foreign, universal ideas.140 These intellectuals, 
disenchanted with the cultural detachment of the radical left, saw in Catholic Social 
teaching a deeper, more authentic and local elaboration on the principles of counter-
culture and anti-establishment fervor that they had experienced in their previous 
ideologies. 
Because of this increasingly social, corporatist, and anti-liberal outlook, Catholic thinkers 
had a special relationship with Franco’s Fascism of the Spanish Civil War.141 Catholic 
Nationalism also had a close relationship with the Fascist movements of the late 1920s 
and early 1930s, but did not consider Fascism and Nationalism synonymous. In a 1928 
edition of Criterio, the leading Catholic periodical in Argentina, Manuel Galvez, a 
militant Catholic writer and revisionist historian, gave his interpretation of the events 
sweeping across Europe, mainly, the rise of Fascism and Communism. Galvez claimed 
that dictatorship was distinctly “Latin”, inherently anti-Jewish and intrinsically tied to 
Catholicism while the ideologies “subverting” the Argentine identity, such as 
Communism, Capitalism, and materialism in general are foreign (as in the time of 
Rosas).”142  Nationalists did not have problems with conflating the state’s aims with those 
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of Catholicism, going as far as to call military service “a vocation”, a hard life of self-
sacrifice, where the only admonition would be to avoid ambition and endure hardship for 
the purpose of advancing both the will of God and the welfare of the state (which is 
similar to that of one’s family). God and country were one love.143 The soldier, at the 
time considered an ideal citizen, realized there were two truths: God's truth and the state's 
truth. The state lost legitimacy however, if it began to contradict God’s law. The truths 
had to be defended against opposing ideologies that would threaten God and country. 
This conflation of State and God and the fear of Enlightenment ideologies were shared by 
both Argentine and Spanish nationalists.144  
Order was an important concept in Nationalism, which is why Fascism may have 
appealed to many clergy during the 1930s as a legitimate way of combating the 
breakdown of traditional social and political structures, a breakdown which resulted in 
chaos similar to Rousseau’s “State of Nature.”  Unlike Rousseau however, Catholic 
Nationalists believed, in accordance with Thomistic thinking, that nature is inherently 
ordered, and that maintaining this natural order is of the utmost importance no matter 
what social situation the country is in. Maintaining order is a custodial duty and a 
responsibility given directly by God, a responsibility to protect the country as one 
protects the family itself.145 Fascism gave an answer to the crisis of national instability 
and moral decay, as Galvez pointed out, Benito Mussolini once again gave the Church a 
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place at the table through its emphasis on religious education and general rules against 
immorality.146   
However, although Nationalists embraced Fascism, it was, in their conception, only a 
temporary means toward a more ideal end.147 Nationalists were wary of association with 
a broad trans-national movement that was not in line with Catholic teaching on the place 
of God in society and the importance of orthodox teachings underpinning the 
government. Franceschi, as editor of Criterio during the rise of Fascism during the 1930s, 
thoroughly rejected Nazism for its racially based pagan ideology and its denial of some of 
the Church’s fundamental rights (i.e the ability to attend a Eucharistic conference), 
although he said this did not preclude the Church having diplomatic relations with the 
Nazi state.148 For Franceschi, the means should not be confused with the ends, the means 
being fascism and the ends being the restoration of the Church to its proper position of 
power. In short, nationalism was not analogous with Spanish Catholic Fascism, and 
despite sharing much of the fascist vision, stood on its own philosophically.149 Insofar as 
international Fascism served the purposes of the Church’s restoration of temporal and 
moral power, it was a legitimate means, but when Fascism’s strands deemphasized the 
Church they became illegitimate, so far as to be as objectionable as democracy as a 
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vehicle for a new Catholic state. Francesechi wrote: “ ¿Cuál es la posición del 
totalitarismo? No dice que Dios no existe, sino que afirma que Dios soy yo. Yo, es decir 
el estado.” [What is the [ideological] position of totalitarianism? It does not say that God 
does not exist, but affirms, “I am God”, I that is, the State.]150 And although Catholic 
Nationalism attempted to emphasize nationalist Argentine culture through authoritarian 
means, Franceschi insisted that this in itself is not enough, that to see cultural identity as 
the final end was to make the same error as classical liberalism that is, seeing the Church 
as a social tool instead of recognizing its supernatural and divine mission.151   
However, Franceschi acted as not only a buffer between correct and incorrect 
authoritarianism, but also a bridge between Catholics on two sides of a philosophical 
divde. The question of whether a spiritual state should be uniform and confessionally 
Catholic, or universally Christian and plural, dominated theological debates. These 
theological divides spilled over into the very political pitfalls  of the Spanish Civil War 
discussed in earlier chapters. The two sides of the Argentine debate over liberty and 
order, between which Franceschi represented a bridge, stretched back to the early debates 
over how to receive Maritain in Argentina amid world debates on authoritarianism and 
the Spanish Civil War.152 More specifically, this divide dates back to the publication of 
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the publication of Jacques Maritain’s Integral Humanism in 1936153, which criticized a 
19th Century collaboration between Church and state, called for the State to play a part in 
the forming of human consciences, and permitted pluralism within a Catholic framework 
that rejected Modernists excesses. At first, Maritain’s positions found resonance with 
Catholic militants that ran aground of a complacent Catholic hierarchy. These young 
militants of the 1930s saw the pact between the Church and the state as a betrayal of 
Catholic values, and were glad that Maritain’s work presented space for maneuvering 
within the Church. However, Maritain would also break with Nationalist intellectuals 
over the Pope’s 1927 condemnation of Action Française which proposed a return to strict 
adherence to Natural Law and Catholic rule.  
Maritain, basing himself in St. Thomas of Aquinas, rejected Modernism as a whole, but 
argued that St. Thomas Aquinas was “the saint of the intelligentcia.” He proposed that 
Catholic militants could not revive the Middle Ages per se and should instead consider 
how to preach classical Catholic values in a Modernist setting. 154  Liberal Catholics 
responded positively.  Agosto J. Durelli cites Maritain in his article for the liberal journal 
Sur praising Maritain’s supposed lack of partisanship in spiritual affairs. Quoting 
Maritain directly, Durelli highlights Maritain’s shift from the merely political to the 
spiritual arguing that the Gospel does not compel one to follow a party but “to learn with 
intimacy the word of God.” This intimacy argued Maritain and Durelli, would stop “The 
                                                 
153 The Spanish edition was first published in Spanish in 1940 in Santiago de Chile. 
154 José Zanca, Cristianos antifascistas: Conflictos en la cultura católica argentina (Buenos Aires, Siglo 
Veintiuno Editores, 2013), 38-48, 50-51. 
 103 
good from calling down the fire of God upon the bad” and should cause devout Catholics 
to think of Christ’s death for his enemies instead of a God that would command them to 
kill for him. Similarly, Durelli slammed French poet Paul Claudel for his criticism of 
Maritain’s social theory. When Claudel mentioned European social democracies as 
examples of why structural change was not necessary, Durelli jumped in: “And here we 
see that the author is a fan of the most bourgeois Protestant nations on the planet.” 155  
As the introduction of Maritain at the University of Córdoba October 6, 1936 (during his 
larger Latin American tour) by philosopher Alfredo Fragueiro showed, many Argentine 
scholars warmly welcomed Jacques Maritain. They lauded his philosophical rigor and 
also his social conviction. They found his encompassing views refreshing, especially his 
rejection of the use of the scientific method as an ethical tool, and his updating of a living 
versus an “archeological” Thomism.156 
 Not all intellectuals agreed however. According to another Córdoba philosopher 
Fernando Martínez  Paz, Leopoldo Lugones, called democracy a “cadaver” and was 
willing to write against the failure of the “bourgeois democracy.” Charles Maurras’ 
dialectic according to Paz “seduced” many of Argentina’s Catholic intellectuals into 
taking authoritarian positions due to their healthy skepticism of participatory processes. 
The problem according to Maritain lay in the fact that governments that were involved in 
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pure action are not worried about human dignity (Pius XI’s criticism of Action 
Francaise). Paz believed that Maritain opened up a way to a “Catholic political 
integralism” a “second liberation” that constituted a “true metaphysics.”157 
According to Paz, while Maritain did not rule on the Spanish Civil war as just or unjust 
defense on the part of the Franco regime (as mentioned in an earlier chapter he eschewed 
such categories as an unfair mixing of the profane and sacred). Instead, Maritain 
criticized the Spanish Civil War for creating a savior-like mentality that denied the 
balance between “force, justice, and civil friendship. For Maritain there was a 
contradiction in attempting to construct the kingdom of God on “political realism and 
hate” and allowing that liberty “open the way to dictatorships.” He also took issue with 
the classification of the Spanish Civil War as a “holy war” saying that the term was 
anachronistic in a time in which the “sacred” was clearly separated from the “profane.”158 
Further angering Catholic anti-Semitic intellectuals, Maritain defended the Jews as a 
“mystery” and condemned what he saw as apologists for the Nazi regime. He saw 
complicity in those who saw the Jews as “the source of all evil” even when Catholic 
nationalists did not necessarily agree with the Nazis’ racist suppositions.159  
Despite a vocal minority in support of Maritain, Catholic Nationalists, who constituted 
the majority of intellectuals at this time, rejected both Italian and German Fascism, but 
were clear that Spain provided the ultimate model for how to combine God and Country 
                                                 
157 Fernando Martínez Paz, Maritain Política e Ideologia: Revolución cristiana en la Argentina (Buenos 
Aires: Editorial Nahuel, 1966), 74-77. 
 
158 Iibd. 118-119. 
159 Ibid. 121-123. 
 105 
and elevate the state to a level “second only to the Holy Trinity.”160 Spain’s 
determination, not only to root out insurgency, but also to root out the ideologies 
underpinning these insurgencies (such as democracy), presented a model the Nationalists 
themselves wished to emulate. In fact, so attached were the two countries, that when 
Franco passed away, many nationalists looked to the Spanish transition to democracy as a 
parallel of the troubled Argentine democracy of Isabel Perón and a portent for the 
triumph of liberalism, a wave that must be stopped.161 
 
CATHOLIC NATIONALISTS AND PERONISTS: FRIENDS OR FOES? 
“Y como siempre daremos un grito de corazón…por este gran argentino que se supo 
conquistar a la gran masa del pueblo combatiendo al capital.” 
Hugo de Carril “La marcha peronista” 
 Catholic attitudes toward Peronism were mixed at best and hostile at worst. Catholics 
had enthusiastically supported the 1943 coup that brought the United Officers’ Group 
(GOU), a military clique, to power with Perón as Secretary of Labor. Gustavo Franceschi 
mixed both God and country, claiming “God is criollo in other words, Divine providence 
cares for us much more than we deserve. The army saved us definitively from the [prior] 
situation: The military revolution put a stop to the social Revolution.”162  Fear of the 
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social classes had influenced Catholic thinkers to favor traditional authoritarian 
hierarchies since the Russian Revolution of 1917, but by the 1940s Catholic writers were 
not as marginal as they had been in 1930.  Catholics formed part of a broad alliance 
formed with other sectors of the society, including the trade unions, who hoped to do 
away with electoral fraud. For the unions this corruption impeded their access to 
fundamental workers’ rights, and for a struggling Radical party in the 1930s, the 
corruption stalled their electoral return to power. The Church however thought of its own 
interests, lauding the abolishing of political parties and the mandating of religious 
education in December 1943. For the first time since the Revolution of 1930, a 
government would actually follow through with a Catholic agenda through official state 
mechanisms such as censorship and official state propaganda to “re-christianize” 
Argentina and through corporatist structures promote class harmony. Class harmony 
would prevent the poor’s “temptation” towards Communism. 163  
 During his tenure as the GOUs Secretary of Labor, Peron saw commonality with the 
social mandate of the Church laid out in the Papal letter Quadragesimo Anno (1931). He 
especially honed in on income inequality which brought “great harm” to “the common 
good or social justice” to which the encyclical alluded. Perón emphasized the Catholic 
concept of class harmony through his guarantee that private industry would receive 
“nothing but recognition” if it provided a living wage to workers. Peron, promised 
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workers that the government would ensure the vigorous enforcement of clear and fair 
laws in exchange for non-violence. 
 In religious matters, Peron also attempted to placate the religious hierarchy. In 1946 
Argentina became the only country to formally file a request with the Vatican asking for 
a formal declaration of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary (which would be declared 
dogma only in 1952).164 These types of petitions and other external forms of Catholic 
devotion initially drew moderate praise for him from some prelates. 
Catholics had much to admire in his agenda. In one sense, the 1950 “Twenty truths of 
justicialismo [Peronism]” coincided with fundamental elements of Catholic social 
teaching, especially its rejection of political ends for those of the common good (Article 
9), the subjugation of capitalism to the general welfare (Article 16) and national unity 
without class conflict (Article 11).165  Peron also identified with classic Platonic 
conceptions of society valuing “order, harmony, [and] proportion” saying that all of these 
led to” justice….the first rule of antiquity converted into political practice.”166 Peron´s 
corporatist political structure, which came from his background in the GOU coup of 
1943, emphasizing the nation and hierarchy, appealed to Catholic thinkers. The 
opposition, with the exception of the anti-liberal Catholic right, sharply criticized Peron´s 
rhetoric as “anti-enlightenment” and irrational.  
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Despite criticisms from traditional liberals, Perón embraced Catholic morals because they 
moderated “hedonist” consumption and encouraged a selfless national identity. Laws 
Perón implemented limiting the working hours for women were not so much 
“humanitarian” as reinforcements of Gálvez´s earlier traditional vision of the domestic 
family. Nationalist intellectual José Figuerola´s warning about the “inorganic” masses 
complimented Perón´s idea of a country of harmonious class relations.  
Despite some consensus on general social structures, there were sharp differences 
between Perón and middle-class Catholics. First, as Catholic Church historian Austin 
Ivereigh suggests, even in 1945 after years of anti-liberal militancy and unity, Catholic 
politics in Argentina was not uniform. Argentine Christian Democrats, aided by Jacques 
Maritain, lobbied the Vatican against an allegedly totalitarian Peron arguing that he 
merely used the Church for political purposes. Second, Ivereigh argues that Peron drew 
suspicion by nature of his background: a non-religious colonel who entered into a civil, 
not sacramental, marriage with a famous actress, Eva Duarte. Because of this initial 
suspicion, Ivereigh argues, Perón adeptly walked a political tightrope in his relationship 
with the Church, fusing Enlightenment ideas of civil religion with key concessions on 
education, workers’ rights, and promoting “Hispanic” identities.167 Perón did not adopt 
the overt anti-Semitism (to be discussed later in the chapter) of Meinvielle or Leonardo 
Castellani, Jesuit priests with authoritarian tendencies. Instead Peronists tended to talk in 
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terms of class and speculative “vendepatrias”168 In keeping with the movement’s focus on 
class and inequality, some of Perón’s supporters, such as left-wing populist Juan José 
Hernandez Arregui, who was sympathetic to Nationalist anti-liberal tendencies, blamed 
Jews for economic instability and domination of the financial system and blamed them 
for not joining nationalist movements such as Peronism. Following in the tradition of 
nationalists that had connected Jews with anarchism and the lower class prostitutes, 
Arregui connected Jews with the Communist and Socialist parties. Despite some 
philosophical differences, convergences led to a tacit alliance between Nationalism and 
Peronism, especially on the issue of religious education, mandated in Perón´s 1949 
constitution.169  
The coup of 1943 had also previously opened the way to reigniting the private school 
debate, and later on in 1949, Perón would mandate religious education. Despite this 
educational triumph however, many Catholic intellectuals saw Perón’s educational style 
and even his “religious hour” as “routine” and encouraging of low teaching standards.170   
However, Eva Perón, in keeping with Catholic mores, called for female compliance with 
a paternalistic system calling for “more homes, and for that more women to fulfill well 
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their destiny and mission”171 Eva Perón’s push for the feminist vote attempted to balance 
the obvious contradictions of her actress background with the requirements of the 
Catholic hierarchy by presenting herself as a channel of her husband’s political project. 
Eva Perón emphasized the need for women to influence their nation, but put first priority 
on the home, a “traditional and Catholic” Christian home that would avoid 
“unscrupulous” and “anti-Argentine” behavior.172 However, facing significant middle-
class opposition at home, Eva Perón looked abroad. Her visit to Spain and the Vatican 
only highlighted justicialismo’s need to find international moral backing for their 
programs at home. By this measure Eva had moderate success, gaining the Cross of 
Isabel the Catholic from Franco, but only a routine audience with the Pope upon her visit 
to Rome. However, her return from Europe made her ambitious. The Eva Perón 
Foundation continued however to mix traditionalism with political militancy. So far, 
despite skepticism, the Peronists continued to walk the tight-rope of pacifying the 
Catholic and social wings of their parties. 
Although spiritual advisers like Peronist priest Hernán Benítez helped oversee religious 
aspects of Eva Perón’s outreach, the politics of social justice would eventually trump the 
Church, encroach on traditionally Catholic areas of action, and sideline religious 
authorities. Distinguishing between “alms” and “justice” Eva Perón would come to take 
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on a “messianic” image that would over time contradict and eventually exclude her 
former Catholic discourse. Some sectors would start to compare her image to that of the 
Virgin Mary, although her social work also gave her a “redemptive” aura of a saint. This 
“Madonna of the Meek” worked with Perón to coopt traditional religious festivals, such 
as Christmas itself, to give these old symbols a new Peronist meaning. After her death, 
followers would claim miraculous cures done in her name and would exalt “Peronist 
Christianity” as a superior pragmatic form of the faith than dogma and vertical 
hierarchies.173 Eva Perón, in short, had coopted the discourse that had given her 
husband’s government initial legitimacy but had also thrown overboard those dogmas 
which had condemned her previous life, and the lives of the poor that could not meet the 
hierarchy’s high bar of social acceptability. 
 
After years of intermediate strain, this Peronist-Church social consensus began a clean 
break after Eva Perón’s death. The Catholic world remained divided over how much 
legitimacy to grant the Peronist movement. Cardinal Copello and Monsignor DeCarlo of 
Resistencia, Chaco supported the first lady and actively supported the Foundation, but 
others such as Franceschi and bishop Miguel de Andrea, resented Peronist appropriations 
of Catholic social doctrine and traditionally Catholic social products such as single 
women’s shelters.174  Catholics also opposed Perón’s policies on divorce and prostitution. 
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As Donna Guy writes in her work on the sex trade, Protestant anti-trafficking groups 
accused Argentina, a Catholic nation, of exactly the opposite stance. In fact, the 
legalization of the sex trade would become a major sticking point between Perón and 
middle class Catholic intellectuals. Originally, this confusion stemmed from the 
diverging opinions within the Church itself. On one side stood the Catholic hierarchy. 
Those supporting legalization consisted of local Argentine officials, many anti-
hierarchical, who adopted a “pragmatic” reading on St. Augustine and St. Thomas 
Aquinas accepted prostitution as a lesser evil that would stave off public depravity. 
Others saw it as a remedy to a graver social taboo, homosexuality.175  The tradition in 
which municipal governments and some local churches would often “look the other way” 
on the issue of legal bordellos (whore houses) exemplified this view. President Perón 
followed in this tradition as well using the intense fear surrounding homosexuality in the 
military to justify prostitution as a tool to save the nation and the family but, Catholic 
Nationalists, tied to middle class rationales about public morality and order, bitterly 
resisted Perón’s efforts to legalize prostitution (noting as well that his second wife Eva 
Duarte de Perón had affairs to scale the social latter in her acting career). In fact, Critério, 
by then Argentina’s leading Catholic weekly led by polemicist and priest Gustavo 
Franceschi, condemned what they saw as a misguided interpretation of church teaching 
by proponents of legalized bordellos.176  Despite sectors of support, most mainstream 
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Catholic intellectuals saw the legalization of prostitution as a beginning of a slide into 
societal decay. 
 
Franceschi also took issue with the Professional Associations law (Decree 23.852). 
Franceschi supported the right to unionize, seeing unions as actualized versions of the 
guilds that he claimed worked so will during the Middle Ages, but that the 
revolutionaries in France outlawed through the 1791 Le Chapilier law.  For Franceschi, 
bourgeois capitalism running through international markets had created great inequalities 
(which he credited Marx for being “somewhat right” for criticizing). Furthermore, 
capitalism dismantled the classic systems and social barriers that would have kept 
ordinary men protected from the forces of international competition. Pointing to the 
Encyclicals Rerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno, Franceschi asserted that the 
Catholic Church held the right to associate according to profession was a basic human 
right not subject to popular whims or votes. Nevertheless, he criticizes the Professionals 
Law for its concentration of power in the hands of the Secretary of Labor and Budgets 
(Secretario de Trabajo e Previsión). The government achieved this concentration by 
mandating that each profession be represented as a branch in only in one union, and 
through only one representative of that branch. Franceschi argued that this sort of 
corporatism, with only one representative determining the interests of each union, 
stripped away the power of the unions themselves in exchange for government access.177  
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For Franceschi then, the central premise of the Perón government did not only imply anti-
democratic tendencies, as Perón’s liberal adversaries had constantly warned. Rather, 
Perón’s main tenet of working organization signaled for Franceschi a stark move away 
from the individual autonomy of the human person. Such dignity did not come from an 
Enlightenment sense of reason, but immutable Divine Law. In Franceschi’s view, Perón 
had exchanged the wage slavery of the Enlightenment for the worker’s captivity to an all-
powerful state. 
Catholic thinkers such as Pedro Ivanissevich had difficulty embracing the Peronist 
emphasis on a working class with the same right to consumption as the rest of society. 
Although his review Revista Argentina tried to meld Catholic middle class thought with 
the Peronist project, its emphasis on education of the working class as a way to 
“eliminate” the identity of the cabecita negra (Eva Perón’s endearing term for the 
working poor) did not mesh with the valorization of working class identities epitomized 
by the Eva Perón Foundation.178  By 1955, the last year of Perón´s reign, the disdain that 
Catholic middle class clergy and intellectuals had for the “uncontrollable” masses is 
palpable. The ecclesial-Peronist conflict which led to the burning of several churches as 
well as Perón’s forbidding of a number of religious processions and expulsion of priests 
in response to Catholic advances his monopoly on unions further heightened tensions.179  
                                                 
grew out of the chaos of the swift change from rural to urban life. (See: Gino Germani, "Clases populares y 
democracia representativa en América Latina." Desarrollo económico (1962): 23-43.). Juan Carlos Torres 
however argues that workers, far from manipulated neophytes, rather demonstrated pragmatic political 
resolve in making a mutually beneficial pact with the Peronist government. Juan Carlos Torre, 
"Interpretando (una vez más) los orígenes del peronismo."Desarrollo Económico (1989): 527. 
178 Eduardo Elena, Dignifying Argentina, 181 
179 Paul Lewis, Guerillas and Generals, 8 
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At this juncture, Franceschi wrote encouraging Catholics to stand up for their faith and 
calling the working class Peronist activists involved in the riots “street urchins” and 
“peddlers of every type of immorality” that “incite violence…trusting in impunity [and 
thus] multiplying every act of impunity.” Speaking of the fires, Franceschi sarcastically 
feigns pity mocking “I think about those bands of arsons. Poor souls!”  He continues, 
“Where do they come from? Who exploits them? I know them because I have been a 
prison chaplain and I have concerned myself with the neediest homes.”180  The 
dichotomy between poor and rich, cultured and barbaric, orderly and chaotic, would 
continue. Perón would ferment a “revolutionary” attitude, advising his supporters to 
“heroically resist” Revolución  Libertadora and subsequent governments through a series 
of small and isolated actions to make the country ungovernable and pave the way for his 
return.181  
Despite Catholics as a whole welcoming the downfall of the “Argentine caudillo” some 
members of the community showed a favorable attitude toward Peronism without Perón. 
For them, the strongman may have pushed the limits of state power, but his original 
teachings had hierarchical authoritarian roots, and Perón’s policies had addressed 
working class problems such as wages and working hours long ignored by the liberal 
                                                 
180 Gustavo J.  Franceschi, “A la luz de los incendios” Criterio 14 de julio de 1955. «Pienso en esas bandas 
de incendiarios. ¡Pobres! ¿De dónde salen? ¿Quiénes los explotan? Los conozco, porque he sido capellán 
de cárcel y porque me he ocupado de los hogares menesterosos. En cada ciudad de alguna importancia 
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181 Daniel James, Resistance and Integration: Peronism and the Working Class 1946-1976 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988), 79 
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government, and even the then-current government of Pedro Eugenio Aramburu. One 
such leader, Augosto Rodriguez Larreta, criticized the government for not attending to 
workers’ rights and too often using overly harsh means to crush dissent. He also shook 
off accusations that such criticisms of the government made him a suspected Peronist 
sympathizer, pointing to the “fifty days of peace” during the government of Catholic 
Nationalist general Eduardo Lonardi. Asked if he equated his pro-working class attitude 
with Peronist populism, and if he had said he was a “Peronist and proud of it” he said 
both yes and no: 
It’s false [to accuse me of saying that]. [Saying that] would have been hypocritical, 
when, considering Perón a declared enemy of his own people, I was a constant 
opponent of his governing method for twelve years. What I said in the Plaza Italia 
is that I was not Peronist [but that] if being on the side of social justice, economic 
independence and political sovereignty [made me a Peronist], then yes I was 
Peronist and very proud of it.182 
Another recognized author José Maria de Estrada, author of The Nationalist Legacy (El 
legado del nacionalismo) also supported Peronism’s earlier Catholic influence without 
endorsing the exiled general that had created so much strife for the church in his last 
years in power: 
                                                 
182“Un discurso discutido”  Azul y Blanco 18 de julio de 1956. « Es falso. Hubiera sido una hipocresía, 
cuando, precisamente por considerar a Perón un enemigo declarado de parte de su pueblo, fui, durante doce 
años opositor permanente a sus métodos de gobierno. Lo que dije en Plaza Italia es que no era peronista, si 
serlo significaba ser partidario de La justicia social, de la independencia económica y de la soberanía 
política, entonces sí que era peronista y con gran honor de serlo.» 
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- [Question] Don’t you believe sir that the moment has come to talk about some 
concrete aspects of Peronism, that is, the movement’s more positive aspects, 
despite the false ideological direction and demagoguery with which its leaders 
marked it? 
- [Answer] Without a doubt. As I said in my book, Peronism is still too current of 
a phenomenon [for us] to make a definitive judgment about its causes and 
motivations that determined its presence in our historical reality. The wounds 
inflicted then are still fresh. The harm done to the nation were more notable than 
the reasons-that in the beginning could have had some popular support among 
broad sectors of public opinion. Nevertheless, it's evident that the politician, the 
authentic politician, should be alert to Peronism’s more positive aspects and know 
how to respond to popular desires. [This means] clarifying what democracy is and 
bettering the poorer classes.183 
 
                                                 
183 «Reportaje al autor de “El Legado del Nacionalismo»  Azul y Blanco, 18 de julio de 1956. [Pregunta]-
¿No cree Ud. Que ha llegado el momento de encarar francamente algunos aspectos concretos del 
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This trend of separating Perón’s later aggressions from his earlier pro-Catholic policies 
contrasted with Franceschi’s zealous denouncement of working class sensibilities. These 
divisions did not just apply to Franceschi and Maria de Estrada. Ludovico García de 
Loydi claimed that Perón, not merely disgruntled followers, had deliberately set the 
church fires that had brought condemnation from Franceschi. Garcia de Loydi, like any 
good nationalist critic of an adversary, accused Perón of masonry.  Others such as Mario 
Amadeo believed, like De Estrada, that Peronism’s attending to the working class should 
be clearly separated from Perón’s later anti-clerical push.184 Azul y Blanco furthered this 
distinction. The paper chastised “the oligarchy and politicians” for repressing the 
demands of the workers. The article also referred favorably to the “movements of 1943 
and October 1945” excusing the workers for being taken with a “caudillo.” The article 
argued that workers’ demands stand on their own, and that all sectors, from the 
“wrongfully labeled free unions” to the old-guard unions deserve an answer to their “just 
demands.”185 All told, Catholic opinion on the working class was not homogenous, and 
feelings toward the Peronists tended to correlate with feelings about the place of working 
class militancy in social thought. 
Azul y Blanco, drawing on echoes of Perón’s election rhetoric, questioned the turn of the 
1955 government under Aramburu accusing it of falling under the influence of foreign 
interests. In one 1957 editorial, the paper criticized the government specifically for asking 
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185 Notas gremiales “Aspiraciones de la clase obrera”  Azul y Blanco 11 de julio de 1956. 
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for military training (described as “collective intervention” in the article) from foreign 
countries that had acquired land, attempting to adopt foreign models of government. The 
article then chides “patriotic” officials for not purging these vendepatrias from its 
ranks.186  Yet another editorial discussing “the crushing of Argentina” traced those who 
“handed the country over” to foreign interests. The article went as far back as to US 
ambassador Spruille Braden (1945), who had created the “blue book” in the 1946 election 
in an attempt to tie Perón to the Nazis and therefore influence the election in the United 
States’ favor. Appealing to a partially anti-Peronist readership, the author did not defend 
Perón. Rather, citing US author Summer Welles, compares Catholic Nationalist feeling to 
that of the US opposition to Roosevelt. They were glad to see Perón leave, but rallied 
behind many of the general’s old complaints regarding foreign intervention in domestic 
electoral affairs.187 
 In summary, Perón initially counted Catholics as an important part of his constituency, 
partly based on anti-liberal precepts. After his rise to the presidency, the alliance turned 
more uneasy. While Catholics agreed with him on issues like education, they strongly 
disagreed on issues like prostitution and divorce. As Perón borrowed many of the 
symbols and rituals of the Church, tensions came to a head. Attacks against churches 
heightened tensions further and raised suspicions about the malleability of the working 
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classes in the minds of many middle class Catholics.  Other intellectual currents took a 
more conciliatory approach toward Perón. Many right wing Catholic intellectuals 
maintained a healthy distance from the person of Perón, while embracing and defending 
his ideas of national sovereignty and sharing his suspicion of foreign powers and 
international systems. Not all thinkers shared Franceschi’s paternalistic view of the 
working classes as unruly mobs manipulated by personal charisma. Rather, drawing on 
Catholic social teaching dating back to the beginning of the twentieth Century, they 
encouraged class conscience, even as they counseled workers to reject revolution and to 
channel that conscience within existing political channels. However, Franceschi, far from 
purely decrying working class complaints, feared rather that inept or maleficent  populist 
leaders could take those demands and resolve them in such a way as to destabilize the 
social harmony that he exalted. 
THE JEWISH QUESTION: DIFFERING RESPONSES 
For much of its history, the Argentine Catholic Church had embraced the old Spanish 
“blood libel” passed on by early Church fathers who saw Jesus’ Jewish executioners as 
passing down the debt for his unjustified death. As mentioned before, early on, Rosas 
exploited the figure of Judas (for him the Jew per excellence) as a traitorous symbol of 
national subversion.   As Jewish Argentine historian Federico Finchelstein writes, Julio 
Meinvielle ties Jews to Protestantism, Capitalism, and the Anti-Christ himself. Virgilio 
Filipe, thinkers such as Karl Marx (the father of Communism) and Sigmund Freud (the 
father of modern Psychology and thus analysis of sexuality, justified the stereotype of the 
revolutionary Jew.  
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Gustavo Franceschi also quickly tied Jews to international capitalism, arguing before 
World War II that their status as a people without a nation made an economic system 
based on international trade far more appealing to the Jewish collective. Initially, 
Franceschi’s fear of alleged Jewish affinity towards revolution also led him to advocate 
turning a blind eye towards the Nazi persecution, even as he decried Nazi racism. Around 
the rise of the Third Reich in 1933, Franceschi reasoned that the rising anti-Semitism 
among German citizens responded to a “catastrophe” caused by Jews in Germany that 
risked spilling over into Argentina itself warning: “Let’s be real: a great pogrom is no 
longer improbable among us.”188 Argentina’s ambiguous position during and after the 
war also influenced this anti-Semitic attitude, as large groups of post-War Germans, 
collaborators, and sympathizers immigrated to Argentina. These groups (mainly divided 
between the Germans, Belgians, and Italians) did not arrive in a vacuum, instead finding 
already developed communities to help their transition.189 
However whereas writers such as Meinvielle and Castellani emphasized a strong 
connection between Jewishness and anti-patriotic agendas even after the horrors of the 
Holocaust had been revealed, by 1945, Franceschi attempted to walk back his own 
position on the “Jewish question.” Using a post-war audience between Roman Jews and 
Pius XII as his starting point, Franceschi calling anti-Semitism an “intrinsic evil” 
                                                 
188 Federico Finchelstein, The Ideological Origins of the Dirty War, 54-56. Ibid. P. 55  Quoting: Gustavo 
Franceschi, “Como se prepara una revolución,” Criterio, September 14, 1933, 30. See also: 
“Antisemitismo,” Criterio, December 7, 1933. 
189 El impacto del nazismo en la cultura argentina: Sobre nazis y nazismo en la cultura argentina  by 
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incompatible with Catholic teaching. Franceschi condemned two forms of anti-Semitism, 
one of physical violence and one of slander. Franceschi took on anti-Semitism and the 
racist determinism that laid behind it: 
But if at every turn and every time that someone trips up with a distasteful action 
the fact that [such action] has been committed by a Jew, gradually you can put in 
the heads of the fools-and there are quite a few of them- the idea that the Jews, the 
race, the collective, are a group of sinister human beings capable of all sorts of 
crimes, and that this is the result of the blood that runs in their veins. From there, 
according to that logic, eliminating them from society becomes a social duty, to 
preserve it by any means [necessary], is only a step away. Such deep-seeded anti-
Smeitismt  is the gradual but effective preparation for that more violent [anti-
Semitism].190 
Franceschi went further saying that “Christian charity” should “overcome all human 
prejudice” to “see in the Hebrews our brothers [italics mine] who we cannot hate without 
[being] criminals. Quoting Pius again, Franceschi reminded his readers that “Pius XII 
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said one time ‘We are spiritually Semites because we invoke our father Abraham.’”. If 
we practice anti-Semitism we would be committing suicide.”191 
While such a change of heart may have fit with the times and showed a bit of political 
aptitude given the recent genocide uncovered, while the modern historian can still detect 
below the surface a tinge of apologist rhetoric and Franceschi’s undying support for the 
idea of a confessional Catholic state, with Spain as the prime example of magnanimous 
governance. Claiming that the Spanish containment and expulsion of Jews in 1492 
constituted a nonviolent solution to a particular political problem Franceschi boasted 
“Look where you want to, you will find neither in dogma nor in moral [teachings], nor in 
the institutional ordering of the Church a single trace of Anti-Semitism. Christianity is 
not a counterpoint to Judaism, but rather the fullness of its beliefs and laws.”192 
THE DEMOCRATIC SHIFT: REALITIES AND ILLUSIONS 
 Argentina’s Catholic community underwent substantial development following the 
Fascist defeats in Europe. Catholic shifts regarding democracy’s legitimacy as a political 
method, and some thinkers’ (Franceschi for example) changing views on the Jewish 
question reflected this shift. Franceschi, who would have earlier at least tolerated any 
anti-Communist regime, conflated Communism with Nazi Fascism. He  considered 
Communism to be the final stage in the 19th Century philosophy that had given rise to the 
“pantheistic” German right wing. Franceschi also turned from some isolationist 
                                                 
191 Ibid.  
192 Ibid.  “Búsquese cuanto se quiera, no podrá darse en el dogma, o en la moral, o en el ordenamiento 
institucional de la Iglesia con una sola huella de antisemitismo. No es el cristianismo una contraposición al 
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Nationalist positions to embrace figures like Winston Churchill. In one editorial, he even 
lamented Churchill’s defeat in Parliamentary elections.193 In short, Franceschi seemed 
comfortable with democracy’s more conservative  and traditionalist variant. 
However, Franceschi did not show complete comfort with popular governance, and 
showed some residual  affinity for authoritarian solutions. Franceschi feared the masses 
even more than authoritarian governments however. In an editorial about the 
“lamentable” death of Benito Mussolini through “material circumstances outside the 
bounds of any natural, not just legal rules”, Franceschi emphasized that the dictator’s 
death came at the hands of “the ferocious masses.” He warned the spectacle could tarnish 
the image of popular rule and obscure the cruelties of Mussolini’s rule: 
History will judge very harshly those rulers that put themselves above the law and 
believed that the “will to power” granted all legal powers. But the ferocious 
instincts unleashed in the last hours of these despicable [rulers], which seem like 
more vengeance than justice, may inspire pity on the part of future writers and 
delay the condemnation that [they or history] should impose on Mussolini’s 
tenure.194 
                                                 
193 For the relationship between Nazism and Communism see: Gustavo Franceschi, “La política religiosa 
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últimas horas de esos infelices un carácter aún más de venganza de que la justicia, son capaces de inspirar 
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In short, Franceschi constituted a complicated and somewhat contradictory bridge 
builder, disgusted by the excesses and un-Christian virtues of the authoritarian 
governments the Allies had just banished, but unwilling to embrace the risk that popular 
participatory democracy implied for Argentina and the rest of the world. 
But Franceschi by 1945 did not flat out reject democracy, and defended it as legitimate, if 
not always preferable. Quoting Pius XII, Franceschi reminded his readers in a January 
editorial that democracy responded to “the needs of the moment” and did not concern 
itself with its “structure [and] organization” but rather with the treatment of the individual 
which, “far from being…a passive element in the social order is in fact, and should 
always be its subject, its foundation, its end.”195 This quote echoed Maritain’s vision of 
the person as the foundation of a plural society that accepted “many forms.”  Further 
echoing Maritain’s frustrations with merely formal democracy, Franceschi held  that 
democracy could take many forms, either popular or monarchy. After all, a monarchy 
with a Parliament would, he reasoned, be as “democratic” in principle as a democracy 
which had transformed into an oligarchy.196 If his 1945 views on democracy and the 
human person leaned toward Maritain, these views leaned on the personal respect he had 
for the philosopher, highlighting his breadth of reading, “insatiable curiosity”, and 
historicized theology that “captures the developments of the doctrines within the 
                                                 
195 Gustavo Franceschi,” La alocucion de Navidad y la doctrina democratica” Criterio 11 de enero de 
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196 Ibid. 
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environment that favored their constitution.” Commenting on the Vatican’s acceptance of 
Jacques Maritain as French ambassador to the Holy See Franceschi commented: 
The designation of Maritain [as ambassador] means that the most high ecclesial 
authority has no objection or reason to oppose him. Otherwise, and given that the 
current Foreign Minister of France, Mr. George Bidault is a Catholic of notable 
public action and deep personal faith, [the Pope] could have asked, in a discreet 
manner and before any official nomination, for another ambassador.197 
Franceschi went on the next month to make a Maritainian distinction between 
Communism and Marxism, in the process justifying the alliance of the Soviets and the 
other Allied Powers. He combated a notion that “confuses an accidental alliance between 
countries with a similarity of political doctrines between each one,” asking “Why do we 
fight totalitarianism?” He defined totalitarian not merely as the fascism that the Allies 
were fighting then, but rather any state that “depress[es] human dignity, the absorption of 
the whole person into the society and the denial that every man, however small, possess 
rights independent of the State, that he has not received from it, and that cannot be 
negated by governmental orders.”198 In this last statement Franceschi revealed two 
interesting transformations. The first political transition indicates that he no longer gave 
                                                 
197 Gustavo Franceschi, “Jacques Maritain, embajador ante la Santa Sede” Criterio 1 de marzo de 1945. 
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198 Gustavo Franceschi, “Democracia y Comunismo” Criterio 19 de abril 1945. “Su esencia consiste en la 
depresión de la dignidad humana, en la absorción total de la persona en la sociedad, en la negación de que 
todo hombre, así sea el más pequeño, posee derechos independientes del Estado, que no ha recibido de el y 
que no pueden ser aniquilados por disposiciones gubernamentales.” 
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as much weight to the idea of an organic society where humans are the parts, but rather, 
like Maritain, placed a value on the person as individual over and against the State. 
Second, Franceschi demonstrated that although he fervently opposed Communism, he 
was open to the possibility that other systems were worse. By asking why “we” fight 
totalitarianism and distinguishing between “accidental” alliance and political and 
philosophical coherence, while highlighting that Communism was against God’s 
purposes, Franceschi  tacitly sided with the Allies on the pragmatic decision on who to 
fight near the end of the war. Franceschi’s moderate approach did not occur in a vacuum, 
but was part of a measured response to a democratic counterforce, a minority of Catholic 
intellectuals that argued against a literalist reading of Scholastic philosophy and for a 
more modern, nuanced, approach to political philosophy. 
 
Younger Argentine thinkers in the 1950s, like Maritain before them, started to move 
away from and question the militant mandates of their 1930s forefathers, and started to 
compromise with the state. Christian Democrats began to make an impact on the 
hierarchy. A stark shift in priorities came on the issue, for example, of education. While 
previous generations had pushed for the public enforcement of Catholic values through 
education, Christian Democrats contented themselves with achieving the rights to act 
independently. With the ouster of Perón in 1955, Catholic thinker and ministry education 
minister Atilio Dell’Oro Maini issued decree number 6403/55, authorizing the creation of 
private universities in Argentina. He argued that such an authorization allowed for a 
plurality of voices.  
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Maini’s argument drew fire from both sides of the political spectrum. On one side stood 
the classical liberal reformers. José Luís Romero, writing for La Nación, argued that 
private education represented only secret tactics to reinsert Catholic education back into 
the schools and that Argentina did not need to supplement public schools that already 
granted all students access to resources.  Catholic thinker Mario Amadeo resisted the 
decree from the other side, arguing that Catholics deprived their children of moral 
instruction by allowing them to attend public school. By extension, Amadeo implied that 
society’s duty towards moral instruction also prohibited such leniency regarding 
education.199  However, where Amadeo’s view had universal resonance in earlier years, 
dissenting opinions slowly moved into the mainstream. 
A Catholic divide over the issue of religious and public education, unheard of in an era in 
which the faithful considered the hierarchy’s authority unquestionable, represented what 
José Zanca, citing Max Weber calls the “internal secularization” of Catholics. In short, 
secular Catholics did not abandon their faith. Rather, they de-emphasized dogma to bring 
more attention to social action. This trend contrasted with the model proposed by Rerum 
Novarum, where Natural Law and Church authority sustained social action. In the 
traditional historiography, the intellectuals that fought for privatization instead of a 
national Catholic education were considered “less Catholic” facing down an 
“unquestionable” hierarchy which effectively controlled  which political philosophies 
Catholics could attach their symbolic imprimatur.200  
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As mentioned previously, Catholics in the 1950s split along authoritarian and democratic 
lines with Franceschi acting as the bridge between the democratic and authoritarian 
intellectuals. Franceschi acted as this bridge because he was both a priest and head of a 
lay magazine. The opinions printed in his weekly magazine had the imprimatur of 
hierarchical legitimacy by virtue of his high profile and clerical position.  For his part, 
Franceschi was well equipped to navigate these turbulent philosophical waters. 
Franceschi always remained skeptical of democracy, but had also criticized many of his 
contemporaries in the 1930s for trying to appropriate fascism in order to create a Catholic 
state that excluded diverse points of view. However, because of his death before the 
major reforms of the Second Vatican Council, history will be mute on how far his 
transition could have gone. As Zanca hypothesizes, his death possibly saved his moderate 
aura from many of the polarizations and dichotomies of the Conciliar and Post-Conciliar 
period.201  Creating space for the new generation of 1950 and 1960s a newly progressive 
Criterio consolidated that stood for democracy and pluralism in the line of Jacques 
Maritain. On the other side, stood La Plata’s Revista de Teología which opposed 
liberalizing trends. This ideological divide, already present during the 1950s, turned 
starker during the 1960s Conciliar period in which Criterio backed the Conciliar reforms 
(and Cardinal Congar in particular) and the Revista de Teología vigorously opposed new 
theological discussion.202  
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These micro-divisions of these communities represented larger conflicts within the 
national church.  Despite the progressive ascendency seen during the period, the 
influence that authoritarian intellectuals had over the Argentine Episcopate was best 
exemplified in the bishops’ proposals for discussion in the Second Vatican Council of the 
1960s and their reaction to the Council itself. Argentina’s Catholic nationalist history and 
its conservative ideology caused it to be one of the more conservative Episcopates 
regarding Church state relations and liturgical reform that it thought went too far.203 
Much of this dissent was expressed through the disagreements over liturgical reforms, 
and to what extent the Catholic Church would be the “true church of Christianity.”204  
While the proposals of the fifty-one Argentine bishops attending the Second Vatican 
Council varied, high profile  Argentine representatives such as Bahía Blanca bishop Jorge 
Mayer, Jorge Ramón Chalup of Gualeguaychú, Ramón José Castellano of Córdoba, 
Alfonso María Buteler of Mendoza, José Agustín Marozzi of Resistencia, agreed upon 
several proposals. The major concerns and proposals of the hierarchy included an official 
restatement of the ills of atheist materialism, Protestantism, Communism, Masonic 
societies, and the modernist secularization of society condemned by the First Vatican 
Council.205 The Argentine church was divided into two groups, the conservative 
                                                 
203 Fernando Carlos Urquiza, “Las transformaciones a la iglesia argentina: Del concilio Vaticano II a la 
recuperación democrática”, (Universidad Nacional del Centro, 2006), p.3 
204  Fortunato Mallimaci, “La continua critica a la modernidad: Análisis de los "Vota" de los Obispos 
Argentinos al Concilio Vaticano II” (Sociedad y Religión CONICET, Nº10/11 1993), p.23. Ibid. Quoting 
Mons. Mayer, Mons. Castellano, Mons. Chalup, Mons. Buteler, Mons. Rodriguez and Olmos, Mons. 
Marozzi, p.15. 
 
205Ibid. Quoting Mons. Mayer, Mons. Castellano, Mons. Chalup, Mons. Buteler, Mons. Rodriguez and 
Olmos, Mons. Marozzi, p.15. 
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Nationalists who had been formed in the 1930s in the Nationalist (integralist) philosophy, 
and the more progressive elements of the church centered on theological and biblical 
studies in the various seminaries.206 The traditionalists held a majority, while the 
progressives were largely marginalized. Ironically, as the reforms were pronounced by 
the Council, the progressives were in a better position to act on these reforms, while the 
Church hierarchy, which had condemned what they saw as excesses of modernism, was 
left trying to figure out how to respond to the rapid reforms, reforms even more radically 
interpreted by the CELAM conference of 1968.207 To Nationalists, the splits described 
above represented what nationalist author and young Catholic militant Carlos Sacheri, in 
his book La Iglesia Clandestina, called “the dialectalization of the church.”  Sacheri 
rejected creating a false dichotomy between correct tradition and necessary renovation of 
the Catholic Church i.e. the Council. By choosing one of the dichotomies, one had 
already lost the debate. In the words of Sacheri: 
Such dichotomies such as “Integralism or progressivism, ‘Conservation or 
Renewal’, ‘Episcopal authority or Papal authority’, ‘Capitalism or Communism’ 
etc., do not leave room for intermediate definitions and unconsciously force the 
population to take positions for one possibility and against the other. The grand 
                                                 
206 Fernando Carlos Urquiza, Las transformaciónes a la iglesia argentina: Del concilio Vaticano II a la 
recuperación democrática, Universidad Nacional del Centro, p.3-4. The count for the bishops in attendance 
at the Council comes from the Argentine Catholic News Agency. See: “Al Concílio Vaticano II asistieron 
51 obispos argnetinos” Agencia Informativa Católica Argentina 26 de Nov. 2013. 
http://www.aica.org/9600-al-concilio-vaticano-ii-asistieron-0-obispos-argentinos.html. Link accessed April 
26, 2015. 
207 Ibid, p.5-7 
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majority… [do not realize] that all of these false dichotomies, and others like them, 
are radically false.208 
The dichotomies expressed by Sacheri left the Nationalists feeling even more isolated and 
betrayed by the church’s rapid change, a change that many Nationalists felt was 
destroying the unity of the church from within by way of modernist thinking.209 
LEONARDO CASTELLANI: ARGENTINA’S PRIEST 
Born in Reconquista Santa Fe, Argentina in 1899, Leonardo Castellani joined the Jesuits 
in 1918, was ordained in 1931, and studied philosophy and theology in Rome at the 
Pontifical Gregorian University. In 1934, he moved to Paris to get his doctorate in 
Psychology from the Sorbonne in 1934, and returned to Argentina in 1935.  Fairly 
controversial due to his conflicts with more progressive superiors210, the Jesuits expelled 
Castellani in 1949, but he befriended the Archbishop of Salta in 1959 and finally was 
granted the right to return to the priesthood in 1966. He continued to write until his death 
in 1981.211 Juan Fernando Segova described Leonardo Castellani, along with Julio 
                                                 
208 Carlos Sacheri, La Iglesia Clandestina, (5º edición, Buenos Aires: Ediciones de Cruzamante, 1977), 
56. “Tales disyunciones como ‘integrismo o progresismo’, ‘conservación o renovación’, ‘poder Episcopal o 
autoridad papal’, ‘capitalismo o comunismo’, etc. no dejan lugar a planteos intermedios y fuerzan 
psicológicamente a la gente a tomar posición a favor de una de las posibilidades y contra la otra. La 
inmensa mayoría…[no perciben] que todas esas antinomias y otras similares son radicalmente falsas.” 
209Ibid.15 
210 Right after his return to the priesthood, Castellani opened his journal Jauja. In his last editorial for that 
journal, he describes the great pain he felt in his “exile” from the ministry. He compares his exile to that of 
St. John of the Cross’ Long Dark Night, and blames it on unorthodox enemies in the Church and the 
conciliar reforms. Castellani compared the Council reforms unfavorably to the Countereformation 
lamenting the lack of heroic virtue in the bishops of the 1960s. See: Leonardo Castellani, “Directorial” 
Jauja, noviembre de 1969, 2-5. 
211 Alfredo Sáenz, El apocolipsis según Leonardo Castellani (Pamplona: Fundación Gratis Date,2005),2. 
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Meinville, “one of the best Argentine writers, essayists, novelists, journalists, literary 
critics, poets, philosophers, and theologians.”  
Castellani, through a series of essays, liked to work up to  the abstract from practical 
realities, going from the theological, to the personal, all the way to the political For 
Castellani though, the struggle between good and evil happened not in the political sphere 
per se, but in the everyday lives of human beings. His informal style, his willingness to 
use vulgar language to get his points across, made him controversial with some in the 
Church hierarchy. Nevertheless, Castellani took his job as a doctrinal gatekeeper very 
seriously. Scholars have a more difficult time pinning down Castellani’s philosophy than 
that of Meinvielle because the philosophy remains scattered throughout a series of essays, 
books, and novels instead of a few key works.212  Castellani held one theme common 
throughout his work: A dystopian vision of liberal Argentina. He often mocked 
Argentina’s system in writings and portraying its leaders as incompetent clowns 
controlled by a dictatorship of relativism and Jewish conspirators. In El Nuevo gobierno 
de Sancho Castellani mocked the dogmatism of a supposedly tolerant Liberalism through 
a scene in which government advisers must predict the results of an impending war and 
recite a mantra of liberal pro-democratic principles which mindlessly condemn the 
authoritarian principles that Castellani upheld: 
                                                 
212 Juan Fernando Segovia, "La legitimidad entre la teología y la política. Reflexiones sobre el orden 
político católico en Meinvielle y Castellani (1930-1950)”, 98-99. 
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How are the speeches of dictators?-Violent-And their proceedings?-Aggressive.And 
their intentions? Exorbitant. And their attitudes? Intransigent. And their intentions? 
Criminal. And their gestures? Totalitarian. 
Castellani continued after ridiculing the governor for kicking a servant: 
[Question]:What does the Committee against anti-Semitism defend? [Response] 
Democracy. [Question] And Democracy what does it produce? [Response] Progress. 
[Question] And what does progress cause? [Response] Human Brotherhood above all 
races and religions. [Question] And Human Brotherhood above all races and religions 
in what is that based? [Response] The Argentine Liberal Tradition. [Question And 
who said so? [Response] Sarmiento. Enough said.213 
Criticizing the liberal order and its godlessness, Castellani lambasted the moral 
legitimacy of the atomic bomb, and blasted the praise of La Nación columnist Enrique 
Larreta, who wrote after Japan’s defeat “We thank God that the atomic bomb has come to 
the U.S.A.” Leonardo Castellani criticized what he saw as the power to destroy pitted 
against the creative powers of the divine. He also criticized the United States for 
fomenting foreign cultures that replaces idyllic Spanish values: 
                                                 
213 Leonardo Castellani, El nuevo gobierno de Sancho 4 Ed. (Buenos Aires: Biblioteca Dictio Vol.1), 24. 
«Como son los discursos de los dictadores? Violentos. Y sus procedimientos? Agresivos. Y sus 
pretensiones? Exorbitantes. Y sus actitudes? Intransigentes. Y sus intenciones? Criminales Y sus gestos? 
Totalitarios. 
El Gobernador de la Insula Agatháurica dio un puntapié por equivocación a una escupidera que había 
dejado abandonada junto al trono el paje de guaria, y prosiguió diciendo: -Que defiende el Comité contra el 
Antisemitismo? -La democracia  -La Democracia, que produce? -El progreso. -El progreso, qué causa? -La 
Fraternidad Humana, por encima de todas razas y religiones. -La Fraternidad por encima de todas razas y 
religiones en qué se basa? -En la Tradición Liberal Argentina. -Quién lo dijo? Sarmiento. -Basta.» 
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René Guénon says that modern science is demonic. In its essence it cannot by 
demonic, for that would be a manicheistic error; but it can be [demonic] in its 
direction. Science is the child of reason and is a high gift of God. However, man 
can abuse his gifts and most terribly the most high [gifts]. This technological 
know-how called science, empiricism, and mathematics, without wisdom, is not 
interested in knowing God and the soul, but rather, to know material, to master, it, 
to extract it…Science, channeled in a sacramental way to the denial of God and 
the monstrous deification of man, is maturing and turning into the Second Beast. 
[This beast] “puts all its power is the hands of the First Beast.” The detour of 
“Modern Science” that give us “marvelous and telling lies”  and  the miracles we 
ask of them, is one of the elements of this New Religion that we see forming right 
in front of our eyes. It takes on an outside appearance of the lamb and in its mouth 
[are stored] blasphemies…We’re not talking about old Roman Catholicism, which 
(according to Larreta) has utterly failed. We are talking about a new Christianity, 
made in the U.S.A, which can perfectly mix with Protestantism and Masonry. 214 
                                                 
214 Leonardo Castellani, “La bomba atómica” In: Luis C. Vizcay, Leonardo Castellani ( Buenos Aires: 
Ediciones Culturales Argnetinas, 1962), 24-25. «Dice René Guénon que la ciencia moderna es diabólica. 
En su esencia no puede ser diabólica, sería error de maniqueísmo; pero puede serlo en su orientación. La 
ciencia es hija de la razón que es un alto don de Dios. Pero el hombre puede abusar de sus dones, y más 
terriblemente de los más altos. A ese conocer tecnológico llamado hoy día ciencia, empirismo y 
matematismo sin sabiduría, no le interesa ya conocer a Dios y al alma, sino conocer la materia, para 
dominarla  exprimirla…La ciencia, orientada sacrílegamente hacia el desconocimiento de Dios y la 
deificación monstruosa del hombre, está madurando a convertirse en la Segunda Bestia, “que pone todo su 
poder en mano de la Bestia Prima”. La desviada Ciencia Moderna, que nos da “prodigios y portentos 
mendaces” por los milagros que le pedimos, es uno de los elementos de esa Nueva Religión que vemos 
formándose frente nuestro, que tiene aspecto exterior como el cordero y en su boca palabras de 
blasfemia…No se trata del viejo catolicismo romano, el cual (según Larreta) manifiestamente ha fracasado. 
Se trata de un cristianismo nuevo, made in U.S.A, que puede combinarse perfectamente en una persona con 
el protestantismo y la masonería.» 
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Castellani strongly defended the Hispanic tradition, Catholic values, and traditional 
Spanish laws which brought him into conflict with a man he had formerly had such kind 
words for, Jacques Maritain.  
In 1951 during the democratic transition, in his work So is Christ Returning or Not 
[Cristo vuelve o no vuelve], Castellani commented on the Maritain’s essay “Why we are 
neither Racists nor Anti-Semites.” Castellani condemned the vague attacks of the French 
Catholic philosopher directed at “certain Spanish theologians [ciertos teólogos 
españoles].” Maritain, citing the critical report of Bartolomé de Las Casas of the Spanish 
treatment of indigenous races before they were declared human, accused theologians of 
one of many forms of racism. Castellani responded by questioning the integrity of 
Martain’s anonymous attack saying that it “should make one cry.” Castellani mocked 
Maritain’s international reputation saying “What disgusts us quite a bit is the Jew in 
service to propaganda, even if he is Christian and a philosopher…The French philosopher 
has left aside philosophy and is left only with the French, and not even that…What a 
disaster!” Castellani showed his disdain for internationalism (which he considered to be 
at the service of Jewish Capitalism and Communism questioning “If this is what they can 
call international Catholic information, we would prefer lacking it and being Catholic 
nationalists, or better yet, just simply Catholics. If these international Catholics have such 
good information, name the Spanish theologians!”215 Castellani, as both a Hispanist and 
                                                 
 
215 “El racismo” In: Leonardo Castellani, ¿Cristo vuelve o no vuelve? 2° Ed. (Buenos Aires: Biblioteca 
Dictio, 1976), 196-197. “El que nos disgusta bastante es el judío puesto al servicio de la propaganda, 
aunque sea cristiano y filósofo. La Información Católica Internacional anda repartiendo un folleto de 
Jacques Maritain, titulado Por qué no somos racistas ni antisemitas. Es cosa de ponerse a llorar cuando uno 
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Catholic, criticized religious freedom, pluralism, and what he saw as ineffective public 
policy on the part of the Peronist government. In an essay titled “Small industries,” 
Castellani responded to what he saw as the questions of the time: 
Question: Will the [2nd] Quintenal plan fix the University? 
Response: If the Blessed Mother wants it! I don’t know. What I do know is that 
there are philosophy professors for example-with whom you could raise the salary 
two thousand and five-hundred pesos and also by $25,000 pesos monthly and they 
won’t teach philosophy…you can’t give what you don’t have. 
Making fun of the government institutes that the populist government created Castellani 
dismissed hopes of development during a Peronist government: 
Question: What good is the course they invented in the Humanities Institute in La 
Plata titled “Methodology of Teaching and Education Helping Science?” 
Response: With that [type of] Science and ten cents you can take the subway from 
[Street] Federico Lacroze to Leandro N. Alem. 
Castellani also criticized what he saw as corporatist indifference to individual 
professional working demands: 
Question: What can you tell me about the taxi strike? Shouldn’t the municipality 
give in immediately?216 
                                                 
lo lee….!que desastre!...si ésa  es la información católica internacional, prefirimos carecer de ella y ser 
católicos internacionales simplemente. Si los católicos internacionales tienen tan buena información, ¡que 
nombren a esos teólogos esapñoles!. 
216 Pregunta: ¿El plan quinquenal arreglará la Universidad? Respuesta-¡La Virgen Santísima y Nuestro 
Señor lo quieran! Yo no lo sé. Lo que yo sé es que hay profesores-por ejemplo, de filosofía-a quienes 
pueden aumentar el sueldo a dos mil quinientos pesos y también a 25,000 pesos mensuales, y no van a 
enseñar la filosofía…Nadie da lo que no tiene. Pregunta-¿En qué consiste y para qué sirve la asignatura 
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Response: By no means. Even if [the municipality] weren’t right. [Giving in] 
would be the nefarious downfall of social authority. “Get everything right without 
fail-says the duty of the noble and principles,-but if you get it wrong- keep at it, 
don’t amend it.” Especially when, in this case the Municipality seems to be 
right…But it’s false what you claim that “Perón is proposing a nationalization of 
the taxi industry, so similar, almost a thousand times over, to the hated Transport 
Corporation.” 
 
Castellani also dismissed pleas for religious tolerance especially of Spiritists, exclaiming 
that Jesus was not Spiritist. Castellani sarcastically gave the address, date and time of 
Jesus’ endorsement of freedom of religion and pluralism that precluded religious 
education. He mocked such questions through an elaborate set of allusions that only 
seemed to befit a legitimate answer: 
Question: Is it true that Jesus said: You can’t impose beliefs by force, and 
therefore I’m against religious education in the schools? 
                                                 
que inventaron en el Instituto de Humanidades de La Plata, titulada: Metodología de la Práctica de la 
Enseñanza de la Ciencias Auxiliares de la Educación? Respuesta- Con esa ciencia y diez centavos usted 
puede ir en subterráneo desde Federico Lacroze a Leandro N. Alem. Pregunta- ¿Qué me dice de la huelga 
de los taxis? ¿No debe ceder de una vez el Municipio? Respuesta- De ninguna manera. Aunque no tuviera 
razón. Sería una caída funesta de la autoridad social. “Acertar siempre y sin falla-debe el noble y 
principal,-pero si la acierta mal,-sostenella y no emendalla”. Sobretodo cuando, en este caso parece que 
tiene razón el Municipio…Pero es falso lo que usted alega que “Perón se propone una estatización del 
negocio taximétrico, parecida a la mil veces maldita Corporación de Transporte.” 
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Response: Yes, it’s true that Jesus said that at a three-legged table, where he was 
invoked by Fernando Saccone, President, and [Don] Inocencio Merlo [President 
of the Registry of Bahia Blanca], vice President of the Association of the Basil 
Scientific School [Spiritist School founded in 1917 in Buenos Aires], Spiritist 
Worship, Rawson 53, Buenos Aires, intersecting with [Norberto] Quirino Costa 
[Foreign Minister under Bartolomé Mitre], Videal, Salta 222, Canals (Cordoba), 
Venado Tuerto [Santa Fe city founded in 1935], Fraile Muerto [Southeast 
Cordoba], and Montevideo [also a Fraile Muerto there]. I’m not lying. 
Question: What do you think of cottage industries? 
Reply: I think that some of them deserve to be destroyed: The Costal University 
[In the capital city of Santa Fe], the taxi outlaws, and Spiritism for example are 
small industries. 217 
Castellani sharply criticized what he saw as a liberal wasteland. However, Castellani 
praised one of liberal Argentina’s principle proponents, Jorge Luis Borges, for the 
liberal’s extraordinary writing even as he condemned the writer’s heresy that “every 
cultured man is a theologian and faith is not indispensable.” Castellani believed in neither 
                                                 
217 “Las pequeñas industrias” In: Ibid. 208-209. Pregunta- ¿Es verdad que Jesús dijo: No hay que imponer 
por fuerza las creencias, por lo cual yo soy contrario a la enseñanza religiosa en las escuelas? Respuesta- 
Sí, es verdad que Jesús dijo eso en una mesa de tres patas, donde fue evocado por Fernando Saccone, 
presidente, y don Inocencio Merlo, vicepresidente de la Asociación Escuela Científica Basilio, Culto 
Espiritista, Rawson 53, Buenos Aires, con filiales en Quirino Costa, Vidal, Salta 222, Canals (Córdoba), 
Venado Tuerto, Fraile Muerto y Montevideo. No Miento. Pregunta- ¿Qué opina usted de la destrucción de 
las pequeñas industrias? Respuesta- Opino que algunas dellas merecen ser distruídas: la Universidad del 
Litoral, los troperos de taxis y el espiritismo, por ejemplo, son pequeñas industrias. 
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fully condemning nor fully endorsing him, but rather engaging his perceived theological 
heresies straight on.218  As late as August 1936, amid the controversy surrounding Jacque 
Maritain’s visit, Castellani wrotes approvingly of the philosopher in the liberal Argentine 
journal Sur. Castellani called Maritain’s worldview “profound, grounded and just. [His 
philosophy] is also notably opportune in Argentina.” Castellani called Martian’s melding 
of current history with his theory of a “New Christianity” to replace the old, “full of 
clarity.” Castellani ended diminishing his disagreements by “seeing the trees instead of 
[just] the leaves” and exhorting that “the latest works of Maritain are a must read.”219 
Such a position towards a prominent liberal writer should drag  Castellani’s image out of 
the one-dimensional caricature that both his hagiographers and detractors draw. However, 
Castellani’s biggest controversies would arise during his years as head of a journal. 
JAUJA: CASTELLANI’S MOUTPIECE 
Castellani’s journal Jauja (1967-1969) represented his more conservative views, and a 
radical, but influential, Catholic fringe. In circulation in the years 1967, 1968, and 1969, 
critical years of the post-Conciliar period, the magazine constituted a haven for those who 
wished to flee the rapid reforms of the Second Vatican Council and its allegedly false 
dichotomies. Economically speaking, the journal continued to give voice to traditional 
popular and Meinvielle’s  anti-Semitic theory of an international Jewish conspiracy  
against the Argentine nation. Amancio González Paz wrote against the Alliance for 
                                                 
218 Quoting Borges in “El enigma de Edward Fitzgerald, (2004): 66. In: Adur Nobile, Lucas. "Fascinación 
y rechazo. Borges ante los intelectuales católicos argentinos." In VII Congreso Internacional Orbis Tertius 
de Teoría y Crítica Literaria. 2009, 4-5.  
219 Leonardo Castellani, “Jacques Maritain” Sur Año VI (Agosto de 1936): 65-67. 
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Progress and International Development Bank as mere tools of the International 
Monetary Fund. Paz considers the IMF to be the governing body of the “Jewish 
assassin…not yet punished” that “fulfills [gradually] the Priories of Sion”  despite the 
international press’ attempts to deny that such grand conspiracies existed. The author tied 
the hypothetical Jewish assassin to the “tragic” death of Catholic president John F. 
Kennedy, who died, the article implied in an almost paranoid twist, for opposing 
international financial monopolies. The end goal of all of this conspiring, according to the 
author, was to devalue the Argentine currency sufficiently to create enough poverty for 
social unrest. This poverty would pave the way for the entry of international Communism 
in the region. 220  
While none of these arguments should surprise the reader (and their continuity with old 
anti-Semitic ideas may even bore them), the author’s almost supportive lament of the 
“tragic” death jumps out. Given the obvious role of the United States in the direction of 
these financial agencies (the United States comprised of about half the world’s economy 
during this time), the author’s mourning of the dead president, who championed among 
other things a strict separation of Church and State, spoke to the strength of Kennedy’s 
Catholic mystique. Catholic nationalists’ willingness to employ US figures against what 
they saw as imperialist policies demonstrated the existence of fluid political boundaries 
and identities which allowed anti-US authors to separate its intellectuals, or even its 
defunct leader, from its grand imperial ambitions. 
                                                 
220 A.G.P [Amancio González Paz?], “Fondo monetario internacional” Jauja, enero de 1967, 8, 9. 
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Echoing similar critiques by Brazilian Christian Democrats regarding Johnson’s 
intervention, Castellani’s journal showered scorn upon the project, comparing 
democracy’s project unfavorably towards both traditional colonialism and even 
Communist statism. Alejandro Sáez Germain, writing on the importance of ideas to the 
nation-state building project, criticized the US war effort in Vietnam in 1968, just as 
global protests from the Left heated up. Praising Hitler and Mussolini for attempting to 
“create a new European order,” Stalin for at least fighting for the Communist ideal, Spain 
for reestablishing the old Spanish sense of Empire, and even the British for fighting for 
their view of civilization, the author called for grand ideas, “the morale of victory” to 
guide civilizations. For the “Yankee” lack of morals, the author lambasted the values that 
underpinned the US anti-Communist crusade: 
The US soldiers that fight in the Vietnam area in “defense of democracy”, do not 
feed their spirits neither with exalting war literature nor with the inflaming and 
powerful military prowess of some grand leader. They prefer the miniskirts of 
Raquel Welch, the clowns of the insipid Bob Hope and the five days of free time 
and eroticism in the prostitute islands prepared by the effective, and how 
lamentable it is, Yankee logistics. That is called the morale of defeat. 
 
The author called the Soviet soldiers’ willingness to die a “morale of victory” compared 
to the decadence and laziness of the US troops.221 This article creates surprise not 
                                                 
221 Alejandro Sáez Germain, “Sobre nosotros y la voluntad de suicidio de un imperio inútil” Jauja, Junio 
de 1968, 24. “Los soldados estadounidenses que combaten en el complejo Vietnam en “defensa de la 
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because of its predictable anti-US sentiment, but rather, the token praise it gives to the 
Soviet generals. In this worldview, unabashed Communism deserved respect. Liberalism, 
Communism in disguise, did not deserve the same admiration.  
Similarly, US values and legal rules had ruined Argentina’s culture by imposing outside 
traditions, as had the French Civil Code style, which had created by fiat, in the mind of 
the journals writers, synthetic laws that quickly fell into disuse without proper cultural 
backing. The journal offered traditional Spanish corporatism, ostensibly based on St. 
Thomas Aquinas as the answer to the failures of international liberal institutions.222  
Castellani similarly mocked US religious leaders’ efforts at evangelization in an almost 
uniform Catholic country as well as Liberal Protestantism’s abandonment of Christ’s 
fundamental teachings. Rebutting possible inroads by Protestant fundamentalists, 
Castellani built up the Argentines as a rational people not prone to the emotional pull of 
the alter call. He chided Billy Graham, who visited Buenos Aires in 1967, for his bad 
theology as well as poor marketing.  Castellani  cited an April 8, 1966 TIME article “Is 
God Dead” saying that the diversity of opinion represented the divisions of the “Christian 
atheist” Liberal protestant theologians (Thomas J. J. Altizer, William Hamilton, and Paul 
van Buren).  Referring to Graham’s emotional claim to have “talked and traveled” with 
                                                 
democracia”, no alimentan su espíritu ni con literatura de exaltación guerrera ni con las inflamadas y 
poderosas arengas militares de algún gran jefe. Les agradan más las minifldas de Raquel Welch, las 
payasadas del insulso Bob Hope y los cinco días de licencia extra y erótica en las islas prostibularias 
preparadas por la eficaz, cuanto que lamentable, logística yanqui. Eso se llama moral de 
derrota…Recientemente declaró Gialp, general en jefe de las fuerzas comunistas: “Nuestros soldados están 
dispuestos a morir. “ Eso se llama moral de victoria.”   
 
222 "Filosofía del Nacionalismo" marzo de 1969, Jauja Marzo de 1969, 10-11,14. 
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God, Castellani responds, “[W]e all believe that at a certain point, but we’ve never come 
to believe  that we’ve played a hand of truco with him.”223 Castellani rebuked the U.S’ 
Protestant individualism that so many Latin American authors had come to associate with 
exploitation, like of philosophical rigor, and materialism. 
Jauja also rejected the reforming trends of the Second Vatican Council calling for an 
opening towards modernity. H.I Giuliano rejected what he saw as a “total war” of the 
internal enemies of the Church against its tradition, waged by Jesuits such as Teilhard de 
Chardin (1881-1955).224 The idea of a developing God and developing theology that 
implied universality threatened the Church’s exclusive claims to truth. He focused on 
Cardinal Giovanni Battista  Montini of Milan, who had argued that external and internal 
forces threatened the “riches” of its liturgical traditions. Guiliano chides Maritain for his 
refutation of a “Christian civilization” and his acceptance of Marxists and embrace of 
certain liberal principles in the name of tolerance.225 In the same issue, the journal 
reviews Julio Meinvielle’s book critiquing  Maritain. The review described the work as 
“old wine” that gains [quality] with time.” The review praises Meinvielle’s struggle with 
the “talented” French theologian, but turned around heaping scorn upon Maritain noting 
“he was not so bright before becoming a reformer.” Echoing Sacheri’s disdain for 
dichotomies,  the journal took offense at the very term “New Christianity” as implying a 
                                                 
223 Leonardo Castellani, “La nueva Didaje, Ha muerto Dios?” 18-20 Feb. 1967, 18-19. 
224 Teilhard de Chardin, 1881-1951, was a semi-universalist Jesuit priest censored by the Vatican for his 
views that the world was developing toward one unified conscience. He has since entered the mainstream. 
See: Teilhard de Chardin, The phenomenon of man, (London: Collins, 1959). 
225 H.L Giuliano,“Un nuevo Conciliarismo en la Historia de la Iglesia” Jauja, Enero, Febrero, Marzo de 
1968, 36-39. 
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rupture with “the Old.” For the journal, this dichotomy paved the way for the terms “pre” 
and “post” Conciliar which only further divided the body of Christ. The author implied 
support of Charles Maurras, the founder of Action Française, by criticizing Maritain’s 
1930 rupture with the group.226 Castellani’s anti-Conciliar allies found strange allies 
among some of the Conciliar fathers themselves. Julio Meinvielle wrote critically of Karl 
Rahner asking if he was the “famous” and “successful” theologian that others had 
claimed him to be, or if he merely continues the old gnostic tradition of humanity’s 
progressive and subjective progression toward truth. Liberals, and the press specifically, 
“who [drank] up [his works] with the jealousy of Beelzebub” used Rahner’s theology to 
argue for all  sorts of doctrinal changes in Church teaching. Meinviele found common 
cause with theologian Hans Urs Von Balthasar. Meinvielle shrewdly pointed out 
Balthasar’s uneasiness with Rahner’s proposed theological reforms, which the Conciliar 
father warns “could break the continuity of Christianity as it has been understood until 
now.”227 
 The journal may have criticized the Church’s present leaders, but it did not lack heroes, 
even those condemned by the church. Jauja allowed for high praise of the right wing 
fringe, praising the Falangist founder José Antonio Primo de Rivera. One article literally 
                                                 
226 A review of “De Lammenais a Maritain” by Julio Meinvielle Jauja, Enero, Febrero, Marzo de 1968, 
56. 
 
 
227  Quoting Hans Urs von Balthasar. Cordula oder der Ernstfal; Einsiedeln, Johannes Verlag, 1966. Fue 
traducido al español bajo el título de “Seriedad con las cosas” (Córdula o el caso auténtico). In: Julio 
Meinvielle, “Rahner, ¿teólogo católico o gnóstico” Jauja,  abril de 1969, 15. 
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spells out Primo de Rivera’s “imitation of Christ” with high rhetoric that would have 
disturbed many moderates in the Vatican: 
Justice and Harmony” is the saying of José Antonio and the Falange. They 
testified to it with their blood. At thirty-three years old Christ died. At thirty-three 
years old José Antonio died. Christ’s public and heroic life was three years as 
were Jose Antonio’s last [three years]. Christ offered himself as a sheep before the 
slaughterer. From the beginning of his public life, José Antonio offered his: “We 
have sacrificed ourselves,” he said in his first presentation. An iniquitous trial 
crucified Christ. An iniquitous trial executed José Antonio by firing squad.228 
As for every saint’s ability to imitate Christ, the author made clear that the Spanish leader 
rose to the top as far as saintly behavior was concerned saying “some might object: ‘You 
have forgotten the Popes.’ I have not forgotten them [in this comparison].” 
There is no doubt that José Antonio was one of Christ’s elect. [He was] in favor 
of hispanidad, Christianity, Civilization, and Culture. Father Castellani has said 
that he is “one of the kindest figures in all of history. A hero worthy of Homer’s 
                                                 
228 Hilario Lafuente (Industrial Engineer), “Primo de Rivera y la empresa” Jauja, mayo de 1959, 7. 
“Justicia y Armonía” es el lema de José Antonio y de la Falange; y lo testimoniaron con su sangre. A los 
treinta y tres años murió Cristo, a los treinta y tres años murió José Antonio. Tres años de vida pública y 
heroica fueron los de Cristo, tres años de vida pública y heroica fueron lo últimos de José Antonio. Como 
oveja que va al matadero se ofreció Cristo, desde el comienzo de su vida pública ofreció su vida José 
Antonio: “nosotros nos sacrificaremos” dijo en su primera presentación. Un juicio inicuo crucificó a Cristo, 
un juicio inicuo fusiló a José Antonio.” (7) 
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[poems] (if Homer’s heroes had been Christians).” Love was José Antonio’s 
motivator. Love, Country, Bread, and Justice.229 
Castellani and his journal also showed an enthusiasm for Rosas, who they saw as a great 
statesman intentionally erased or diminished in the history books.  In his editorial in 
August 1968, Castellani contested the notion that a good country can be ruled by “one 
hundred years of tyranny.” Decrying the rise of liberalism, Castellani referred to Rosas’ 
defeat in 1852 at Caseros as “the grand national defeat” that led to “bribery, 
ignorance…idiocy” and “cretinization.”230 In November 1968, comparing Rosas to the 
grand French monarchy and aristocrats, the “governments of the best,” Adolfo Dante 
Loss condemned the incapable liberal merchants that took over after independence. 
Saying that Argentines understand how a Platonic governing of capable elites works, the 
author lamented, “Oh how we miss you Juan Manuel de Rosas.”231 Castellani also 
inserted himself into historiographical debates of his era, commenting on Rosas’ 
biographies and histories of the French intervention by Federico Ibarguren, J.M. Rosas, 
Gabriel Puentes, and García Lupo. At one point, Castellani showed a certain frustration 
with the uncharitable view Mexican historian Carlos Pereyra took towards Rosas. 
Castellani chafed at what he saw as the apparent contradiction that Rosas was “not a 
statesman” but still “a wonderful organizer.” Castellani claimed that if Rosas could not 
                                                 
229 Ibid. «No hay duda que José Antonio es un elegido de Cristo en favor de España, de la Hipanidad, de 
la Cristiandad, de la Civilización y de la Cultura. El Padre Castellani ha dicho de él que es “Una de las 
figuras más simpáticas de toda la historia; un homérida; (si los héroes de Homero hubiesen dsido 
cristianos”). El Amor fue el móvil de José Antonio. El Amor, la Patria, el Pan y la Justicia.» 
230 Leonardo Castellani, “Directorial” Jauja, Agosto de 1968, 2-4. 
231 Adolfo Dante Loss, “El Otro Baudelaire” Jauja, Noviembre de 1968, 9. 
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achieve the status of a great statesman then “we’ve never had one in our history…that’s 
our great punishment.” 
 Castellani also invoked religious explanations for Argentina’s political mailaise and 
instability: “Enlightenment, liberalism, progressivism, and now ‘democratism.” In his 
view, Argentina’s philosophical “heresy” had come from Spain, which had ironically 
accepted dangerous doctrines (Castellani might have pointed to Bourbon absolutism and 
the 1812 Constitution). Castellani deemed these “far worse” than the Protestant teachings 
of Luther and Calvin the Spanish had so wisely rejected in the 1500s.232 Luis Soler Cañas 
approached the restoration of Rosas from a literary perspective Soler Cañas focused his 
article on a poem by John Mansfield who wrote about the Argentine leader when he 
arrived in  Buenos Aires 1878.  He described the poem that resulted, Rosas, an important 
“historical, critical or artistic [contribution] about Rosas [which] has had the most 
circulation in the world, however that which [also] is practically unknown to us.” 
Mansfield’s “spontane[ous] and preci[se]” tragic poems with epic landscapes reminded 
Soler Cañas of Shakespeare and Poe.233 Such cultural praise for the work of a British poet 
reminds historians that Rosas spent his exile years in England, and that even Catholic 
Nationalists looked beyond their borders for praise of their heroes ignored at home. 
While Castellani showed enthusiasm about Hispanic culture and governance at the 
theoretical level, by 1969 he had grown fairly pessimistic regarding the 1966 coup that 
                                                 
232 Leonardo Castellani, “Directorial” Jauja, abril de 1969, 3-5. 
233 Luis Soler Cañas, “Primeras Imágenes de Don Juan Manuel de Rosas en la poesía del siglo XX” Jauja,  
febrero de 1967, 16. 
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had brought Oganía to power with a promise to return traditional Hispanic values. 
Castellani criticized the Revolución Argentina saying it is a revolution “in name only.” 
He speculated that a real “National Revolution” would be based on  a monarchy, or at 
least a life president, elected indirectly by the governors of the different provinces. 
Following the classic corporatist model of representation by social profession, Castellani 
also suggested that Parliament should not be divided by region, but by five major social 
interest groups: Labor, National Defense, Religion, the intellectual class, and then last of 
all, geographical region. This interests together would form “a grand political team” that 
would check the excesses of a possible tyranny.234  
Specifically, he criticized the Revolution for implementing top-down laws that stripped 
individual families of education choices and ignored “national customs.” Castellani 
argued for pragmatism, arguing that stale education decrees that tried to “create new 
customs” would not “catch on.” In his critique, Castellani combined the philosophical 
and the practical, rejecting public schools (which dated back to Napoleon’s monopoly of 
education) as mere “communist” factories. “[T]he worst [scenario] is not an irreligious 
school, but an ineffective one” he wrote. Such a factory creates an “explosive animal that 
produces if it’s tame, and revolts if it’s mad.”235  Still others in Castellani’s circle such as 
Bruno Jacolvella took direct aim at the traditional Nationalism for pushing elite 
ideologies and cultural agendas such as education and international idealism instead of 
                                                 
234 Leonardo Castellani, “Directorial” Jauja, octubre de 1969, 5-6. 
 
235 Leonardo Castellani, “Directorial” Jauja mayo de 1969,3. 
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focusing on the needs of the working class and the day-to-day dignity of its 
citizens.236Such critiques should not surprise readers, as Oganía had at one time 
constituted one of the moderate azules of the government, and may have been less than 
enthusiastic about supporting Catholic Nationalists exclusively despite their initial 
optimism. 
CONCLUSION: CABILDO AND THE COUP OF 1976 
As Argentina entered the 1970s, the chaos of the Peronist period ushered in a new wave 
of clerical and guerrilla radicalism. On one side stood the Catholic-inspired Montoneros 
and the Ernesto Guevara inspired People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP). On the other side 
fought right-wing paramilitary groups and traditionalist trade unions that awaited the 
return of Juan Domingo Perón to reestablish the socially conservative, but worker 
friendly, state discussed earlier in this chapter. Lamentably, the tenure of Perón’s proxy 
government (Héctor La Cámpora served as Perón’s hand-picked president in 1973), and 
his Perón did not provide the stability nor the ideological certitudes that his followers 
expected. His death, and the unstable rule of his second wife Isabel Perón, eventually 
further polarized Argentine society. This polarization swept up (even further) Catholic 
militants, who called for drastic measures in order to return to what they saw as 
normalcy. The social consensus that rejected social instability, paved the way for the 
                                                 
236 Bruno Jacolvella, “Desnacionalización del Nacionalismo o el Revisionismo Revisado” Jauja, Enero, 
Febrero Marzo de 1968, 25. 
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“Process of National Reorganization” which lasted from 1976-1983 and cost the lives (or 
disappearances) of 19,000-30,000 Argentines. 
Before the disturbances of the 1970s, as José Zanca pointed out in his work, Catholic 
democrats played an important role in the disputes over the Second Vatican Council. 
They constituted a substantial minority of religious thought, especially in the area of 
social action in the poorer areas of Argentina. Thus, historians would be negligent to 
ignore them in evaluating how the Argentine church arrived to its present day centrist 
position. However, during the crucial time period of the coup, this school of thought lost 
out because it did not have the backing of the Church hierarchy, which had stuck with the 
“safe” option of a loyal priesthood with a top-down structure and a military that would 
enforce Catholic values. But after their drawn out victory during the Conciliar period, 
how did the Nationalist leaders actually respond to the 1976 coup, considered now to be 
the bloodiest in Argentine history? Did the most effective campaign against “subversion” 
and progressive values that even reached into the Church itself actually please them? Yes 
and no. The Catholic trajectory tracks through the stages of elite middle-class literary 
Catholicism, Spanish Fascism, conservative Catholic alternative democracies, and the 
reactionary theology of the anti-Conciliar hierarchy. As such, Catholic Nationalists were 
well positioned to both accept the anti-Communist justifications the military government 
offered for taking power, but were equally positioned to be disillusioned and call for 
more radical action than the “market-liberal” dictatorship would allow.  
Surprisingly, Nationalist leaders even today say they “resisted” the military dictatorship’s 
economic policy. Many times this statement misses an important distinction between 
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resistance and right wing criticism.  Right wing Catholics’ claims that they “opposed” the 
dictatorship on economic and ideological  grounds (from the right) conveniently gives 
Nationalists a way in their own minds of skirting around the military’s unpopular 
economic policies and failed military campaign even if they readily embrace the 
disappearance of 19,000-30,000 Argentine citizens. Nationalists, however, do have the 
fog of war that at least partially obscures the historical certitude on their rationale for 
supporting the Proceso’s worst excesses. The regime was avowedly anti-Marxist, made 
traditional Catholic values the center of its moral justification for the armed coup, and 
spoke the language of God and Country by appealing to the “two pillars” of Argentine 
identity, Church and Military.237 
 According to Catholic Nationalism, a coup was licit to prevent anarchy, tyranny, or a 
disruption of the natural order.238  However, there is evidence of some friction between 
the dictatorship in its actions, and in the Catholic Nationalist ideology that it tried to 
appease for ideological cover.  After Criterio became more moderate in the wake of the 
death of Franceschi in 1957239, the Catholic Nationalists movement had no one single 
consistent arena to express the arguments they had put forward in 1930 with nationalism 
and fascism at its height. In 1973 however, Cabildo: Contra el caos began to circulate. 
Cabildo continued the anti-capitalist, anti-Marxist rhetoric of Franceschi’s Criterio, 
                                                 
237 Mark J. Osiel, “Constructing Subversion in Argentina's Dirty War”, Representations, No. 75 (Summer, 
2001), p.121. 
238 “Historia Argentina: Una Entrevista con Antonio Camponnetto” La Hora de Juan Cruz, el 29 de 
septiembre ,2011. http://lahoradejuancruz.blogspot.com/2010/09/historia-argentina-entrevista-al-dr.html. 
239In an editorial on March 11, 1976, Criterio expressed its opposition to the impending coup claiming 
that all democratic options had not been exhausted at that point. This denotes a clear departure from the 
editorial stance of Franceschi. 
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adding the accusation of an international financial conspiracy to its pages. Cabildo shows 
its suspicion of international news sources through its responses to a New York Times 
article petitioning for the freeing of a political prisoner Jacobo Timerman. The New York 
Times is labeled a “Marxist super-capitalist” newspaper, hijacked by the Argentine exile 
community attempting to unduly influence the government. On the covers of the 1976 
Cabildo editions one sees conflations of Jewishness with subversion.240 Cabildo, in its 
first publications in 1973, was against the flailing, but democratically elected government 
of Isabel Perón, which they believed was ineffective and an example of democracy at its 
worst.  Due to her ineffectiveness at controlling the various guerrilla groups, these 
organizations effectively targeted prominent Catholics for assassination, such as the 
shooting of Carlos Sacheri, one of the main Catholic Nationalist activists at the time.241 
Thus, Cabildo only increased their criticism of Isabel Perón, the political system, and the 
idea of democracy itself. Her adviser José López  Rega, was even more despised for his 
centralization of power.242 Their criticism of Lopéz Rega eventually led to their being 
                                                 
240“Algo para recordar”, Cabildo nº 14, 2da.ép.marzo 1978, p.13.  For the anti-Semitism distinction See: 
Quoting Antonio Caponnetto (responding to a reporter’s question regarding the concept of Jews as a 
“Radical Synagogue”): “Con los judios tenemos una enemistad teológica. Sabemos con nuestro Señor que 
son ‘los hijos del padre de la mentira’…que éste gobierno es el gobierno con mayor número de judíos que 
se recuerde…pero no sé si conforman una ‘sinagoga’ porque dentro de todo el término connota sacralidad. 
Mas bien un ‘trust’ impio,deprecador, usurero y corrosivo del alma Cristiana y argentina…el probelma no 
es el sionismo a secas, sino en tanto y en cuanto éste es una expression y un fruto descantado del judaísmo. 
Hay una cuestión política sin duda, y económica y social, pero en el fondo…palpita una cuestión 
teológica.” Antonio Caponnetto, Del proceso a de la Rúa: Una Mirada nacionalista sobre 25 años de 
política argentina 1986-Presente, Vol.II (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Nueva Hispanidad, 2001), p.410-411.   
For the conflations See: Cover, Cabildo, 2da Epoca Abril 1977 Año I-Nº7; Cover, Cabildo, 2da Epoca 
Nov. 1977 Año II Nº-11 
 
241 “Carlos Alberto Sacheri: Martir de Cristo y de La Patria,” Calbido, Enero 1975, Año II-Nº21, p.18,19. 
242Vicente Gonzalo Massot, “El estado soy yo”, Cabildo, Febero de 1975, Año II-Nº22, p.7 
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shut down in 1975, until they were able to reopen under the new Junta Militar.243 When 
the journal reopened, it continued to criticize Videla, considered a moderate when 
compared to the rest of his junta, from the right. Cabildo was censured and sued due to 
this editorial for “slander” against the dictatorship, that is, assuming that the dictatorship 
was perhaps not as Catholic or Nationalist as they professed.244  
This being said, the resistance of the Nationalists to the Videla regime, and the 
consequences of this opposition, can definitely be overstated.  Nationalists rejected, and 
to this day reject, the very idea of human rights as “the new myth of a decadent 
civilization that itself threatens to be a violation of true personal and national dignity.”245 
For Antonio Caponnetto246, the editor of Cabildo, and most Argentine Catholic 
Nationalists, “human rights” is only an extension of “Masonic and communist 
ideologies” that had been consistently condemned throughout modern history. 
Caponnetto argued in short that natural law, not rights constructed by human standards, 
should define the dignity that a human being deserved. For this reason, Nationalists 
supported the military when it dismissed human rights, and criticized it when it appeared 
                                                 
243Cabildo, 2da. Epoca- Año I-Nº 1 Agosto 1976, p.13. 
244Cabildo nº 14, 2da.ép.marzo 1978, p.5 
245Antonio Caponnetto, Del proceso a de la Rúa: Una Mirada nacionalista sobre 25 años de política 
argentina 1975-1986, Vol.I (Buenos Aires: Ediciones Nueva Hispanidad, 2001), 57.  
246 Caponnetto is the revisionist historian mentioned earlier in this paper. He continues to be a fierce critic 
of the centrist wing of the Church to this day, questioning for example the legitimacy of the Conclave that 
brought Jorge Mario Bergoglio to the throne of Peter. He argued that while the Holy Spirit was present, and 
the authorities were legitimate, that a lack of prudence might have led the Cardinals to ignore the moves of 
the Holy Spirit, therefore electing a candidate God might not have in fact preferred. See: 
http://nacionalismo-catolico-juan-bautista.blogspot.com/2013/03/antonio-caponnetto-sobre-el-
pontificado.html. Date accessed: March 30, 2015. 
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to give in to international pressure to enforce human rights.247  The magazine consistently 
praised the military’s performance on the battlefield while condemning what it saw as 
equivocation and attempts at moderation in areas such as the regulation of education and 
the freedom of religion. In one case, the magazine criticized the dictatorship’s reversal on 
letting Jehovah’s Witnesses practice their religion. According to the nationalists, this sect 
undermined the two basic pillars of the state: God and military vocation. To allow a sect 
to practice their errant religion would be to undermine the very foundations of society 
that provide stability against the divisiveness of subversive ideas pleasing with the 
government that “[m]ore than ever, it is necessary to defend to the death the principle of 
national unity, a unity that can only come from [the roots] given to us by the Hispanic-
Catholic tradition.”248 Therefore, the Church and the militants it supported were hardly 
“complicit” in the passive sense. Right wing militants in the torture chambers during the 
Dirty War followed in a long tradition of anti-Northern sentiment, a disdain for the rule 
of law in the liberal sense, and a religious conviction that transcended simple questions of 
economic instability or mere public order. This religious fervor showed itself  literally in 
sharp disputes and parodies of international progressive Catholic figures and the tenets of 
Liberal governance.  Disputes and disagreements with Jacques Maritain and his idea of a 
confessional Catholic tolerance and a building of a “New” Catholic republic to replace a 
Middle Ages Catholic utopia, facilitated the cold-blooded “accidental” deaths of the 
                                                 
247 Ibid. p.29-34 
248 “La subversion que también debe combatirse: Un fallo lamentable”, Cabildo 2da epoca Año I nº9 
Agosto 1977,p.42. «Nunca como ahora es necesario defender a muerte el principio de la unidad nacional 
que no puede ser otra que la que nos viene dada por la Tradición Católica e Hispánica.» 
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progressive Church leaders mentioned at the beginning of the chapter. The length of time 
that Nationalists criticized from the margins of power does not prove the correctness of 
their ideas, but might speak to the sincerity of their hearts. For Nationalists that had 
passed, the ghosts of the past had nothing to do with the photos with no bodies to match 
them, but rather, the failure to pull “the Clandestine Church” permanently from the 
shadows of a tepid Vatican leadership, despite their willingness to stain both the sword 
and the cross with the blood of the unworthy. 
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Chapter Three: Liberty through Order: Tracing Brazilian Catholic 
Exceptionalism, 1930-1970 
The previous chapter laid out Argentina’s clear preference for authoritarian solutions to 
political problems, especially working class problems that sowed distrust in high ranking 
military officials. Such ideological polarization, and the Argentine church’s closeness 
with military officials, created an environment which left little room for compromise or 
concessions. How did the Brazilian Church, which also had a strong right wing Catholic 
movement, respond to the government’s democratic and dictatorial projects?  This 
chapter attempts to trace the complex relationship between the Catholic press and various 
government institutions in the midst of various stages of authoritarian rule. In the first 
example of such a relationship, intellectuals during the Estado Novo (1937-1945) divided 
tasks within the state apparatus. Some journals achieved collaboration by defining 
cultural issues around the state project while others merely further developed the ideas of 
the biggest journals.249  Whether Catholics related to the regime of Getúlio Vargas, or 
considered themselves an independent center of power, the Catholic press would 
appropriate Vargas’ model. The Centro Dom Vital would serve as the center of Catholic 
lay-thought in Brazil, with other journals and weeklies acting as intermediaries and 
interpreters.  Scott Mainwaring divides the Church into two periods in the “long” 20th 
                                                 
249 To read more on the cooptation of elites in general during the Estado Novo see: Monica Pimenta 
Vellosco, “Uma configuração do campo intellectual” Ch.3 In:. Gomes, Ângela Maria Castro, Mônica 
Pimenta Velloso, and Lucia Lippi Oliveira, Estado Novo: ideologia e poder ( Rio de Janeiro:Zahar, 1982), 
76-77. 
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Century. From 1891 with the separation of Church and state to 1910, the Church focused 
on internal affairs, while from 1916-1945 the Church actively engaged in politics to 
enforce its agenda.  Mainwaring also notes three different types of Catholic: The 
modernizing Catholic who wanted to make the gospel more accessible, the traditionalists 
who believed in creating a confessional Catholic state, and progressives who emphasized 
social justice as a main priority.250 A Ordem housed all three types of these intellectuals 
during its golden years (1930-1960). However, Catholic newspapers and journals did not 
share the same organizational structure as the handpicked cultural journals of the Estado 
Novo. As the reader will see later on, papers and journals often cited each other for 
reinforcement and diffusion. Constant citation signified the universal importance and 
renown of intellectuals such as Alceu Lima and Church leaders such as Archbishop Dom 
Hélder Câmara. However, even early on, major centers of Catholic thought attempted to 
compile special sections that reinforced their case against modernity through local 
examples of religious victories won, Communist threats rising or foiled, or new 
intellectual breakthroughs in philosophy and theology. While a shift in  editorial policy in 
one journal did not mean an instant shift in a corresponding regional media outlet, my 
research has encountered significant consistency across major Brazilian literary platforms 
despite what other scholars claim about the political inconsistency of centers such as the 
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 159 
Centro Dom Vital. 251  In short, while others argue that a change in political position 
constitutes a philosophical rupture, I argue that philosophical consistencies weigh more 
than those changes, which occurred pushed by new observations, especially regarding 
how intellectuals viewed authoritarianism after the Second World War. Such 
philosophical consistency, even in the face of changing political realities, gave  the 
intellectuals from the Christian democratic tradition the flexibility to maintain their 
categories of analysis, even as the writers many times categorize or rethought how 
specific actors fit into them.  
 
José Luis Bendicho Beired especially addresses the role of state formation in shaping 
Catholic thought. In the case of interwar Brazil and Argentina, Brazilian intellectuals’ 
ability to create mutual interests with the state and the Argentines’ inability to do the 
same during an anti-clerical Radical government reasonably account for the difference in 
the groups’ respective moderation or radicalization.252  Roberto Romano, suggests that a 
“flexible and autonomous” Church discourse may break through the usual binary 
analyses that color Church historiography. His theologically oriented approach 
recognizes that “unquestionable notions,” such as the Church’s complete subservience to 
oppressive state ideologies, weaken historical analysis and avoid larger philosophical 
issues. Traditional historical methodologies fail to take into account the Church’s 
                                                 
251  Leandro Luiz Cordeiro, "Alceu Amoroso Lima e as posturas políticas na Igreja Católica Brasileira 
(1930-1950)" PhD diss., Dissertação de mestrado em história ( Maringá: Universidade Estadual de 
Maringá, 2008), 157. 
252 José Luis Bendicho Beired, Sob o signo da nova ordem:Intelectuais autoritários no Brasil e na 
Argentina, (São Paulo: Loyola, 1999),67-68. 
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theological basis in hierarchy as well as its historical memory as a “church always 
reforming.” In short, social analyses alone miss the obvious: The stated mission of the 
Church as a real motivation for its actors even on the political stage. This mission often 
came into conflict with the ruling elites in Brazil. Although it took a defensive posture 
towards Republican ideas for the sake of its own existence, the Catholic community  
developed “intellectual vanguards” of its own even as it relied on the state to help push 
through many of its social programs.253 Other scholars such as Marcelo Ridenti have 
pointed to Popular Action and the Catholic University Youth (JUC) as examples of 
groups that challenged the Church hierarchy’s emphasis on the spiritual at the expense of 
practice in the 1950s and 1960s in the lead up to the Council. The author traces 
Maritain’s influence upon these figures arguing that before the Cuban Revolution, the 
groups sought a balance between sluggish consumerism and statist Communism using 
Maritain’s “historical ideal.” Maritain’s vision eschewed the idea that an idyllic medieval 
past was retrievable, but nevertheless employed Thomism and scholastic views of the 
Human Person to critique two concepts Maritain considered toxic to the human 
condition. Ironically, this anti-hierarchical group employed a vision later fully embraced 
by the Church at the Second Vatican Council, formed the initial basis for the JUC’s 
activism. The group split between a Maritainian wing and a more personalist wing 
consisting of  Mounier and   Jesuit progressive Telhaird de Chardin. Nevertheless, all of 
                                                 
253 Roberto Romano, Brasil: Igreja Contra Estado: Crítica ao populismo católico (São Paulo: Kairos 
Livraria e Editora LTDA, 1979), 11-15. 
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these groups maintained a tie to sociological priest Louis-Joseph Lebret who influenced 
both Lima and Camara, the two monoliths of Brazilian Catholicism.254 
I will trace the period of “Rechristianization” and then liberalization from 1930-1964 and 
also by looking at the reach of progressive intellectuals like Alceu Lima and the 
hierarchy’s support for the Conciliar reforms. I will also argue that Alceu Lima had a 
disproportionate influence even in the local Catholic press of Minas Gerais, the center for 
conservative Catholic militancy in Brazil during this time period.255 Tracing this period in 
tandem with the different trajectories conservative and liberal authors should highlight 
the Brazilian Church’s principled stance in Brazil regarding human rights. This stance, 
especially the voices of the Northeastern Bishops, against the state’s excesses made the 
Church appear to be “one of the few institutions capable of confronting the state 
[and]…appear like the defender of human rights per excellence.”256 
 
PRECURSORS TO LIBERTY: CONTEXTUALIZING THE BRAZILIAN CHURCH’S 
INTELLECTUAL TRADITION 
The state of the Brazilian Church starting from the late 19th Century mirrors the “church 
under siege” faced by the Argentines. The Brazilian Church gave little ground to those 
clergy considered reactionaries, quickly allowing moderate measures such as the 
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separation of church and state, civil marriage, lay cemeteries and Non-Catholic public 
education. Such a vision appeared even during the Imperial period, where Dom Pedro II, 
an admirer of the Enlightenment, considered Catholicism useful for maintaining social 
stability without encroaching upon the king’s political dominance. In fact, liberal elites 
saw a privatized, apolitical, and spiritualized church as a political asset. William de Souza 
Martins considered the Vatican’s condemnation of modernity a “divorce” from the world, 
which encourages a separation of the spiritual and the political.257 Brazil’s previous 
monarchical structure had nonetheless set up the return of Catholic intellectuals in an 
important way. As Brazilianist historian Dain Borges notes, while the Imperial 
government often burdened Church officials with the paternalistic requirements of the 
Padroado (approval of Bishops and control of the circulations of ecclesial letters etc.), 
they trained seminarians during the mid-1800s that would later go on to become some of 
the few political activists in the country at the time.  The government decided to break the 
hold of traditional religious orders but also to incentivize newer, and well-educated 
groups into the country. This included the Jesuits who had suffered during the Bourbon 
expulsion. Anti-clerical sentiment softened in the midst of debates on the abolition of the 
slave trade, but eventually returned with the coup and the founding of the Republic in 
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1889 as well as in reaction to various millenarian movements which played into a state 
narrative of Catholic subversion.258 
Catholic intellectuals, reacting to the growth of other political and cultural movements in 
the 1920s that attempted to fill the void and solve Brazil’s national crises, affirmed the 
primacy of spiritual matters over political and social matters.259 In this regard, during the 
late 1920s, Jackson de Figueiredo, the founder of the Centro Dom Vital and the journal A 
Ordem was a man, as Francisco Iglesias describes him, “possessed by his ideas and living 
them frenetically.” He would take up the call to bring about a “restoration” of order in 
Brazil. His attitudes reflected a larger European disillusionment with the failures of 
Liberalism and the rise of Communism in the interwar period. Figueiredo saw liberalism 
as antithetical to the common good, and as willing to aid the middle class, but unwilling 
to regulate it when necessary. From his religious point of view, the Middle Ages served 
as a Golden Age to be recovered, much like thinkers of the Renaissance valued 
Antiquity.260 Contrary to much of the historical consensus however, I argue the 
theological division between a spiritualized Church and a political world drew not from 
Platonic and monastic traditions of fleeing the world, but was itself a political tactic of 
elite Catholic intellectuals to discredit existing secular philosophies.  
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Catholics’ abrupt entrance into full-fledged militancy in the 1920s and 1930s fomented 
radical and often authoritarian positions. Militancy was, as noted in previous chapter, in 
the Monarchist reactionaries and later in the Fascist ideologies circulating during the 
1930s.  Such ideologies led sometimes to selective readings. As Lorena Madruga 
Monteiro points out in her article on Maritain in Brazil, Jesuit groups in Rio Grande do 
Sul took only the early anti-Modernist writings of Maritain into account when evaluating 
the author.  While they typically admired his reinterpretation of Thomism, their anti-
Communism obscured Maritain’s shift toward a Christian democracy that would allow 
for dialogue with the Communist.261  Because of the authoritarian reception of even 
pluralist European authors, Brazilian Catholic authoritarianism is often associated with 
racism and all types of European fascism. In its centralization of society within the state 
and limits of basic freedom, a Church-backed authoritarian regime can be perceived 
today as overlapping with the worst trends of the 1930s. Historical proximity and similar 
myopic visions (anti-Semitism and a focus on national traditional values) lend Nationalist 
regimes to comparisons to the racist and “blood-pure” policies of the Third Reich and the 
all-encompassing Italian Fascism of Mussolini. However, such an association would not 
just be an error of degree, but of fundamental substance. Even Catholic authoritarianism 
was diametrically opposed to the fundamental tenets of the Third Reich and suspicious of 
Mussolini’s statist influences. Contrasting with these regimes, Catholic authoritarians 
find their specific identity. Regarding Germany, during the early years of the 1930s, 
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Catholics walked a delicate line regarding Hitler rise and his treatment of the Jews with 
the Nuremburg laws. In A Ordem, some authors, such as Osorio Lopes, wrote that 
Hitler’s 1932 response to the Jewish question was both historical and proportionate, but 
that the Church had resisted efforts to pin Jews into racial stereotypes: 
 
The Anti-Semitic proposal of Hitler is not too much when we remember how 
Jews were processed in the country of Hidenburg. In the 18th Century, the Jews 
exercised great influence there, supported by the emperor Fredrich II. But the 
popular reaction did not take long, with all of its collage of assaults and all kinds 
of incidents…In the 14th Century the same scenes, and the same repudiations of 
the unsaved. [But] The bishop of Ausburg demanded them for his diocese and the 
Archbishop of Mayença gave powers to a Jew to negotiate with his companions 
the conditions of [the bishop’s] reinstallation into the diocese that he oversaw.262 
 
Lopes sympathized with the opposition to Jewish philosophers, like Moyses Mendelsohn, 
who had the audacity to challenge local sovereigns and quickly rise the social and 
economic latter, however the Catholic Church remained suspicious of the nationalist 
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race-based politics of Hitler, which the author traced back to the liberal tradition of 
German Chancellor Otto Van Bismarck. The Church, he writes “recognizes no religion 
based on race… [and] abhors all notions of a national Church. Catholic means universal.” 
Lopes concluded by ridiculing Hitler’s plan to make the two major newspapers, the 
Frankfurter Zeitung and the Berliner Tageblatt write in Hebrew, but also ends with the 
image of “prophetic rabbis” conspiring against Hitler’s political cause. 263  Clearly for 
Lopes, Hitler’s blatant racism was out of bounds. Nevertheless, a product of his time, 
Lopes seemed unable to shake the stereotypes that filled the pages of anti-Semitic 
literature and concocted the Priories of Sion.  In another instance of xenophobia, Newton 
Cavalcanti, a military official, particularly took issue with the “foreign tutelage” (many 
times a substitute for ‘Jewish’) that the “savage and bloody” Communist followers 
adored at expense of God and the Fatherland.264 O Diário, a Catholic newspaper which 
will be analyzed later in this work, took a directly anti-Semitic tone in one scathing 
editorial, tying Communism and Carlos Prestes the “Horseman of the Apocalypse” 
directly to “Jewish capitalism of the exploiters of misery” for which “the grieving virgins 
yell their accusations.” The editorial laments the death of government officials likening it 
to the original sin of Cain, a “stigmatizing stain.” He accuses the “monied executioners” 
and the so-called “Horsemen of Hope [the alleged name the Communists used for Carlos 
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Prestes]” of commanding their followers to “kill, slaughter, rob, and rape.”265  
Nevertheless, anti-Semitism in Brazil never quite had the traction that its Argentine 
counterpart, in part because of the relatively moderate influence of A Ordem which, 
because of the centralization discussed earlier, dominated Brazilian Catholic discourse. 
 
Although anti-Semitism reached the pages of A Ordem, saying the journal endorsed this 
position might be a mistake. Instead, the review acted as a forum that housed wide-
ranging and often contradictory points of view. Intellectuals such as Júlio Sá, who while 
rejecting Communism, embraced an overturning of the political and economic order that 
worked toward the perfection of man. The only condition for this revolution was that the 
change be based on the social teachings of the church. For this reason Sá criticized Hitler, 
who had put himself and German paganism above God and made himself, the Fuhuer, the 
center of cosmic meaning. Sá did not have much more use for Mussolini than Hitler, 
accusing him of a Romanesque cult of personality which also bordered on the pagan.266 
Much of this moderation had to do with Alceu Lima’s leadership at the helm.  
Alceu Lima enjoyed a variety of influences in his early academic life. Lima studied in the 
Ginásio Nacional and the College de France giving him prolonged exposure to modernist 
Brazilian intellectuals such as Graça Aranha. Despite this upbringing, Alceu Lima 
detected a “melancholy of his generation” which rested on dependence upon Europe, and 
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a dissatisfaction with intellectuals that did not reach European standards of 
achievement.267  During the time of the Brazilian Catholic revival, intellectuals longed for 
the Middle Ages, a time of reason, a time before materialism, before individualism, 
before the “liberal bourgeoisie.” Worldwide, an anti-modernist Maritain was updating the 
pre-Capitalist utopias of J. de Maistre, Bonald, and Donoso Cortés.268  Alceu Lima, too, 
shows the Middle Ages nostalgia typical for the Catholic revival period. In his work 
Adeuses á Disponibilidade, Lima compares the mission of Brazilian Catholics to the 
glorious conquests of Christendom past: 
 
A crusade never done before in Brazil! A Crusade of servants for the Return 
of Christ that was like that…of the 13th Century, only governed this crusade 
of adolescents by the clarity of conscience now formed from a faith that does 
not just trust in the heart to guide itself. 269 
 
Alceu Lima, disillusioned by his training and on fire through his conversion in 1928, 
emphasized the seemingly obvious political solutions that hierarchical authoritarian 
governments presented. He joined the ranks of the Catholic right fresh off the fervor of 
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conversion. His dramatic change from modernist literary critic meant that much like 
Jacques Maritain, during his early years, he towed the intransigent anti-Communist line 
in an increasingly polarized Brazil. For Alceu Lima, then Tristão de Athayde, the 
government had a responsibility to expose the Communist threat, the “enemy within.” 
According to Brazilian historian Eliana Dutra, Lima was even willing to create a “hidden 
and omnipresent enemy” for the sake of national unity. Lima during this period drew 
inspiration from Vargas, his patron who lamented the “forces of evil and hate…casting a 
shadow over the friendly spirit of our land and people.”270 As director of the Catholic 
Electoral League during the 1930s, Lima also pushed for politicians at the local, state, 
and national level that would emphasize religious education and resist the legalization of 
divorce at all costs.271 However, Alceu Lima did not officially integrate into the state 
apparatus and became wary of the Church’s closeness to the Vargas regime. As his 
emphasis on liberty, and the idea of pardon (he would later cite Hannah Arendt as a 
major influence regarding its political applications) show, he remained sanguine about 
the role of the state in every day affairs. At a base level, like Arendt, Lima believed in the 
ability not of mere political action, but of interpersonal communication, what he would 
call “the dialogue culture” between educated adversaries that, while all opposite sides of 
a fundamental divide, shared the virtues of charity and a love of the common good.272  
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Despite his openness, Lima strongly rejected Communism itself. Lima warned against 
considering Socialism a mere economic system with which one could compromise, 
instead considering it to be an integrated philosophy inconsistent with Christianity. In 
Lima’s mind, resistance to totalitarian Communism should constitute the pinnacle of 
Catholic thought. Lima was equally skeptical of the Nazis however. In 1938, he 
eviscerated the regime which he saw to be based on the same liberal modernity that 
challenged the humanist precepts of St. Thomas Aquinas and the Thomist revival of 
Jacques Maritain. Such a philosophy, based on 19th century Positivism and racial 
eugenics, flew in the face of integral Catholic thought.273 Lima’s condemnation of 
totalitarian Communism would eventually flip towards a broader condemnation of 
authoritarian regimes. His philosophy would not change, but rather mature to see the 
dangers behind systems he had once advocated. 
 
During the 1930s, Alceu Amoroso Lima, was, besides editor of A Ordem, one of the key 
leaders of the Brazilian Catholic laity, president of the Catholic Election League (LEC), 
and director of the Centro Dom Vital. Through his position, he influenced Brazilian 
Catholic intellectuals at A Ordem to show continuing reserve towards Hitler. They 
showed skepticism to the rising secular right in Germany that Lopes had shown on his 
ambiguous analysis of the Jewish question. In a published transcript of his October 1935 
talk at the Brazilian Military School, Alceu Lima at once debunks the notion that 
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Socialism is compatible with Christianity simply because it claims to liberate the poor. 
“If this was the case, we would all be socialist” quips the author. Instead he considers 
socialism and its continuation of historical materialism to be merely a continuation of the 
past century’s liberalism.  More interestingly however, he lumps Stalin, Hitler, Mussolini, 
and Lenin in the same category of authoritarian men who were molding history in 
contradiction to Socialism’s claim to rational historic development.274 Before Hitler’s 
rise, A Ordem’s Registro, a bulletin highlighting political events from around the world 
already considered Hitler’s rise to be “a terrible threat to Continental peace” on a par with 
the continuing violence in Mexico. Such instability, the journal feared, only opened more 
doors for the Communist threat.275 Early on, like Maritain in France, the intellectuals at A 
Ordem saw little daylight between the racist and materialist totalitarianism of Fascism 
and Communism respectively. They opposed Fascism on the ground that its violence  
would not only debase the dignity of man, but open the way for another competing evil. 
 
Despite the journal’s criticism of authoritarian governments abroad however, these 
writers were immersed, for better or worse, in their own domestic version of corporatist 
authoritarianism. In 1930, the general Getúlio Vargas lost an election, asked for military 
intervention, and in 1932, solidified his executive power with a successful campaign 
against the powerful republican state of São Paulo. In 1937, he established what would 
become known as the Estado Novo, an authoritarian state that would emphasize 
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industrialization, workers’ rights, and a new sense of national identity. Historian Boris 
Fausto describes this Brazilian state as “authoritarian” and “modernizing.”  It was neither 
fascist (it repressed the Brazilian Integralist Party [PIB]) nor traditionalist (it emphasized 
economic development as a key pillar of its government). Vargas did however draw on 
the fascist idea of an “organic state” which represented special interests within the 
organization of the state. Following (incompletely) the Italian model of absorbing outside 
bureaucracies, Vargas absorbed the Federal Council of International Commerce (CFCE) 
and created the Technical Council on Economics and Finances (CTEF) which subsumed 
many formerly independent financial, industrial, and commercial leaders. Vargas limited 
his embrace of authoritarian tendencies, however, and played the Good Neighbor in 
regional affairs such as the 1932 Paraguayan-Bolivian Chaco War. Vargas navigated the 
lead up to World War II by blasting liberalism (to the applause of Germany and Italy), 
prohibiting foreign languages (which targeted southern Brazilian German communities) 
and maintaining cordial relations with Franklin Roosevelt. Finally though, Brazil’s 
economic ties, fortified through free-trade agreements, would trump ideological 
convictions.276  While Fausto emphasizes the Estado Novo’s practical side, Luiz Carlos 
Bresser-Pereira links the Vargas regime to the ideologically diverse revolutions in Japan 
(1868), Mexico (1910) and Turkey (1924). For Pereira (and I suspect many of the 
intellectuals that decided to integrate into the regime), Vargas represented a break from 
the coffee-producing bourgeoisie liberal order. In Pereira’s reading of Vargas, minds like 
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Villa-Lobos and Gilberto Freyre had paved the way for the Vargas regime with their 
emphasis on tying culture to economic development through industrialization.277  In 
short, intellectual collaboration with the regime was not only inevitable, but a badge of 
honor. As intellectual elites integrated in the 1930s into Vargas’ Estado Novo they 
softened their tones. Oliveira Vianna exemplified the public intellectual inextricably 
linked with the regime. Vianna rejected “liberal utopianism” arguing such concepts to be  
merely excuses for “unscrupulous” partisan actors to take power and work against the 
national interest. Instead of partisan divisions, Vianna, as a legal counsel for Vargas’ 
Labor ministry, proposed a corporatist vision of society which “harmonized” its various 
sectors. As such, he pushed for unions’ representation in the Parliament to counter 
possible liberal majorities.278 The Catholics were no exception, as many in the laity and 
the hierarchy had ties with the general from Rio Grande do Sul who made made his 
propaganda of uniting various, often contradicting, and sectors of Brazilian society an art. 
Catholic intellectuals followed the tendency of their adversaries in advocating for 
working class rights, but with the caveat of elite tutelage.  
 
ALCEU LIMA: RUPTURE OR CONTINUITY? 
 
I was not always as old as I am today and I was not as young as I am today. I like to say that I was old and 
turned out a boy. It’s usually said that you begin [life] as an arsonist and turn out being a fireman. I flipped 
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it. Perhaps this is the idea: I started out a fireman and I hope not to become an arsonist. But, in any case, 
some sparks I look to throw here and there.  
Alceu Amoroso Lima 1983 Canal Livre279 
 
Lima’s idea of plural dialogue went back as far as 1929, when Alceu Lima first began at 
the Centro Dom Vital. Jackson de Figueiredo, his predecessor and mentor, looked down 
upon the Mexican regime, which at the time persecuted Catholics during the Cristero 
Wars, with disdain. Figueiredo believed that no dialogue could happen with a 
government so far lost to the ideas of revolution and liberalism, an ideology that flew in 
the face of his effort to “re-Christianize” Brazil.280 Alceu Lima also zealously defended 
the faith and eagerly attacked liberals, but he recognized the possibility of an “invisible 
Mexico” behind the atrocities committed by liberal president Plutarco Elías Calles. The 
Mexican ambassador Alfonso Reyes, “prudent [and] enlightened” in Lima’s eyes, 
represented this concept well. Reyes’ classical education moved him ever so slightly to a 
“Christian Communion” and his popularity among Lima’s old companions in the 
Modernist movement could not have hurt his standing with the conflicted intellectual.281 
This incident and relationship shows that Lima’s concept of plural dialogue had roots 
both in his conversion and his response to his first great international ecclesiastical crisis 
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as a Catholic. Just as Lima dialogued intensely  with  at least one Mexican intellectual282  
in the midst of a Catholic-Liberal-fueled civil war and the turbulent 1930s that followed, 
so he would also plea for social harmony, coexistence, and integration of the Communists 
(if not Communism), into the larger society in the 1960s. 
 Alceu Lima’s political transition may have stemmed from theological and philosophical 
continuities, but the political change was both substantial and gradual. As the Second 
World War developed, and the Axis abandoned any sense of classical civilization, Alceu 
Lima turned on the fascist powers, instead choosing to embrace plural liberty as the 
ultimate political good. In his 1932 work Política Alceu Lima had already discussed the 
idea of “necessity” and “liberty” as the two essential features in individual searches for 
the common good, and he shared with French philosopher Jacques Maritain a healthy 
critique of a mechanistic modernity pitted against the soul of the human person. In his 
view, socialism presented a synthetic, not organic unity, one based on the dualistic vision 
of class struggle. The common good, on the other hand, melded various societies together 
into a corporate structure, a cohesive social unit.283 The transition in Alceu Lima’s 
political philosophy constituted a shift in attitudes toward certain classes of social 
participants, not a change from his corporativist mindset which emphasized the human 
person as the foundation for society along with the family. Take for example his 
foreword to the Portuguese edition of Christianity and Democracy by Maritain at the end 
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of World War II. He continued to condemn Communism and Totalitarianism, but 
expressed a preference for a confessional democracy that could rebrand this classic form 
of government with the anti-liberal label: 
 
 The grandness of this small book is precisely to show what Christianity 
represents for a true democracy, providing [democracy] its true roots. On the other 
hand, democracy also can, in this century, represent for Christianity a political 
instrument in defense of Liberty against the advance of Totalitarianism.284 
 
Some critics reject such a turn as unsubstantial, however, seeing a reliance on Maritain’s 
Catholic pluralism as a type of social escapism. Historians such as Alexandre José 
Gonçalves Costa contend that the Centro Dom Vital lost influence because of its alleged 
separation of the political and the social. Indeed others, such as a student who wrote to 
Gustavo Corção, the director of the Centro Dom Vital in 1958, complained about the 
Centro’s irrelevance to new ideas because of its inordinate support of Alceu Lima. 285 
Arguments about Alceu Lima’s irrelevance do not, however, hold up in the face of his 
prestigious positions and international travel. One such trip involved lectureship in New 
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York University’s “Brazilian Institute” reported in A Ordem in October of 1958. 
Ironically, the same frustrated Corção of later years had nothing but effusive praise for 
his director, hoping he could “give a little of our wisdom to the northern part of the 
Continent.”286 Theologians such as William Timothy Cavanaugh argues that the “Neo-
Christendom” which Alceu Lima espoused through his intellectual mentor Jacques 
Maritain actually led to corporatist ideologies. Its separation of the political and the social 
allowed the military regimes of Latin America an opening through which to push the 
Church from politics and punish those priests who decided to enter politics and sideline 
the church which had “disappeared itself” from the body politic.287 For such historians, 
the revolutionary church replaced this complacent church, a church for the poor replaced 
a church of the landed elite, and revolutionary ideologies, some of them Marxist, clashed 
starkly with the prevailing orthodoxies of the Vatican. In few other churches is this 
apparent shift more prominent than in the Brazilian church. For these historians, Alceu 
Lima remains only a half revolutionary, or if he is relevant at all, his activism comes 
through gradual enlightenment, a drastic shift in political philosophy. While historically I 
cannot deny that a shift in political application took place (he went from a supporter of 
corporatist regimes to a supporter of Christian pluralism in the course of twenty years), 
Alceu Lima’s conception of charity which lead him to condemn both state and guerrilla 
violence also lead him to political action.   
                                                 
286  Notícias do Centro Dom Vital, “Viagem do Prof. Alceu Amoroso Lima” A Ordem outubro de 1958, 62. 
287 William Timothy Cavanaugh, Torture and Eucharist in Pinochet’s Chile (Dissertation: Duke University 
1996), iii,xiv. 
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 Alceu Lima and and A Ordem’s progressive turn: 
 While scholars cannot deny some of A Ordem’s authoritarian tendencies during the Pre-
War and part of the war period, the journal took a decisive and early stand for many of 
the policies that the Second Vatican Council would later ratify. The journal endorsed 
Christian Democracy, social justice and economic equality leading the way for other 
Catholic publications to expand on these issues. All the while, the journal maintained a 
fierce anti-communist line, pointing out the many failures of the Soviet Union in 
questions of workers’ rights and religious liberty. The journal also took aim at the United 
States for its treatment of racial minorities at home. Alceu Lima and his writers wrote 
sympathetically, but not uncritically of the United States. Where did these trends come 
from? Did they represent a continuity or rupture with previous Catholic thinking? What 
external forces influenced A Ordem’s editorial line? How did the experience of the 
authors themselves influence their perspective on the solution to the Social and the 
Communist questions? 
 
With the end of the war and the fall of the Fascist powers, authoritarian governments 
seemed even less viable than before the war (when the Church only expressed interest in 
certain governments such as that of Franco). As Brazilian historians Leandro Luiz 
Cordeiro and Rodgrigues Candido point out, the post-war period represents an inversion 
of political momentum within the Church. Democratic ideals, once shunned, now 
reemerged, and proposals for using dictatorships to bolster stability and order fell into 
 179 
disfavor.288 A pluralistic editorial stance would continue at the journal A Ordem 
throughout the 1950s, a decade which experienced the beginning of the Cold War, the 
rise of developmentalism, and the Cuban Revolution. Much of Ordem’s editorial line 
maintained an anti-liberal tendency. Alceu Lima strictly traced the ills of mechanized 
modernity back to the Reformation. Back in the 1930s, Alceu Lima had suggested a 
return to the Natural Law as opposed to the “legal skepticism” proposed by modernist 
legal thinking. In Alceu Lima’s view, any law not based on objective standards of justice 
and the “empire of the law” risked falling into legalism due to its precarious 
underpinnings.289 Lima’s rejection of individualism in favor of collective rights would 
continue into the 1950s, as would his condemnation of the Protestant Reformation for 
throwing the floodgates open to a view that treated human beings like a cog in an 
industrial machine. In comparing St. Ignatius of Loyala to Martin Luther, the Alceu Lima 
of 1956 bore much philosophical if not political resemblance to that of the 1930s: 
 
The radical opposition between the German reformer and the Spanish counter-
Reformer in relation to dogmas is that Luther considered Dogma as a relative truth 
and a purely human formula of revealed truths. He did not hesitate in bringing 
down the spiritual patrimony of the Church and with that to introduce into religion 
a ferment of secularization. [These seeds] in the following centuries would turn into 
                                                 
288 Leandro Luiz Cordeiro, “Alceu Amoroso Lima e as posturas políticas da Igreja católica no Brasil”,20. 
289 Alceu Amoroso Lima, Introdução ao Direito Moderno 4º Edição (Rio de Janeiro: Edições Loyola, 
2001), p.20 
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seeds of annihilation. 290 
 
Despite his anti-modernist continuities however, stark political differences, suppressed 
during the 1920s and 1930s, emerged between Alceu Lima and the philosophical legacy 
of the late Jackson de Figuereido, the fire-breathing intellectual giant that had started the 
journal. Commenting on the death of author Perillo Gomes, Alceu Lima emphasizes the 
criticisms that another protégé of Figuerido makes of his old mentor over his ties to 
reactionary philosophy. Lima quotes a 1951 letter Gomes wrote commemorating the 23rd 
anniversary of Figuereido’s death: 
We have to admit that Veuillot, De Maistre, and their people had a certain bad 
influence on Jackson’s thought, which had not reached its peak when he died. If he 
had been able, as he so wanted, to take some time away from political action and 
give himself completely to intellectual pursuits, I have no doubt that he would have 
done a general revision of his work, cleansing it of so many errors that we all had in 
the beginning of our faith, because really our first vision of the Church was more 
human than divine, more political than mystical. 291 
                                                 
290 Alceu Amoroso Lima, “Santo Ignácio e Lutero,” A Ordem Julho 1956 Vol. LVI, 8. “A radical oposição 
entre o reformador germânico e o contra-reformador espanhol, em relação aos dogams, é que Lutero, 
considerando o Dogma como uma verdade relativa e como uma formulação puramente humana de 
verdades reveladas, não trepidou em abalar o patrimonio dogmático da Igreja e com isso introduzir na 
religião um ferrmento de desagregação, que os séculos posteriores viriam transformar em semente de 
aniquilamento.” 
 
291 Alceu Amoroso Lima “Adeus, Perillo” A Ordem Agosto de 1952. “Mas temos de começar por admitir 
que Veuillot, de Maistre e sua gente fizeram um certo mal ao pensamento do Jackson e que o seu 
pensamento não tinha antingido o grau máximo de evolução quando morreu. Se ele  tivesse podido, como 
tanto desejou, retirar-se por algum tempo da ação política e entregar-se de todo ao trabalho intelectual, não 
tenho dúvidas que teria feito uma revisão geral de sua obra, expurgando-a de uns tantos equívocoos que 
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Alceu Lima also led the vanguard in ecumenical efforts at A Ordem. Years before the 
Council, Lima argued that Protestants, although paving the way for the Modernity he 
loathed, still held to the same values, and many of the same civilizational foundations as 
Catholics. In fact, he called on Protestants to fight the destruction of Brazilian culture. He 
noted that the “common enemy” Modernity had made Protestantism in comparison “not 
as radically separated as in the time of the great Rupture, giving hope for of a future 
united Christendom.”292  While A Ordem praised French general Pétain during the war, in 
1946, one Christian Democrat, Fábio Alves Ribeiro, citing Jacques Maritain, labeled him 
a “clerical fascist.” While warning non-Catholics not to see the divisions in political 
philosophy within the Church itself as disunity to recognize “that the son of God was 
incarnated to save all men”, and that Maritain always maintained a skeptical view toward 
relativism and modernity, the article warns that the spiritual must subordinate the 
political, protecting “the right to intervene in the temporal when the final end of man and 
his dignity is in danger.” “From there” said the author of the article, “Come the 
condemnations of political parties and social doctrines such as fascist Statism, Nazi 
racism, Socialism, and ‘Action Française.’”293  Brazilian readings Maritain’s message, far 
                                                 
foram de todos nós, no início de nossa Fé, pois a nossa primeira visão da Igreja foi mais humana do que 
divina, mais política  do que mística.” 
 
 
292 Alceu Amoroso Lima, “Santo Inácio e Lutero,” A Ordem Julho 1956 Vol. LVI, 10. 
293 For the universal theological vision of the Church, see: Fabio Alves Ribeiro “A democracia de Maritain 
e a Igreja” A Ordem  Dezembro de 1946, 100-102. Interestingly enough, on page 102 of the same editorial, 
Ribeiro also cites the series of 1945 articles praising from Gustavo Franceschi discussed in this thesis. 
Apparently, Franceschi’s impression of the Holy See’s acceptance of Maritain as the French ambassador 
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from advocating withdrawal from the world, advocated further engagement, but based on 
solid spiritual principles. 
GUSTAVO CORÇÃO AND THE CATHOLIC COUNTER-NARRATIVE 
One prominent intellectual did not share Lima’s zeal for progressive applications of 
Thomist principles. Gustavo Corção, originally an electronic engineer, started to read the 
works of Karl Marx in German as a child. After the death of his wife, he grew closer to 
Catholicism and to Lima in particular, and joined the Centro in 1939.294 Fervently anti-
Communist, Corção nevertheless initially defended democracy, and criticized integralists 
such as Plínio Salgado for their over-emphasis on imposing “nationalism” or the political, 
over the common good and the spiritual (“patriotism”). From Corção’s point of view, a 
disproportionate love of the nation led to various injustices, including the Dreyfus affair, 
in which a Jewish official, Alfred Dreyfus was imprisoned wrongfully on charges of 
treason in France. From a theological point of view, Corção saw nationalism, not racial 
deformity, as the reason the Jewish religious leaders killed Christ, “one man…so that the 
nation might be saved.” Hitler, Mussolini, Franco and Perón made the list of nationalist 
vice, while Tiradentes and an 18th Century Polish democrat headed the list of virtuous 
patriots.295  Although Corção’s ideas struck the Church as revolutionary in the 1940s, and 
                                                 
had international impact. For the condemnation of Pétain See: Fabio Alves Ribeiro “Maritain e a Nova 
Cristandade” Ibid. 108.  
294 Alexandre José Gonçalves Costa, Teologia e política, 25. For full biographical summary See the 
corresponding footnote (16) in the Costa work. 
295 Corção, Gustavo. Patriotismo e nacionalismo (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Presença, 1963), 9-10, 12, 14-15.  
See: Austen Ivereigh, Catholicism and the Politics of Argentina, 27, 87. This distinction between 
Nationalism and Patriotism is crucial. According to Austen Ivereigh, the distinction lay in a state that did 
not try to direct, but rather, coordinate independent members of society. Catholics such as Lima and Corção 
and Lima distinguished between a figure like Salazar and Franco for precisely this reason, in line with 
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he eagerly defended Maritain’s controversial democratic pluralism, the rising 
progressivism of the Catholic Church disturbed Corção nonetheless, and caused a split in 
the Centro, with the creation of a new review, Permanência. Rather than launch a simply 
reactionary journal, Corção hoped to stem the tides of church heresies, and in the words 
of O Lutador, “conserve correct concepts, and renovate what must be renovated.”296 His 
change came based on his convictions that Communists, who violated freedom of 
conscience in the Soviet Union, should not be accorded the same rights in democratic 
societies as the rest of the citzenry. Corção firmly believed that those who worked for the 
common good (i.e the majoritarian Catholics) were the only true heirs to a democratic 
society. Although Lima would compare the military coup to Nazism and Statist 
philosophies, Corção separated the 1964 coup from the “illegitimate” coups waged not 
for the defense of the country, but for self-aggrandizement and the acquisition of power. 
The state of emergency would also give the dictatorship the additional benefit for 
excusing any “eventual abuses” of power in the name of “purifying” democracy.297  
Corção demonstrated that no one concrete definition of democracy existed. Nor did 
criticizing integral philosophies mean that Catholic writers had to place institutional 
freedom over what they saw as the welfare of society.  
                                                 
Catholic thinkers of their day (p.27). Integralist definitions of the two concepts also clarify them. Ivereigh 
again points out that that integralists considered “patriotism” and “tradition” as absolutist and Gallican 
concepts. Instead, they preferred “nationality” which was, contrary to patriotism,  “widespread, submerged, 
omnipresent, violated, and now resuscitated in the hands of newly-articulate classes contesting the liberal 
hegemony (p.87).”. 
296 “Gustavo Corção lança revista «Permanência» para anunciar corretamente a palavra de Cristo” O 
Lutador, 8 a 15 de septembro de 1968. 
297Christiane Jalles de Paula,. "Gustavo Corção: apóstolo da ‘linha-dura’." Revista Brasileira de 
História 32, no. 63 (2012): 173-174. 
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Corção’s attempt to create a new journal to be heard merely highlights the hegemonic 
reach of Alceu Lima’s organization. Despite this notable defection from the Christian 
democratic line, however, the Church eventually sided with developmentalists and social 
revolutionaries, even as Catholic news outlets maintained vigilance about framing their 
stories in an anti-Communist light. In the final analysis, Corção’s departure shows the 
diversity and contradictions within Christian Democracy. However, Lima’s intellectual 
dominance also shows plural Catholicism’s staying power in the region. In a twist of 
historical irony and a demonstration of the tightness of the Catholic community, 
journalist and poet Josué Montello recalled at Corção’s funeral a reconciliation between 
the two adversaries. The exchange, recorded in Montello’s diary on July 6, 1978, begins 
with a question from his friend Alfonso Arinos asking if Montello knew about the 
reconciliation: 
-Alceu was in the the Church of Glory, in Largo do Machado, on his knees praying. 
He asked God to save the life of his son, victim of a disastrous car accident. [The 
son] was in critical condition. In the middle of the prayer, he promised to complete 
the most difficult mission that God inspired him to, so as to earn the grace he asked 
for. From that came the determination to visit Corção. He left and went to complete 
the promise. Corção was not there. Alceu sent around the block. An hour later, he 
went to knock on the door without knowing how the other, with all of his 
intransigent [attitudes] would receive him. Corção was home and wanted to know 
who wanted to speak with him. Alceu said his name and kept praying. The door 
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opened. Corção himself came out, opened his arms, and hugged Alceu tight against 
his chest. And the two began to cry.”  
 
Alfonso let a moment of silence pass while Marcos was thinking, and in front of all 
of us finished [saying]: “God saved the son of Alceu.”298 
 
ALCEU LIMA THE TROJAN HORSE: THE CATHOLIC PRESS’ DISGUISED DISSENT IN 
PLAIN SIGHT 
Alceu Lima then, became a figure both traditional and respected and divisive. 
Representing the reactionary right in the 1930s as well as Estado Novo collaborationism, 
his 1960s articles against the dictatorship would show he now represented democratic 
dissent.  Historical visions (held by Ridenti and Cavanaugh) that see  in Christian 
Democracy merely a conservative or bourgeois movement on the fence do not take into 
account the mainstream lay movements that risked their members to stand not for 
revolutionary principles, but for what they saw as the simple social doctrine of the 
Catholic Church that attempted to restore human dignity in the midst of instability. Alceu 
                                                 
298 Josué Montello, Diário da noite iluminada, 1977-1985 (Rio de Janeiro: Editora Nova Fronteira, 1994), 
71. “-O Alceu estava na igreja da Glória, no Largo do Machado, de joelhos, rezando. Pedia a Deus que lhe 
poupasse a vida do filho, vítima de um desastre de automóvel, e que se achava em estado gravíssimo. Em 
meio da súplica, prometeu cumprir a mais difícil das missões que Deus lhe inspirasse, para merecer a graça 
que lhe pedia. Nisto lhe veio a determinação de visitar o Corção. Saiu dali, foi cumprir a promessa. O 
Corção não estava. Alceu ficou a rondar o quarteeirão Uma hora depois, tornou a bater-lhe á porta, sem 
saber como o outro, com as suas intransigências, o receberia. Corção, já em casa, quis saber quem lhe 
queria falar. Aleu disse seu nome, e ficou rezando. A porta voltou a descerrar-se. O próprio Corção veio ao 
seu encontro; abriu-lhe os braços, apertou Alceu contra o peito, e  os dois romperam a chorar. Alfonso 
deixa passar um silêncio, enquanto dom Marcos se paramenta, á vista de todos nós e conclui: 
-Deus popou a vida do filho do Alceu.” 
 186 
Lima’s continued position as the head of the Catholic Electoral League and various 
Catholic democracy movements, plus his vocal criticisms of what he saw as fascist 
tendencies, should give those historians who think Christian Democracy a lukewarm and 
compromising philosophy a bit of pause. Alceu Lima, far from withdrawing from 
politics, took authoritarianism head on in the first months of the regime. Writing on June 
21, 1964 Alceu Lima issues a clarion call for freedom of the press, a warning against  
historical determinism, and a scathing critique of  the military regime and of business as 
usual in politics: 
 
Order supposes unity and variety. It supposes elemental priority and reciprocal 
adjustment between [the two elements]…To confuse order with social immobility, 
with hierarchical rigidity or with the exclusion of contradictory elements is to 
distort the concept in a reactionary or conservative sense, by any unilateral and 
subjective means…To confuse order with an authoritarian regime, with the 
maintaining of the social status quo, with political traditionalism or with a 
government of brute force is to misrepresent [Order’s] very nature.299 
 
O Diário , which had the audacity to publish his editorial, could try to couch this editorial 
                                                 
299 Tristão de Athyde, “Ordem e Progreso” Diário 21 de junho de 1964. “Ordem supõe portanto, unidade 
e variedade. Supõe pluralidade de elementos e ajustamento recíproco entre os mesmos...Confundir ordem 
com imobilidade social, com rigidez hierárquica ou com exclusão de elementos contraditóios é deturpar o 
conceito no sentido reaccionário ou conservador de qualquer modo unilateral e subjetivo...Confundir ordem 
com regime autoritário com amnutenção do statu quo social, com tradicionalismo político ou com regime 
de força é deturpar-lhe completamente a natureza.” 
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in the context of a “democratic revolution” and claim that the Castelo Branco, the head of  
the military regime did not represent authoritarianism or the ancien régime. In fact, come 
1965, the editorial board tried to argue for “progress” even as they argued for stability 
over and against the chaos of the last days of Goulart, the president that Brazil’s military 
overthrew.300 However, Alceu  Lima’s early stance against the dictatorship, a dictatorship 
based in “mere tradition” and the language of development, in subjective truths instead of 
the “eternal” principles of true Catholicism, already sealed his reputation as a staunch 
defender of the resistance. Reflecting upon the death of Kennedy half a year before, he 
criticized middle-class regime opponents of land reform as “small samples of social 
inertia” who called themselves “disinterested” but at the same time merely looked after 
their own interests. He believed that this type of cynical citizen, be it the racist in Texas 
or the small landowner that went against their own interests in opposing land reform, 
constituted the true murderers of the idealist president.301 Lima also challenged a military 
attitude, “the spirit of arms” saying such an attitude alone would have made the victory  
over Nazi pagan attitudes of the Second World War an empty one. Lima called on 
citizens to emphasize “love and fraternity” as the only “arms of the spirit that can combat 
the spirit of arms.”302  Lima took further aim at the “containment” theory of the United 
States. In 1968, writing on their policies in Vietnam, he called the military intervention 
against  “a country rich in moral and intellectual values, but economically poor” by “the 
                                                 
300 Editorial, “Ontem e Hoje” Diário, 10 de janeiro de 1965. 
301 Tristão de Athayde, “Os anti-Kennedy”, O Diário, 1 de maio de 1964. 
302 Tristão de Athayde, “As armas do espírito” O Diário 27 de junho de 1965. 
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richest country on earth” a symptom of  a policy of “pharisaical technocrats” of the Cold 
War that lacked solidarity and human compassion.303 In fact, Alceu Lima promoted the 
concept of dialogue as an anti-conservative concept that allowed variety in society and 
opposes “isolationism and the justification of wars and Revolutions.”304 In case doubt 
remained in the reader’s mind about which revolutions he meant, the paper ran an 
editorial directly criticizing the regime and condemning the “dictatorial” first Ato 
Institucional: 
 
I have disagreed consistently with the Revolution since March 31, 1964. I did not 
wait long, April 9 [1964] to think and say that I considered that military coup 
completely useless and counterproductive, capable of creating evils even worse 
than those against which we all complained. 
 
Indeed, he even complained about the death of lawyer San Thiago Dentas, the former 
Minister of Foreign Affairs under Brazilian President Jânio Quadros, who died in 
September 1964, and the departure of Carvalho Pinto, the governor of São Paulo (1959-
1963) during the Goulart presidency.305 
 
                                                 
303 Tristão de Athayde, “Sábios e técnicos” O Diário, 19 de julho de 1968. 
304 Tristão de Athayde, “Filosofia da dialogação” O Diário, 9 de maio de 1965. 
305 Tristão de Athayde, “Falsos Salvadores” O Diário, 20 de abril de 1966. “Tenho disacordado 
sistematicamente da Revolução desde o dia 31 de março de 1964. Não esperei gemeur o dia 9 de abril para 
pensar e dizer que considerava aquele golpe militar como totalmente inútil e contraproducente, capaz de 
producir males ainda maiores do que aqueles de que todos nos queixávamos.” 
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 At a time when the editorial board of the papers in which he published praised the 
Democratic Revolution, Lima skeptically asked whether such attitudes not only were 
impractical, but non-Christian as well. Those papers willing to publish Alceu Lima 
during the first years of the regime showed a certain ambivalence to the new regime even 
as they strove to laud the policies that went along with their ideas of economic stability 
and order.  Lima praised Dom Hélder Câmara for heading a vanguard of clergy of church 
reform, carefully comparing him to Father Júlio Maria, a reformer and staunch defender 
of political Catholicism in the first half of the century.306  However, this time ironically, 
such a compliment placed Lima firmly in the old-guard anti-Modernist democratic 
tradition.  
 
OTHER SOURCES SPEAK: CONTEXTUALIZING THE CENTRO DOM VITAL THROUGH O 
DIÁRIO DE BELO HORIZONTE AND O LUTADOR 
While A Ordem may have been recognized as the driving force behind the lay Catholic 
press, the journal did not represent the only venue of publication for intellectuals of the 
Catholic right. O Diário, a daily Catholic newspaper that had run since 1922 (in the early 
years under the title O Horizonte, was the most widely circulated Catholic publication in 
Brazil during this time period, ending publication in 1972. O Lutador published by the 
Sacramentino fathers has run every ten days from 1928 to the present.307 Due to the sheer 
volume of material, and the various closing dates of these media outlets, I have focused 
                                                 
306 Evanize Martins Sydow, “Alceu Amoroso Lima e o Regime militar, 1964-1968” (Rio de Janeiro: 
Centro de Pesquisa e Documentação de História Contemporânea do Brasil-CPDOC, 2007),11 
307 In January of this year it began to run as a monthly journal, but with increased content. 
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my attention on a period that would supplement A Ordem, closed between the years 
1964-1974. These seven years encompass a critical juncture in the history of Brazilian 
Catholic thought and the Catholic world at large. The newspapers catch a glimpse of a 
democracy in crisis, economic instability, and the beginnings of military rule, filling in 
the gaps during A Ordem’s absence from the Catholic debate. The newspapers had to also 
negotiate the tricky matter of editorial policy that must cater both to hierarchical interests 
and the military regime with the power to shut the papers down. These media sources 
also replace A Ordem which closed publication between 1964 and 1974 and even before 
then had begun a reduced schedule. The sources are representative of the same line of 
Catholic thought as the Centro Dom Vital itself. Many times, the happenings of one paper 
will make it into the pages of another.  Many times the paper of least circulation will cite 
those of greater circulation. So for example, O Lutador often cites O Diário, but rarely 
vice-versa. O Diário drew enough attention to warrant mention in A Ordem in its final 
years of this period for example. Although A Ordem ended publication, their thinkers did 
not stop writing and speaking.  
 
Alceu Amoroso Lima appeared at least twice a month in O Diário. O Lutador showed 
more caution, not publishing Alceu Lima until several years after the coup. This section 
will outline points of divergence, but also the surprising unity regarding not just support 
of the dictatorship (to be expected in the first years of a regime) but also the surprising 
ways in which all of the papers indirectly criticized the regime. The papers rarely pursued 
direct criticism of the regime, many times allowing third actors to write on their pages, or 
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printing news and speeches that could subtly allow contrarian information to enter the 
reader’s sphere of knowledge. All the while the papers would mask these criticisms with 
slanted commentary and editorials praising the dictatorship’s repressive methods. A note 
of caution here: These papers also expressed a sincere desire to crush Communism, but 
even within that Cold War mindset, the papers differed on their methods for doing so. 
Some writers focused on economic development, while others focused on military 
repression. Coverage of the Second Vatican Council and its emphasis on religious and 
political liberty also served a mechanism for the papers to get past possible government 
censorship. The ecumenical council, an unavoidable world event they would have 
covered anyway, gave Church leaders a chance to expand on the divine good of 
fundamental freedoms without raising the suspicions of the military regime. 
 
FAILING DEMOCRACY, THE COUP, AND THE CATHOLIC RESPONSE: 
“The idealism of Roosevelt has failed. In the world, realism, ‘Communist and Anti-Communist’ has 
triumphed.”- Bolivar de Freitas “O Diário” March 30, 1965 
O Diário showed many moderating traits in common with the rest of mainstream 
Brazilian Catholicism during this era. First was their unconditional support and non-stop 
coverage of the Second Vatican Council in their section Documentação Católica. This 
section represented what can be considered the most vanguard part of the paper. In 1963, 
the paper writes glowingly of John XXIII, comparing him to John the Baptist with the 
headline “There was a man sent by God, his name was John and he came give witness to 
the Light.” What’s more, Diário headlines splashed not the words of any cardinal but 
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those of Belgian cardinal Leo Jozef Suenens (1904-1996), known as one of the major 
forces in the Council and a willing critic of Vatican bureaucracy and traditionalist 
Catholicism.308 Another moderating factor in this Catholic press was their belief in 
development as a legitimate counterpoint to the Communist threat. This position should 
not surprise in light of their relationship to John F. Kennedy, upon whose  assassination 
they called “the Leader of Democracy.” O Diário not only ascribed to Kennedy’s 
economic theories, but saw him as a visionary akin to Julius Caesar. An editorial on 
November 14, 1963 the editorial board lamented “the brutality, uselessness, and 
absurdity” of his death in their daily column Nossa Opinião and compares his death to 
that of Julius Caesar: 
 
This act spawned] not from a personal grudge but a political hate…not to get to the 
person, but get to an idea that most certainly will continue. Once Caesar was dead, 
Caesar’s ideas took off. 
 
However, lest the authoritarian imagery of Caesar transfer to Kennedy, the paper 
affirmed that first Caesar was not “just a tyrant” but a “genius” that ably maneuvered in 
the Roman political environment. Secondly, the paper distinguished between Kennedy’s 
love of democracy and the Caesarian tendencies that abolished the Republic without 
implementing many of the reforms that he fought for. Kennedy had none of those 
                                                 
308 “Houve um homem enviado por Deus. Seu nome era João e veio dar testemunho á Luz” O Diário, 12 
de novembro de 1963.  
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tendencies according to this article, instead he is a Catholic “statesman” that never 
attempted to undermine the Republic. The editorial, following the Catholic line against 
segregationalist policies in the South, hoped that the ideas that caused Kennedy’s death 
could receive a boost from his status as a martyr for democracy. The death of Kennedy 
even unifies the paper’s mortal adversaries, the Communists, in a moment of grieving. 
The paper reported Kruschev’s wife weeping during a half-hour visiting US Ambassador 
[first name] Koehler in which she signed a condolence book.309  
 
Crafting these stories, the paper tried to create an impression of unity. Kennedy, and 
hence his idea of democracy transcended, unified, and conquered. His death shook even 
his arch-rivals at the negotiating table the year before. The message from the paper is 
clear: Democracy, and what Kennedy represented, clearly established itself as the most 
human alternative to the intelligent authoritarianism of Caesar, the anarchy caused by 
those without political and social sensibilities, and the inhumane mechanical structures of 
Soviet Communism. The paper attempted to use Kennedy’s departure from life to enter 
him into world history as an indispensable humanist, Catholic collaborator with the 
highest officials of the Church, and a shrewd democratic statesman, exemplifying the 
Catholic virtues of justice, fortitude, and prudence. 
 
Despite the praises sung to freedom, the paper still preferred military solutions to 
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Communism, a scourge which instilled sectarianism and betrayal, a betrayal that led to 
the death of democracy’s leader and suddenly plunged the nation into a protracted 
institutional crisis. In one editorial commemorating the “discovery” of a Communist plot 
on November 27, 1935, another opinion article cites dissention within the ranks of the 
army (in favor of General Carlos Prestes) that nevertheless is suppressed by a group of 
officers “faithful to legality and the institutions.” The paper would change its triumphalist 
tone however warning the “stupid” Communism had given way to an “international 
conspiracy” of which Brazil was a major center. The editorial attacked the government of 
João Goulart for not believing in the internal threat of Communism, an axis comprised of 
“Moscow, Peking, and Havana” that had shifted from direct wars of attack to wars of 
position invading the minds of those “most ill prepared” to resist. 310 The paper also 
recognized a third threat of personal ambition.  
 
Around a month and a half before the coup that took Goulart from power, the relationship 
between the Catholic press and Goulart had grown worse. Diario had shifted from 
claiming the government was ignoring the threat to accusing it of open collaboration. 
deriding President Goulart as a caudillo who wished, among other things,  to seek 
reelection, consolidate the unions under his political influence, and legalize the 
Communist party, a step that signaled the death knell of other countries which ran up into 
conflict with the United States. This dangerous combination of ambition and left-wing 
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ideology could lead not only to financial bankruptcy, but to a deficit of “equilibrium and 
seriousness.”311 This lack of “seriousness” also extends other parts of the agenda such as 
land reform, where the paper repeats the frequent argument that the revolutionary reforms 
proposed by governments strangle “dialogue” and create enmity between a land owner 
and their workers.312  
 
Like the Guatemalan Church hierarchy in the months leading up to the 1954 Guatemalan 
coup, the Brazilian Catholic right attempted to point out what it saw as the instability of 
the so-called political reforms of the government, trying to paint efforts by the 
government to centralize power as authoritarian, and their efforts at land reform as an 
extension of class warfare. Eventually, Goulart’s visit to China and his alleged closeness 
to Cuba would signal the end for his regime, but a few months before the coup, O Diário 
still granted him “trust on credit” that he could solve the crisis of most concern to them, 
the inflation crisis. Unfortunately, the paper lamented that drastic measures had already 
been taken, and that “there were only a few hours” to avert the crisis and that such action 
required the “avoidance of all light and imprudent actions.” The editorial also pressured 
him to “give no importance” to his inexperienced advisers but rather to trust “clean 
sources” which would help resolve the situation.313  
                                                 
311 Editorial, “Caudilhismo Não” O Diário, 13 de fevereiro de 1964. 
312 J.C de Oliveiras Torres, “ O sindicalismo rural: Revolução ou reforma” O Diário, o 16 de fevereiro de 
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S.I.D, “Devagar com a reforma” O Lutador, 5 de maio de 1962. 
313 Editorial “Crédito de Confiança” O Diário 21 de fevereiro de 1964. 
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Obviously, the President did not concur with these veiled threats. He was overthrown in 
1964, thegenerals promised to save Brazil from economic stagnation and the scourge of 
inflation as the middle classes and the press applauded. Diario specifically called for a 
“Cleaning Operation” (using the hygienist language that long characterized integralist 
and fascist ideologies) to protect the liberty of the citizens. For the newspaper, the 
institutions needed a deep cleaning to wash out the infection of the institutions that they 
had been “malevolently” brainwashed into “naively” holding Marxist ideologies with the 
complicity, and sometimes outright collaboration of the former government in a 
“massification [of the population] without precedent in our history.”314  
 
While we cannot be entirely sure of the range of the paper’s intent with these broad 
declarations, two theories are likely regarding their position towards the new regime. 
Much of the initial praise stemmed partly from editorial policy that favored the regime as 
a good business move. Distancing themselves not from just Goulart, but from all 
historical instability, the paper advocated for a parliamentary system in which the parties, 
not one man with centralized power, made decisions about the wellbeing in the country. 
With a tone of nostalgia, the editors noted “[i]n the Imperial Age when we had a 
parliamentary system, we had 40 years without revolution. During the presidential system 
we have had seventy years of revolutions including the current one.” 315  In 1965, the 
                                                 
314 Editorial, “Apego á Lei na Defesa da Ordem” O Diário 4 de abril de 1964. 
315 Editorial, “Para salvar a República” O Diário 19 de abril de 1964. 
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editorial board vigorously argued against Presidential systems citing Parliamentary 
elections as the the stability of Brazilian politics after the suicide of Getúlio Vargas and 
deriding the Estado Novo as the “longest period of time without elections” in Brazilian 
history. Pointing to the Western democracies of Britain and Sweden, the writers 
implicitly asked whether Monarchy, the Parliament, and democratic freedoms couldn’t 
exist side by side.316 The paper did not show immediate concern however, for when this 
military government would turn control over to the population again and, despite all of 
their talk regarding democracy, quickly accepted the government line about what a “real 
democracy” entailed. 
  
For the paper, democracy came down to a simple phrase: Developmentalism. The talk of 
industrialization and progress prevailed among Catholic developmentalist writers. The 
paper also showed a special concern for the middle-class economy, quickly defining the 
control of inflation as the key to democratic success, economic order as freedom that 
goes along with the elimination of subversive tendencies. In an editorial that lauded the 
new president Humberto de Alencar Castelo Branco’s inaugural address and the “grand 
civic movement of April”, the paper praised Castelo Branco for driving “extreme leftism” 
from power and developing political and economic morality. In another editorial months 
later, Diario laid out again the stakes of the conflict, accusing the ousted Goulart 
government of “taking orders from Peking” and predicting that a Communist victory in 
                                                 
316 Editorial, “Debate oportuno” O Diário, 10 de janeiro de 1965. 
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Brazil would do away with the United States and Western Europe, and calling the coup a 
“decisive defeat” for international Communism.317 One phrase however took on special 
importance. Development needed to happen side by side with workers’ rights, but could 
not happen during an “inflationary orgy.” Therefore, the president should follow his 
highest principles and get inflation under control as soon as possible.318  Around a year 
later, with the government foundering, O Diário exclaimed that the inflationary crisis was 
the “fundamental test of the Revolution” and that the government’s success or failure in 
stopping the prices and stabilizing the economy could mean the “conquer[ing] of this 
fundamental hurdle or sink[ing] irreversibly.”319   
 
The editors pointed out what they saw as the “right track” of true restoration symbolized 
by the  signed agreement between the Ministry of Agriculture to diversify Brazil’s 
exports beyond coffee. The editorial, in a change from the classical corporatist ISI model 
of development espoused by Dom Helder, argued that agricultural diversification 
weighed more heavily in Brazil’s international competition than industrialization.320The 
paper praised the government for being on the “recovery” in getting inflation under 2.9% 
in the month of May. The editorial admitted that the cost of living was stuck at elevated 
levels, but justified the improvement by comparing inflation to the previous year.321 The 
government also basked in this discourse stoking the connection between economic 
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319 Editorial, “Teste da Revolução” O Diário, 17 de fevereiro de 1965. 
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performance and political success with the headline “Revolução vence a inflação com 
progresso” [“The Revolution is conquering inflation with progress.”] a year later.322 This 
preoccupation with various social interests show up in the paper’s coverage of March 
protests against the government by “housewives, workers, business owners, students” and 
“politicians.” The housewives demand lower inflation which the article claims is at 7%, 
the workers also wish for “God and stability”, the business owners grew concerned about 
prices as well. The newspaper favorably covered student protests which demanded more 
autonomy and a decriminalization of the National Student Union (UNE).323 The paper 
slowly started to support priests, in this case those of Guanabara, Río de Janeiro, in 
speaking out against government abuse. One such article spoke of the need to “not to 
collaborate with civil and military power, but to have the necessary courage to speak out 
against the various social injustices…and violence used against the legitimate demands of 
the Brazilian people.”324 
The newspaper also took an authoritarian line in their clerical preferences. They lauded 
the “eminent” Dom Agnelo Rossi Archbishop of São Paulo (1964-1970) to the position 
of cardinal. This praise bolstered support for a bishop who had at best a “don’t ask, don’t 
tell” policy regarding allegations of government torture of student groups during the early 
days of the regime.325  Paul VI eventually replaced him with a more activist bishop Paulo 
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Evarista Arns (1970-1998) allegedly because of his intransigent denial of human rights 
abuses in the diocese.326 Despite his checkered reputation, his appointment in the view of 
the editors, “clearly reminds Brazilians of their responsibilities as children of the 
Church.”327 The paper therefore, took the political position of the hierarchy even to the 
point of contradiction. With Rossi in office, the paper was glowing. But when the Pope 
intervened, suddenly the loyalty of the paper to the overall institution of the Church 
outweighed their political position locally, which officially favored the regime. Such 
comments as the eulogy of the demoted Archbishop, laid bare however, the contradicting 
interests of the Catholic press at this time. 
 
SIGNS OF TENSION: THE CHURCH AND STATE CONFLICT IN THE CATHOLIC PRESS 
Despite widespread support for military intervention, and middle class weariness of class 
tensions, some prominent Church officials remained wary of an overreaction by 
overzealous military officials. Questions about church programs had stirred controversy 
since before the installation of the military regime, causing the bishop of Brasilia, José 
Newton de Almeida Batista to affirm his “absolute support” for Catholic Action and for 
good measure throw in that he considered Alceu Lima, by now a controversial figure 
because of his progressive politics,  to be incisive and completely orthodox.328 One 
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influential churchman, Dom Hélder Câmara, friend of Alceu Lima, and  former head of 
CELAM and one of the lead bishops, was transferred to the diocese of Olinda and Recife 
shortly after the coup. “Let us not accuse them of being Communists who merely have a 
hunger and thirst for social justice and for the development of the country,” he warned 
the government on April 14, two weeks after the coup as Castelo Branco prepared to 
assume power. The bishop went on to say that the Northeast would not “accept the 
professionalization of poverty” and hoped to become “the new face of the Third World” 
through its development policies.329 O Diário’s religious correspondent Padre Paulo 
Fernandes would also heap praise on the “great pastor” for his various social initiatives as 
well as his resistance to government intimidation tactics which Hélder Câmara, according 
to the reporter, fended off through his close ties with the Vatican and his reputation as 
being “evangelical and disinterested” and representing “the Church in the middle of the 
people.”330 Dom Hélder  Câmara maintained a moderate discourse at this stage in his 
career, calling on priests during the opening of the major Northeastern seminary to 
contribute to the “decade of development” that eschewed a “purely spiritual evangelism” 
that gives the impression of a faith “completely detached without life, and without 
strength to seek out and modify that which is wrong or absurd.” Hélder Câmara rallied 
both layperson and priest to participate in temporal politics and not to  be afraid of the 
label “communist” that comes with challenging the privileges of society.331 Câmara saw 
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development as a social obligation, not merely as a key to macroeconomic stability. 
Câmara expressed the idea of a “Church for the Third World” and his seminary would 
teach about the limits to private property under Church law, Scripture’s view on the rich, 
and the way to start a “dialogue between the developed Brazil and the Brazil in 
development.”332 
 
Many times, running stories on the Church hierarchy exposed the simmering conflict 
between Church officials and the government that would boil over in later years. On 
August 18, 1965, the auxiliary bishop of Rio de Janeiro, Dom Cândido Padim gave a 
rather sarcastic speech in which he flatly denied accusations that Brazilian Catholic 
Action had been infiltrated by “Marxist tendencies.” He shielded the Brazilian Church’s 
social philosophy behind the spirit of the Conciliar reforms being debated at the time and 
the social injustices that even the highest ranking members of the Catholic Church 
recognized at the time: 
 I can’t stop myself from protesting against the frivolous accusations brought 
indiscriminately against this apostolic movement. The charge of Marxist infiltration 
in their ranks would only hold water if there was the use of some element obviously 
related to said political school of thought and at the same time if it were brought in 
to some sector of Catholic Action. Or if some publication of Catholic Action 
expressly defended Marxist doctrine. Look, until now I have received no indication 
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of names or official texts that fit that hypothesis…Frequently, accusations don’t 
even present a method for determining which positions can be considered actually 
Marxist. In an era in which even Pope John XXIII has been accused by people of 
little intelligence of spreading Marxist ideologies, it’s not admirable that Catholics, 
faithful to their spiritual head, suffer the same fate.333 
 
 The paper showed its own ambivalence towards government policy by running an entire 
speech laying bare the shortcomings of the Brazilian wealth distribution. O Diario 
however could balance out the bishops’ more direct criticisms or warnings by framing 
them in terms of the paper’s line and government terminology. One such opportunity 
sprang from a campaign Hélder headed to alleviate the slums in Recife from the floods 
and attempt to relocate the endangered residents. At one point Hélder Câmara declared 
“Combatting poverty does not help without incentives for industrialization.”334 On one 
hand, the editors spoke of development as if inflation and monetary policy were of chief 
importance, but on the other continually allowed space for a more pointed social message 
to reach its readership. At the same time, certain speeches of even controversial figures 
                                                 
333 “Bispo desfaz calúnias contra Ação Católica” O Diário, 18 de abril de 1964. “[N]ão posso deixar de 
protestar contra as acusações levianas que têm sido levantadas indiscriminadamente em relação a várias 
setores desse movimento apostólico. A acusação de infiltração marxista em suas fileiras só teria cabimento 
se houvesse a invocação de algum elemento manifestamente filiado a tal corrente política e que no mesmo 
tempo estivesse inscrito em algum setor da Ação Católica. Ou então se alguma publicação da Ação 
Católica defendesse expressamente a doutrina marxista. Ora, até hoje não recebi indicação de nomes ou de 
textos oficiais que pudessem ser enquadrados nessa hipótese...Frequentemente, as acusações nem se acham 
em condições de demonstrar cientificamente que posições podem ser consideradas realmente marxistas. 
Numa época em que até o Papa João XXIII tem sido acusado por pessoas de curta inteligência de propagar 
idéias marxistas, não será de admirar que católicos fiéis ao seu chefe espiritual sofrem a mesma sorte.” 
 
334 “Nova campanha de D. Helder no Recife” O Diário, 4 de julho de 1965. 
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still left room for the paper to frame social justice issues in traditionalist conceptions of 
industrial development and urbanization as opposed to radical wealth distribution and 
social revolution. 
Despite these conflicts, the paper tried to hew to both the line of the government and the 
increasingly vocal Church hierarchy. By placing everything within a social instead of a 
partisan materialist context, both Church leaders and the editors that published them 
could claim reasonable doubt when labeled as Communist, not pointing to Marx, but 
rather to Leo XIII and John Kennedy, the old developmentalist and social heroes of 
Catholicism. 
THE STRUGGLE ‘IN THE MIDDLE’: O LUTADOR SOUNDS OFF AGAINST NATIONALISM 
AND COMMUNISM 
O Lutador, a lesser known paper from Belo Horizonte still runs out of a small publishing 
house in the Planalto of Belo Horizonte, every 10 days offering its commentary on 
Catholic issues around the globe from the perspective of the “middle way” democratic 
populism that so often dominated Catholic thought in the past. This paper, less frequent 
than O Diário focuses almost exclusively on news through a philosophical and editorial 
lens. As such, it provides an excellent source for zooming out and viewing the 
conservative Brazilian reaction to the Conciliar period in more depth. The advantage of a 
weekly such as this rests in the easy detection of shifts in ideas and editorial policy that a 
daily paper cannot highlight.  
 
 The paper began through the work of the Sacramentino fathers and sisters. Belgian priest 
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Júlio Maria, born in 1878 and was admitted to the Missonaries of the Sacred Family in 
1902 at the age of 25. He was ordained in 1908 where he was a superior at a seminary in 
Whacken, Belgium for two years in 1912.  Júlio Maria had always had an affinity for the 
press, and newspapers in particular as a way of countering “bad press with good press.” 
In that idea he had the support of northeastern bishops such as Dom Santino who wrote 
that unlike bad books, newspapers carelessly written by the laity “find its way into the 
hands of everyone…It takes its place of honor; exposed to the curiosities of every visitor; 
it generates the subjects of family discussions….”335  
 
O Lutador during the planning years of the Council exalted moderation as its guiding 
principle. Having witnessed the horrors of nationalist ideologies unfolding, it took the 
line of the Centro Dom Vital and other Catholic press in vigorously condemning 
materialist philosophies: 
 
 We all know that the most difficult position to hold is that of balance, to not veer 
off to the extremes that are so often invoked. Virtue is in the center. [W]e condemn 
all excess. The great secret is to learn to always keep things in perspective. 
 
But this “moderation” came with a catch. The nationalist philosophies condemned by O 
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Lutador had little to do with the evils of those leaders from the right who exalted the 
nation above God, or revived pagan philosophies, those nationalisms so feared by Alceu 
Lima. The adversary of the day, worthy of the condemnable title of “Nationalist” came 
from one particular extreme of the spectrum: The left. The paper exalted the nationalism 
that “defends the national patrimony” and condemned the nationalism that “disturbs the 
peaceful coexistence and friendly collaboration of the American nations” handing over 
Brazil and the rest of Latin America to “Russian imperialism.” This imperialism and 
“Marxist intellectual thinking” had infected “a group of the most high-ranking officials in 
the government” wreaking havoc on “free education [i.e religious education]” and 
brainwashing the Brazilian youth in Socialist ideology.336 Such a stance in 1960, at the 
beginning of the Jânio Quadros regime, the paper had already warned of a Communist 
conspiracy.   This certainty left no room for the type of flexibility that O Diário had 
demonstrated on the issue of inflation even as late as 1963. O Lutador already presumed 
that the party in power was infiltrated, and fully aware of the Communist influence in its 
ranks. Such an assumption rendered dialogue improbable.  
 
But in another sense, O Lutador saw the conflict through the lens of the transcendent, 
divine history, and classic theological debates. A theological worldview shaped the 
paper’s coverage of every issue from international affairs, to the electoral system, to 
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issues as pragmatic as education. Republishing an article from A Cruz the paper makes 
clear that the danger of these philosophies goes beyond mere economic systems and 
realpolitik claiming that “Russia is not Communist…nor the US Capitalist. The fight is 
between liberty and coercion, between spirituality and materialism.” Quoting the US 
Conference of Catholic bishops, the paper makes clear that the US does not receive a free 
pass on its economic policies. The bishops, according to the article point out that the US 
cannot “live a materialist life and at the same time preach openly to the whole world 
about the supremacy of the spirit of God’s law.” The article divides strongly between 
“East and West” the “material and spiritual” saying that in the East, like Brazil, “the soul 
does not count” and the population erroneously believes that social questions will solve 
moral crises. Catholic writers believed that Christians had a moral duty to enter politics 
“for the reconstruction of the Fatherland” that “reform had to be the work of Christians.” 
 
 Participation did not mean cooptation however, as a coalition with either materialist 
party, the free markets or statist communism constituted “treason to our Christian 
tradition.”337 In an ironic commentary on international affairs, the paper mocked 
Communism’s claim to equality calling it “a peace of the impotent weak man subjugated 
by the strong….Hungary is at peace.” 338   Condemning what they saw as a Communist 
plot to pass “The Basic Guidelines and Fundamentals of Education in Brazil,” the 
editorial wrote that standardizing education really constitutes an anticlerical measure, and 
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that private schooling had performed equally well. In short, that the Church and family, 
the cells of society, could perform the functions of education more cost-effectively than 
the public schools themselves. The larger issue, however, boiled down once again to a 
plot to “gradually implant Communism” which like Nazism “can never bear fruit in 
[Brazil’s] climate rich with patriotism and liberty….”339 However, Catholic writers from 
the interior of Minas such as Vitalino  de Miranda of Senador Firmino, also heavily 
criticized this allegedly rich democratic climate  of suffocating at the hands of partisan 
narrowness and candidates who showed “indifference to the Church and to Christian 
principles.”  
 
The paper also disbelieved the assurances of the parties that the reform allowed for true 
freedom of religious conscience. Specifically religious figures like Frei Pio lamented the 
“decay” of Brazil, as represented by the sinful former capital of Rio de Janeiro, which 
despite Christians’ best efforts had become God-forsaken.340  Despite this decline in 
certain parts of the country, the editorial page unequivocally praised the dialogue 
electoral processes created. This dialogue, along with institutions protected the “public 
order.” Writers like P.J.B blame democratic regimes’ complacency for the rise of 
Communist Cuba. 341  Despite this however, the paper still argued “Democracy is this. It 
is good despite all the troubles. The worst democracy is better than the best 
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dictatorship.”342 Another October editorial praised incoming president Jânio Quadros for 
his moderate speech, but warned that a president supporting “dictatorships and leftists” 
would be “disastrous” for the country. Insofar as the president supported social justice 
efforts and measures for the poor, “that is what the Church always wants.”343The message 
was clear: O Lutador despised the current system especially for its increasing attacks on 
the Church’s world view and hegemony. But for the sake of political participation, they 
still felt obliged to support democracy. 
 
However, when it came to the participation of other religious groups in the body politic, 
some religions were more equal than others. Writing about a Protestant complaint about 
the lack of representation at the inauguration of Brasilia, “Zé do Povo” mocked the 
“closed” doors of the Protestant Church, reaffirms the unique value of the Church within 
society as the majoritarian religion and mocked that he cannot “imagine how the program 
would be if all of the religions floating around in Brazil were invited to conduct their own 
rites. They say that just the Protestants divided themselves into at least 503 sects.”344  
Commenting on a Billy Graham crusade to Brazil, Father Arlindo Vileira, the 
conservative priest that had challenged Jacques Maritain and represented the reactionary 
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Brazilian right, challenged Graham’s popularity by ridiculing the “exorbitant” cost of his 
tours and the low retention rate of his conversions (35 out of dozens of thousands that 
attended the Crusades): 
 
 One [London attendee] told a Catholic priest. It’s like a cup of beer. Billy Graham 
is the foam; you all have the substance…That just shows with all evidence that 
souls can’t be saved with millions of dollars, but with prayer and sacrifice.345 
 
The father’s emphasis on money versus results, and salvation versus materialism, follows 
both the paper’s emphasis on transcendental warfare and its disdain for Protestant 
methods of conversion. In summary, the Church remained expectant about the process of 
renovation within the Church, but also skeptical regarding secular political society’s 
ability or willingness to show due deference to Catholicism and its traditional 
prerogatives in civil society. O Lutador during this period argued for a condescending 
approach towards Protestants, who had traditionally been associated with Liberal and 
anti-clerical regimes. The Protestants may have preached the same Christ, but the 
Catholics like Vieira, who joined the spiritual and the material, questioned whether an 
alliance  could possibly function if Catholics were to maintain their integrity, and as 
important, their monopoly. 
                                                 
345 Pe. Arlindo Vieira, “O pregador Batista Billy Graham”, O Lutador,  16 de outubro de 1960. “Um deles 
dizia em Londres a um padre católico: «É mais ou menos um copo de cerveja Graham é a espuma; vós 
tendes a substância»...Isso mostra com toda a avidência que as almas não se salvam com milhões de 
dólares, mas com a oração e o sacrifício.” 
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Communism’s legalization threatened both the country’s Catholic majority and 
democracy. As José Eugênio Corrêa wrote in 1962, “Legalized Communism is 
Communism in progress…it can work, grow, and dominate!” Warning about 
Communism’s threat to the popular rule, the writer continues “[Communism] will never 
enter into any free popular acceptance. Communism can only conquer by force allied 
with betrayal, at which it’s an incomparable master.” Deriding Communism as a 
“deformed minority” forcing its philosophy on a “Catholic country [i.e majority rule].”346 
The Catholic press was democratic out of convenience, not trusting the average voters to 
reject Communism outright at the ballot booth. Instead, Catholicism, like Confucius’ 
North Star, should serve as an unchallenged example and an unquestioned assumption for 
society. Communism did not allow freedom for Catholics in Czechoslovakia, Poland, or 
Russia, so why should it be given a voice in Brazil? More progressive forces might call 
this proposed restrictiveness intolerant, but Father Glauco Vinicio Coimbra rejected a 
false tolerance of error. “God is the only moral break…Tolerance is not an absolute, it 
can be a virtue, but also weakness.” The author goes on to say that fake tolerance allows 
for the “profanation of the name of Christ and Mary”, robbery, and salacious literature 
such as A Carne by Júlio Ribeiro (1845-1890) which because of its erotic themes and 
treatment of divorce should not be read by any “chaste youth.”347 
                                                 
346 D. Josê Eugênio Carrêra, “Os comunistas vão fazer que democratizam o partido-para legalzá-lo” 18 de 
fevereiro de 1962. 
347 Father Glauco Vinicio Coimbra, “Mais um sinal de alarme” O Lutador, 4 de março de 1962, 
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The image of a decaying society dominated by a cabal of Communists oppressing a group 
of ignorant students and youth would continue up until the 1964 Coup, as Catholic 
groups grew disaffected with the Quadros, and later the Goulart governments.348 When 
the coup finally came, one writer Frei Vicente gave gave a full throated endorsement of 
the new regime that came from the “national uprising” and the change of government in 
accordance with his Thomistic view of society349: “They all united: As brothers. As sons 
of the Lnd of the Holy Cross. And they consolidated themselves into one block. Without 
racial, class, or party discrimination.”350 
A few months later, the paper expounded on the previous crisis and demands of the 
middle class to explain their initial support of the government. Such an explanation 
seemed necessary, because of the paper’s emphatic statements about the democratic 
system beforehand, especially its affirmation that despite the flaws in the democratic 
system, that it was the worst, but also the only workable system. The paper, reprinting an 
editorial from Jornal do Brasil, excused its own change of position by citing the will of 
the people to stop the “rank extremism” with extraordinary measures. The quote “Only a 
                                                 
348 The paper O Lutador in 1962 had already distinguished between a “democratic” military intervention 
and “dictatorial” intent. In theory the paper condemned both ends of the spectrum. Referring to the coup 
that took Frondizi from power, Catholics condemned in theory both the extreme right and left, but 
practically speaking saw Communism as the main form of Totalitarianism and thus gave the military’s of 
the region the benefit of the doubt. See:  S.I.D, “Mania de extremismo” O Lutador, 13 a 20 de maio de 
1962. 
349 Thomistic views of organic society should not in this instance be confused with a statist or corporatist 
perspective, which the paper explicitly warned against. For the writers of O Lutador, statism of this kind 
led to “drastic socialism” through its tutelage of all non-State institutions. See: “Perigro do Estatismo” O 
Lutador 10 de janeiro de 1965. 
350 Frei Vicente, “Viva a Democracia!” O Lutador, 26 de abril de 1964. “Uniram-se todos: Como irmãos. 
Como filhos da Terra de Santa Cruz. E consolidaram-se num único blóco: Sem distinção de côr. Sem 
distinção de categoria social, E sem distinção de Partidos.” 
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dictatorship to save the country!” summed up the popular phrase the press needed to 
wash its hands of having to explain an about face, if not on their social philosophy, at 
least the institutional prescriptions they had once held in such high regard. Going further, 
the author compares the “order” of the dictatorship to the “anarchy” and “abyss” of the 
previous government. Drawing on the concept of the common good, and the society as a 
body, the author emphasizes the “candor” replacing “private dishonesty.” 351  Another 
editorial blamed the international pressure Brazilians were facing on the cabal of 
“International Communism” that would “never forgive” Brazil for stopping their sinister 
plans in its tracks.352One editorial went further than these conspiratorial notions. In the 
editorial board’s “congratulations” to the regime, they find one fault, that of weakness. 
Despite the “euphoria” the job of seeking out “dishonest” subversives who would return 
to their “interrupted” work of dismantling society remained incomplete: 
 
 If there are complaints, they are against the lack of repressive action on the 
part of the authorities who are recognized as just and humane…How many were 
saved, when they deserved to be punished for the mischief they caused? 
 
The editorial defended the Church against “misunderstanding” caused by the confusion in 
the minds of authorities relating to Catholic involvement in social justice movements. 
The editorial admits that some laypersons and priests collaborated actively with “the 
                                                 
351 G. Cerqueira, “A revolução continua” O Lutador 21 de junho de 1964. 
352 APLA, “A Revolução brasileira no exterior” O Lutador, 08 de novembro de 1964. 
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deposed government” but that the “Church, Catholic Action, and the Youth Workers’ 
Movement [JOC] are not compromised.”  Supporting the government seemed  to be a top 
priority in this piece however, as the paper reminded the readers that not agreeing with 
the War Minister would be “lamentable.”353 Like O Diario, which had labeled Vargas 
and the subsequent governments authoritarian, another editorial lauded Castelo Branco 
for his moderation, saying that the Revolution allowed for freedom of the press never 
permitted under the Department of the Press and Propaganda (DIPS in Portuguese) of 
Getúlio Vargas. More interestingly, however, the author once again describeed a free 
country as one “free from the Communist virus and the corruption that allowed [it] to 
grow.”354 
The Catholic press, despite its fear of subversion, questioned social realities. Speaking of 
the mineral riches of Brazil and the excessive profits of the dairy industry, F.F Pereira da 
Cunha criticized “overly ambitious economic groups” that read the paper and “put [it] on 
the table” while ignoring the poor. The author praised, optimistically, “clear eyed” 
government officials battling the big economic groups (which the author does not name) 
and said that “revolt and an entourage of unhappiness invade the home” when a father 
cannot provide for his family to eat.355 As Michael Lowy observes, the Movement for 
Base Education drew on Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed, which taught 
                                                 
353 Editorial, “Méritos e mazelas da Revolução”O Lutador,  5 de julho de 1964. “Se há queixas, é contra a 
timidez e a falta de ação repressiva das autoridades reconhecidamente justas e humanas...Quantas foram 
poupados, quando mereciam ter sido castigados pelas tropelias praticadas!” 
354 “Nem da direita, nem da esquerda” O Lutador,12 á 19 de julho de 1964. 
355 F.F Pereira da Cunha, “Ouro para o Brasil e feijão para o prato do pobre” O Lutador, 8 de agosto de 
1964. 
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peasants to participate in forming their own historical narratives within Brazilian society. 
O Diario’s article constituted one more example of the gradual turn of mainstream 
Catholicism against the regime, and toward supporting groups that just a year or two 
before, they had marginalized completely out of fear of a “Communist coup” in Brazil.356 
In a story that O Lutador transcribed from O Diario, the Church attempted to collaborate 
with the government when possible, signing an agreement with the Ministry of Education 
and Culture to strengthen the Base Education Movement (MEB), started in 1961 by the 
National Brazilian Bishop’s Conference, in the Northeast. The organization focused 
primary the literacy campaigns. Both the government minister, Flávioi de Lacerda and 
Dom Avelar Brandão Vilela of Teresina agreed on the group’s usefulness. A change to 
the civil code also allowed the Bishops more control over the Movement so as to protect 
it from the charges of Communism that came with its mission to the poor.357  In return, 
President Brancos attempted to show that he “respected and heard” the voice of the 
conference, and his Minister of War attempted to stay on good terms even with those 
priests with conflicting ideas so that a conflict would not “pit the Church against the 
Revolution.”358Such moves show a complex relationship the Church had with the 
government. This religious institution was not merely a spiritual wing of the national 
                                                 
356  Michael Lowy, The War of the Gods: Religion and Politics in Latin America (New York, London: 
Verso, 1996), 84-85. This background calls into question a unidirectional state and suggests that even the 
dictatorship needed a certain amount of legitimacy and was willing to pay a moderate price to avoid serious 
Church conflict. 
357 “ Conferência Nacional dos Bispos do Brasil: Continuará com a «Educação de Base»”O Lutador 12 á 
19 de julho de 1964. See also: “Os Bispos do Brasil declaram sobre novo Código Civil e o ‘MEB’” O 
Lutador, 4 de dezembro de 1966. 
358 Pe. J. Batista, “Manifesto dos Bispos do Brasil”, Ibid. 
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government, but was instead a relevant negotiating partner with it. Such agreements 
demonstrate the pragmatism the Church often sought in such situations, but the moves 
also provided the Church a certain degree of protection from accusations of Communism. 
After all, the government would have a difficult time arguing with the seal of one of their 
own departments. 
 
O Lutador developed an economic focus to accompany its theological outlook. Pinta da 
Silva wrote in June that price increases were sapping the ability of businesses to generate 
jobs and were hollowing the stimulus efforts of the government.359  From the weekly’s 
viewpoint, the Russians started the Cold War to impede the Western European economy 
and individualist liberal capitalism. Brazil, in their eyes, constituted Kruschev’s “top 
down” test run to disguise Communism in the highest levels of the Goulart government. 
To counter this allegedly nefarious effort, a “democratic revolution” had to take place to 
defeat the castrista Maoist-influenced guerrillas. The paper counted their dismantlement 
as “the most important event in the Cold War.”360 In another September editorial the 
paper talks about the necessity of a “revolution against the cost of living” threatening that 
complacency could lead the new government to be toppled “by the people.” One 
moralistic proposal to this problem was  the reduction of “exorbitant” salaries of the 
wealthy, import restrictions, and “administrative seriousness.” The author shows 
optimism, saying the situation is nothing like those of old union bosses who “spoke in the 
                                                 
359 Rey Pinta da Silva, “A necessidade de conter a inflação” O Lutador, 14 de junho de 1964. 
360 Flávio Meur, “A guerra fria na América Latina” 23 de agosto de 1964. 
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name of subversion, of his stomach, and his comfort.” The stakes could not be higher for 
the citizenry, as once the economic concerns of the people were brought under control, 
“the rest [i.e the end of subversion, communism, social unrest] would come like a 
charm.”361  Another editorial by Father Casemiro Campos blamed the “misery” of the 
lowest level workers for planting “seeds of subversion” and hoped that free high school 
education with night classes “geared toward our economic reality” could stem the tide of 
ideological warfare.362At the end of the day, economics trumped the social, both as the 
roots problems behind subversion, and the main solutions to the Communist threat. 
 
But by 1965, O Lutador also demonstrated some of the tell-tale signs of double 
allegiances. Although traditional editorials ran on Communism’s threat to the individual, 
polemics against other religious sects such as Spiritism, and a paternalistic view of 
Protestants, the paper started covering the workings of Dom Hélder Câmara in his 
inaugural speech of the Northeastern seminary in Recife.363 Much of the paper’s 
reporting focused on the signing of a new document with bishop Jorge Marcos de 
Oliveira of Santo Andrés, São Paulo calling for the development of the north. The paper 
lauded them as the new pair, “Gregory VII and Ambrose” who would intercede on the 
part of the starving masses (“causing an uprising in the homes”) before the 
                                                 
361 “Revolução contra o aumento dos preços” O Lutador, 6 de setembro de 1964. Writer Décio Dutra asked 
for an “explanation” from the President as to the delays in dealing with reforms and the economic crisis. 
See: Décio Dutra, “Revolução cristã” O Lutador, 8 de novembro de 1964. 
362 Pe. Casemiro Campos, “Sementes de subversão” O Lutador, 16 de julho de 1967. 
363“Diferença entre comunismo e catolicismo” O Lutador, 9 de maio de 1965. See also: Bertrand de 
Margerie “Reencarnação ou Ressurreição?” O Lutador, 9 de maio de 1964. See also: E. Molice, “A igreja 
que dialoga” O Lutador, 11 de abril de 1965. 
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government.364 The figures of Gregory and Ambrose, two giants of religious freedom, 
and both prelates who challenged their respective emperors in a high profile defense of 
the faith, perhaps signaled a shift in the paper’s glowing opinion of the government. 
Perhaps these ancient but symbolic figures also served to stake out the paper’s 
increasingly social, and “accompanying” stance. The initial honeymoon period had worn 
off, and the new government had proved less than efficient in dealing with the crisis.  
O Lutador seemed to fight a two front war at this point however. Its writers refused to 
abandon clear teachings on Communism and continued to hammer home a hard line, 
especially when dealing with errant Church members. Responding to general charges that 
the Church could be moving in a progressive direction, Father Glauco V. Coimbra 
seemed defensive: 
 
No, [subversion] in the Church no. In some unfaithful members yes. Those 
that despise any sort of authority; for those who [think] the worst sin of the 
Church is being a hierarchy. They even attempt to convince society that 
Christ did not institute such a hierarchical community.365 
 
The editors, as they had always done, endowed the fight versus Communism with a new 
                                                 
364 “Dom Hélder, Arcebispo de Olinda e D. Jorge, Bispo de Santo André, assinaram documentos que 
poderíam mudar o face do Brasil” O Lutador, 1 de agosto de 1965. 
365 Pe. Glauco V. Coimbra, “Liberalismo na Igreja” O Lutador 19 de junho de 1966. “Na Igreja não. Em 
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universalizing humanistic discourse. The Soviet Union was only a symptom of the three 
great enemies of the Church: The World, the Devil, and the Flesh, to be combatted by the 
three remaining virtues of St. Paul’s famous Cor. 13 passage: Faith, hope, and charity 
(love). An article against the “modern enemies” of the faith including those women 
“without modesty” influenced by the “press, movies, radio television, and shameless 
interests” that incentivized licentiousness in Brazilian society. 366 
 
Even as the paper held to officially acceptable social questions, they started reporting on 
activism that strayed from the area of social justice to that of outright criticism. O 
Lutador published a challenging speech before the State Assembly of Minas Gerais by 
Alceu Amoroso Lima, the “eminent” Catholic intellectual who condemned an “armed” 
mentality that amounted to “Collective robbery from a hungry world.” Calling for a 
redistribution of wealth and a beginning to a “social revolution”, Lima called on the 
Church to leave its “attack or defense” mentality to live “in the midst, at the service, and 
at the side of all men of goodwill against alienation. [Especially] the alienation of 
underdevelopment.” While this language preaching charity was not new to Catholics, the 
controversial line came earlier when Alceu Lima warned against creeds and instead 
promised to work with “all men of good will, be they Protestants, Spiritists, Communists, 
or Atheists.”367 In another story, the introduction praised Lima for a “homogenous 
                                                 
366 “Os inimigos modernos do Catolicismo” O Lutador, 28 de agosto de 1966. 
367 Antônio Otaviano e Antônio Nilso, “ Alceu Amoroso Lima na assembléia Legislativa de Minas” O 
Lutador, 17 de setembro de 1967. 
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evolution” that maintained his “inner coherence with Christianity” while “placing the 
gospel in the circumstances.” Calling him “an unmatchable man of our times” the paper 
argued his message of peace would not fit well with the guerrillas’ message of salvation 
through armed struggle. Lima, warning of a “Third World War” criticized the violence 
advocated by Communist manifestos, arguing that armed force to end colonialism in the 
Western Hemisphere would only reinforce the most reactionary governments of the 
region through “the greatest consolidation of the military mentality and to the fanaticism 
of the ‘rights’, like we have seen here since 1964.”368  Two interesting questions rise 
from this article: Why did the state assembly, which had been one of the leading 
proponents of the coup, allow Alceu Lima, a known critic of the dictatorship to address 
the assembly? Second, why did a paper with a consistent editorial line that emphasized 
the unity between the government and the Church favorably cover a critic known for his 
divisive statements against the dictatorship? These statements were hardly Communist. 
That said, charges of “fanaticism” from the mouth of an eminent Catholic intellectual did 
not coincide with the paper’s apparent attempt to portray unity with the military 
government on economic and social justice matters. 
 
The paper would move further in the direction of openness, publishing the comments of a 
French journalist, Henri Fesquet, from Le Monde asking the Church to be open to rational 
critiques of its tradition. Rejecting the vision of an “angelic” or “glorious” Church, the 
                                                 
368 “Tristão de Ataíde:«As guerrilhas representariam em nossos países sul-americanos o melhor pretexto 
para consolidar o militarismo»”, O Lutador, 18 de fevereiro de 1968. 
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journalist asked the readers to see the “wheat and the chaff” as well as the “smiles and 
frowns” of the Church without disillusionment. He criticized the Church for taking sides 
in social conflicts especially in the times that the Church “not on the side of the poor.” 
The author praised the Church however for giving women’s dignity, claiming 
“Christianity basically created human love.”369 In January of 1968, the paper also sought 
to distance the Church from purely middle class interests, running an excerpt from the 
book of J. Fernando Carneiro, a leading Catholic writer at the Centro Dom Vital, 
defender of democracy, and critic of authoritarianism during World War II. The 
introduction of the author acknowledged the controversy Carneiro aroused on the right 
wing of the Church “exactly like what happens today with men like Dom Hélder Câmara 
and Tristão de Ataíde.” The article went on to say that Carneiro’s seminal work 
Catolicismo, Revolução e Reações was “unjustly” forgotten and begins with an excerpt 
about the “biggest scandal” of the church. The Church’s problem lay in “the loss of the 
working class” to revolutionary movements because of the “social incomprehension of 
some Catholics that contributes to this historical paradox.”370 In one sense, this article 
represented a continuity of the editorial line. After all, Jacques Maritain as well as Pius 
XI, had lamented the loss of the working class, and praised Leo XIII’s courage in facing 
the social question. From another angle, though, this article represented yet another 
departure from an editorial policy that gives heightened importance to financial stability 
                                                 
369 “ Um grade jornalista católico do «Le Monde»: «Tomara que a Igreja dê o exemplo da coragem 
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370 Citing J. Fernando Cardeiro, “«Compete ao intelectual católico descobrir e denunciar a manobra que 
quer ligar a Igreja á ordem social burgesa»”. O Lutador 7 de janeiro de 1968. 
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and the macroeconomic concerns of the middle class. To allude to Carneiro’s controversy 
also highlights the paper’s own coverage of the controversies surrounding those figures 
that then pushed for a social, if not Communist, revolution. Furthermore, the editorial 
board, commenting on a Conference statement criticizing economic inequality and the 
arrest of several dissident priests, put theology and the Church before the opinions of 
economists. Alleging that the economists that would later criticize the statement “praised 
it and therefore did not understand it” the editors  dismissed criticisms of the Church’s 
renewed political interest as “subversive”, calling them “useful idiots” uninformed of 
Catholic social doctrine. The writers reaffirmed their rights of participation in the 
economic debate, claiming that economists comment on pastoral affairs frequently and 
that “the development of a country is not a simply economic matter” but has to do with 
“human, cultural, moral, psychosocial, and religious aspects….”371  By 1969 O Lutador’s 
outspokenness had moderated a bit, although Alceu Lima’s exploits, from his acceptance 
into the French Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, and the publication of his new 
book Violência ou Não [Violence or No?] an anthology of his then-50 years of literary 
and political criticism. The paper also ran ecumenical articles commenting on Cardinal 
Suenens’ call to be more attentive to the various factions within the Church-such as the 
conflict between the laymen and the hierarchy, as well as the various “particular 
churches”, and even a small article on the ecumenical Taizé community’s gift bible to the 
                                                 
371 Editorial, “O manifesto dos bispos e os economistas” O Lutador, 14 de janeiro de 1968. For context see 
also: “«O desenvolvimento econômico não é tema privativo de economistas, porque diz respeito também á 
justiça social e ao em comum».” Ibid. 
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National Conference of Bishops. 372 The paper still showed its solidarity with the Church 
when the matter of guerillas came up however, standing behind Bishop Rossi after he 
received a death threat and a bomb exploded outside the episcopal palace at the beginning 
of August, calling his alleged calmness during the situation “a fruit of the gospel.”.373 
After the splendidly militant year of 1968, the paper seemed to struggle to find its 
bearings amidst the rising polarization that closed the decade of reform and “Revolution” 
in Brazil. Nevertheless, the paper resisted the pull to one side or the other. 
CONCLUSION: 
The Catholic Church in Brazil began in much the same anticlerical dilemma as other 
Latin American governments with strong liberal governments. However, mild state 
improvements during the Imperial period, coupled with its ability to mobilize a circle of 
highly centralized intellectuals allowed the Church to develop a moderate political wing 
with basic ideological coherence. Because the Church came under fire during the regime 
“of Order”, this ideology did not find its authority in material domination per se but 
rather, in its prophetic and theological mission. This mission sometimes tolerated the 
status quo, but also ran the risk of challenging it directly. What readers saw from O 
Diario and O Lutador was a general chronological and ideological consistency that 
leaned toward a skeptical trial period for the dictatorship in 1964, a full turn towards 
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373 “Terrorismo não aterroriza Cardeal” O Lutador 31 de agosto de 1969. 
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social justice near the end of the Council in 1965, and full on criticism from both papers 
by 1968. Each paper maintained its anti-Communist rhetoric, and praised the free-market 
and fiscally conservative monetary policies of the government placing them high on the 
Church’s social agenda. On the other hand, the voice given to recognized and critical 
authors such as Lima, gave the papers ways to implement subtle, but constant critical 
commentary regarding the regime’s defects and government skirmishes with the Church. 
The papers embraced, as far as they were able, the social solutions offered by left-wing 
groups such as the JOC and MEB. These papers indeed tacked conservative in their 
discourse, but clearly sympathized with a moderate left-wing ideology which they 
allowed to run on their pages. Instead of exclusively advocating for the “cleaning up” of 
subversion, the papers recognized the errors of some individuals, but asked that the 
organizations be spared from the dissent of the few. All in all, the right wing press 
represented here, by the majority of the hierarchy, and a substantial part of the laity 
remains both developmentalist and corporatist. These media outlets expressed at once 
truly democratic ideas as well as overly-eager-to-please governmental placations in 
economic affairs. This study argues that this double role, not a rupture or sudden 
transformation, accounted for the Brazilian Church’s democratic inclination, the same 
political tendency that pushed the  Justice and Peace Commission of the Archdiocese of 
Sao Paulo to resist the silencing of Leonardo Boff in 1985. As  José Oscar Beozzo 
highlights, the Brazilian church, hierarchy and all, had played a crucial role in the twenty-
year dictatorship in circumventing censorship and providing refuge to dissenters. These 
hierarchical figures were not all radicals of Boff’s persuasion, but rather, careful 
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practitioners of democratic values that pushed them to defend even the edgier theologians 
in their ranks.374  Except for notable exceptions, Church figures leaned neither left, nor 
right, nor towards Latin American nationalists. The Brazilian Catholics had encountered 
their exception in the no-man’s land of classic social justice and economic development, 
in the crossfire of the military and the guerrillas. 
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Conclusion:  
Through an analysis of newspaper sources, theological texts, and secondary scholarly work 
on the relationship between the Church and the Argentine and Brazilian dictatorships, this 
work has found notable similarities and stark differences between the Catholic 
intelligentsia in each country. In a global context, the Church both tried to utilize and 
combat the ideas of Modernity. In one sense, they appropriated the administrative ability 
of bureaucracies, but also condemned their lack of humanity. The Vatican both condemned 
the absolutism of the liberal and totalitarian state, and centralized control of the faith in the 
Papacy and Bishops’ conferences. 
The global context in which Argentine and Brazilian Catholic militancy grew was caught 
between Catholic rebirth and the zenith of radical liberalism. The repression of the Catholic 
Church in Mexico during the 1920s seemed far removed from Argentina and Brazil, but 
events in Mexico tested the tolerance and commitment of Catholic writers in those 
countries. Argentine writers saw the Catholic resistance in Mexico as an inspiration for 
their project.  Two prominent Brazilian writers Jackson de Figueiredo and Alceu Lima 
concurred, although they fundamentally disagreed about how far Catholics should go to 
engage anti-clerical states. The former believed that the representatives of liberal states 
precluded dialogue due to their unsalvageable positions. Alceu Lima, even in his more 
conservative years, disagreed, believing that a cultured classical education, civility, and 
dialogue could bridge adversaries even in the midst of persecution.  
Jacques Maritain, who originally embraced ultramontane discourse with conversionary 
zeal, eventually inched toward a more plural application of his political philosophy as he 
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aged. His marriage phased out what triumphalist attitudes he originally held toward 
Judaism.  He became disillusioned with his mentors’ focus on reactionary politics and 
followed the Vatican’s lead in condemning ultra-right wing militants. However, he broke 
from mainstream Catholicism in condemning the seemingly Catholic Spanish uprising in 
1936. He condemned what he saw as the mixture of Scholastic theology with nationalist 
militarism. In particular, he condemned what he saw as the Falangist hypocrisy in bombing 
the heavily Catholic Basque area.375 This philosophical shift did not constitute a rupture in 
philosophical vision as his adversaries accused, but rather a continuation of his distaste for 
an over-politicization of the spiritual (i.e “Holy War”). He also maintained a healthy 
skepticism about Communism and its effects on the human person, although many of his 
strongest words came on the issue of racism and a bourgeoisie which protected its own 
economic interests and made an idol of capitalism. Intellectuals like Julio Meinvielle and 
Alceu Lima embraced the “cultural” authoritarianism of the Franco and Salazar regimes.376 
When Maritain moved to the United States, he radicalized politically, developing a 
relationship with Saul Alinsky in Chicago (he lectured at the University of Chicago), and 
condemning what he saw as the liberal bourgeois order that Charles De Gaulle and the Free 
French Movement represented. He befriended Roosevelt and came to see US democracy 
as an ideal political expression of Catholicism.  
                                                 
375 Maritain was already well known in the United States because the debate over the Spanish Civil War 
had also engulfed the US Catholic community as well, with Commonweal as the main voice of criticism 
against the Falangists and America supporting Franco. 
376 Alceu Lima wrote against Franco and supported Salazar because of what he saw as a tolerance for basic 
liberties in the latter’s regime. 
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As the US entered the Cold War, the Catholic Church developed a complex relationship 
with the United States. On one hand, some episcopal conferences saw the United States as 
a bulwark against Communism, on the other hand, even conservative Catholics, such as 
Leonardo Castellani in Argentina saw the United States as merely a materialist power in 
the region. As the Second Vatican Council arrived, the US influence in Latin America 
became less relevant to the Catholic intelligentsia, which started to wrestle with questions 
of how to apply its large body of social teaching to its local surroundings. Developmental 
language became an important part of the hierarchy’s discourse in Brazil. Such language 
emphasized that material poverty needed to be combatted as a spiritual, as well as a 
practical issue. Some in the Catholic laity reacted against these changes, eventually coming 
to suspect Catholic groups who emphasized social justice of subversive tendencies. 
Intellectuals such as Gustavo Corção rebelled against what they saw as the over-emphasis 
on Church personality in the figures of Hélder Câmara and Lima, insisting that the new 
emphasis on material progress and economic justice without a theological basis was 
leading many Catholic youth groups astray. 
In Argentina, a different tension existed. The militants of the 1930s came from an anti-
State, anti-democratic Catholicism that exalted the role of the military in checking the 
alleged corruption of democratic governance. A Christian Democratic minority existed as 
a substantial minority, and they welcomed Catholic philosopher Jacques Maritain to 
Argentina in 1936 as a philosopher that could bury the “archeological Thomism” of 
traditional Scholasticism. But thinkers like Julio Meinvielle disagreed, taking the side of 
the French Catholic right, and accusing Maritain, like his Jesuit counterpart De Chardin, of 
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Universalist heresy. Despite his training at the Sorbonne, and his earlier friendship with 
Maritain, Leonardo Castellani’s disgust with Argentina’s inept system, as well as his anti-
Semitism, would turn him away from the man he formerly admired. On a larger level, 
militants of the 1930s, instead of turning their anti-modernist tendencies against the ills of 
society, instead entrenched themselves on the minority side at the Council, which wished 
to ratify the pronouncements of the First Vatican Council, but without the theological 
innovations that took place at the pastoral level. This group, far more consolidated in 
Argentina (the 1930s militants had not abandoned their integralist politics, unlike figures 
like Lima and Camara in Brazil), presented a challenge to the next generation of “social 
justice” Catholic thinkers. The latter lacked the intellectual gravitas or will to fully 
transition from their counterparts during this time period, and thus remained as a minority 
within the Church. Without the cover of the hierarchy, left-wing groups would not only be 
harassed by the dictatorship, but rather, by traditionalist bishops within the hierarchy. 
In Brazil the situation was quite different. Alceu Lima, since World War II, had turned 
toward Maritain’s conception of Catholic pluralism possibly, as he would later reveal in 
1966, because he had met Maritain in Buenos Aires in 1936 and been thoroughly 
impressed.377 Lima had become increasingly skeptical of the middle-class protection of its 
economic interests which spawned authoritarianism, which in his mind, spawned chaos 
and a breakdown in civic debate and advancement. While traditional papers such as O 
Diario de Belo Horizonte and O Lutador initially took positions of support vis-a-vis the 
                                                 
377 Tristão de Athyde, “Encontro com Maritain” O Diário 31 de julho de 1966. 
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military regime, their support quickly turned to skepticism as the regime failed to deliver 
on its economic promises and as it stepped up charges of subversion against certain activist 
Catholic groups. Of note in these two mainstream, center-right papers, is the moral 
protection these papers give to groups like Educational Base Movement (MEB), Catholic 
Youth Worker’s Movement (JOC), and several endangered or controversial priests in 
Brazil. The glowing coverage of the Second Vatican Council, and Dom Hélder Câmara in 
particular, showed a paper divided between its loyalty to a middle-class economic program 
(they had supported the 1954 Guatemala Coup), and its commitment to defend the Church 
hierarchy even at costs to its own ideology. While the paper did favorably cover reactionary 
bishops from districts like Sao Paulo, such coverage was rare. On the whole, we see the 
difference in the Argentine Episcopate and CNBB’s treatment of the development and 
social questions even before a “theology of liberation” had been formed. A more 
centralized structure had allowed for figures like Câmara and Lima to more fully control 
the Catholic debate in times of transition and steer the Church in a more progressive 
direction than that of their Argentine counterparts. Even in right-wing media, Lima was 
praised for his fight on behalf of human dignity and his condemnation of the violence that 
authoritarianism (and the corresponding guerrilla movements) had brought down upon 
Brazil’s citizenry. Far from being “a fireman turned arsonist” as Lima joked in his 1980 
interview for Canal Livre, he was rather  a ship navigating the complicated waters of the 
political sphere anchored by his “dialogist” philosophy. 
This study cannot claim to be an exhaustive study of even the majority of Catholic thinking 
in these countries. Other papers such as that run by TPF, and the Catholic papers of Rio de 
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Janeiro need to be examined with closer scrutiny than I was able to give in this paper. 
Similarly, other scholarly sources such as Moenia, El Verbo, Cruz y Fierro, and Azul y 
Blanco, and even Criterio during its progressive years, which were at best alluded to in this 
dissertation, could shed light on an incredibly complex tapestry of Catholic thought in a 
rather fragmented Argentine religious scene. 
This work focused on the victors in each country’s ideological debate, but fruitful inquiry 
would also try to connect and contrast the fates of forgotten Catholics-reactionary in Brazil, 
and progressive in Argentina- that also shaped the modern Catholicism of those countries 
(the Catholic University of Córdoba (UCC) is now, for example, a center for the study of 
international relations and gender theory). However, what this paper has done successfully, 
is muddy the national narrative of why the Argentine Church opted for a radically rightist 
option, and why Brazil ended up being a leading example of a region where the Church 
successfully faced down the dictatorship. In short, if the reader sees that reactionaries 
opposed, on principle, many of the failures of modern liberalism that spawned liberation 
theology, causing the reader to see new bridges between the extremes that bypass “the 
squishy middle”, then this work will have fulfilled its task. 
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